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Abstract 
Since the financial crisis of 2008, corporate governance (CG) has been the focus of much 
attention in the developed countries. One of the main priorities of governments in these 
countries has been to implement CG mechanisms that will improve the practice and 
effectiveness of boards of directors. But while much has been written about CG in 
developed countries, developing countries represent relatively untravelled territory in 
terms of CG research. Libya is the largest oil producer in Africa and its oil revenues form 
a steady stream of income for the country. However, the country ranks low in terms of 
international measures of governance. As an Islamic state, with a population that is 
approximately 97 per cent Sunni Muslim, the prevailing culture, systems, rules and 
regulations are all profoundly influenced by Islamic precepts. Indeed, the Central Bank 
of Libya (CBL) has taken steps towards developing a dual system of conventional and 
Islamic banking.  As such, CG and boards of directors (BODs) in the banking sector are 
highly influenced by Shari’ah law and Shari'ah supervisory boards (SSBs). 
This research aims to examine the practices, roles and responsibilities of BODs in the 
Libyan banking sector (LBS) and to identify the factors that facilitate or hinder boards in 
carrying out these roles and responsibilities. Achieving this overarching aim will help 
bridge a gap in knowledge in terms of the roles and functions of Libyan boards of 
directors. To this end, the research investigates boardroom norms in the banking sector 
in the context of the board’s strategic, service and control and monitoring roles. The main 
goals of this research are to contribute to current literature and to provide insights that 
can be applied to corporate governance practice in Libya and, more broadly, the country’s 
economic development.  
The study adopts a pragmatic paradigm to address its central research questions. A mixed-
method approach was employed: quantitative data was collected by means of a 
questionnaire survey, while semi-structured interviews were conducted to qualitatively 
explore the social processes that shape the roles of boards. 227 questionnaires were 
distributed to 16 Libyan banks (6 public, 6 private and 4 Libyan/foreign). 24 semi-
structured, in-depth interviews were then conducted with board members from each bank 
in the sample; interviewees included chairmen, CEOs and independent non-executive 
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directors. The analysis revealed that a number of key international CG regulations and 
structural features are already in place in the LBS.  
Drawing on the work done by other researchers in developed economies and the results 
from this research, the researcher developed a framework to explain board roles in general 
and how they operate in practice in the LBS. The findings indicate that BODs are 
perceived as playing an important strategic role and that most Libyan directors enjoy this 
role more than the control and service roles. The framework pays particular attention to 
the internal and external factors that impact upon board performance such as board size, 
CEO duality, board independence and board diversity. The impact of SSBs is also 
explored, shedding more light on the roles and responsibilities of the BOD in the context 
of the Islamic banking system.  
This study contributes to both theory and practice, providing some useful insights that 
will bolster the CG literature on developing countries and improve our understanding of 
BOD roles. The findings also support the Libyan government’s reformist agenda, the aim 
of which is to create a more attractive and effective investment environment. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Background and Research Problem 
Over the last few decades, a series of high profile scandals and financial crises have 
propelled corporate governance to the forefront of economic debate. The collapse of a 
number of supposedly reputable institutions, such as the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International in the 1980s and Barings Bank in 1995 (Smerdon, 1998), has highlighted 
the shortcomings in existing corporate governance systems, or aspects thereof, in 
developed countries, but the impact of these financial scandals has also been felt in 
developing countries (Bremer and Elias, 2007) .  
The OECD (2004) defines corporate governance (CG) as the system by which business 
corporations are controlled. This system specifies how rights and responsibilities are 
to be distributed among the various stakeholders in the corporation (e.g. the board, 
managers, shareholders and others) and spells out the rules and procedures for making 
decisions on corporate affairs. The OECD’s definition is widely accepted, but the 
literature also offers a broad continuum of alternative definitions, from the purely 
economic, shareholder-oriented to the purely stakeholder-oriented (Maassen, 2002). 
Supporters of agency theory – the framework used in this research – see corporate 
governance as a function of the relationship between agents and principals (owners or 
shareholders).  
The ongoing debate about the relative efficiency of corporate governance in developed 
market economies such as the USA, UK, Germany and Japan has led many to ask: 
What is the “right” corporate governance mechanism? (John and Senbet, 1998). At the 
same time, the apparent departure from the legal provisions by (and subsequent 
collapse of) several leading financial institutions have prompted some to call for more 
stringent controls over the roles and responsibilities assigned to boards of directors and 
their relationship with management. Stiles and Taylor (2001, p.1) point out that the 
lack of accountability of top management has intensified the impression that boards of 
directors are largely “rubber stamps for management”, while Keasey et al. (1997) 
identify the problem as arising from the separation of beneficial ownership and 
executive decision making in joint-stock companies. According to Brennan (2006), the 
role of the board of directors is to act as trustees for the stakeholders: to formulate 
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strategy, facilitate the acquisition of resources and monitor top managers’ activities 
through the chief executive officer. How effective this will be depends on a number of 
factors, such as board composition and quality.  
As the perceived importance of corporate governance has grown in both developing 
and developed economies, it has become the subject of an expanding body of literature. 
However, as yet, only a few of these studies have focused on CG in banks (e.g. De 
Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Caprio et al., 2007). These studies acknowledge that CG 
is made particularly difficult in financial institutions because of their opacity, 
complexity and high level of regulation. Furthermore, boards in these organisations 
must not only monitor managers efficiently, but also be able to offer them independent 
and valuable advice. 
Chahine and Safieddine (2008) argue that banks in developing countries play a key 
role, not just as resource providers but, also by encouraging effective corporate 
governance in other companies. One report on corporate governance in Morocco, 
Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan found that companies in these countries depend heavily on 
banks for financing (Saidi, 2005). As stakeholders (by lending them money) or 
shareholders (by investing in their stock), the banks then play an active role in ensuring 
the implementation of appropriate codes and/or standards and enhancing internal and 
external corporate governance strategies in these companies. Chahine and Safieddine 
(2008) illustrate this by describing how Lebanese banks have become:  
“…highly involved in a set of their corporate clients’ internal 
corporate governance mechanisms. Lebanese banks sit on or advise 
on the composition of the boards of directors. They insist on more 
quality requirements concerning their corporate clients’ auditing and 
disclosure practices beyond the limited regulatory requirements.” 
(p.259) 
1.2. Justification for Choosing Libya’s Banking Sector 
Although Libya possesses the largest oil reserves in Africa, producing 1.6 million 
barrels of oil per day (around 94% of the country’s foreign exchange) (EIA, 2012; 
CBL, 2010; Pratten and Mashat, 2009), many Libyans live in relative poverty. The 
weakness of the economy was exacerbated by international sanctions in the nineties, 
but since these were lifted by the UN in 2003 (with the US following suit in 2004) 
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(Varoudakis et al., 2006), the Libyan government has enacted a number of economic 
reforms to strengthen the role of the private sector and reduce Libya’s dependence on 
oil as its main source of wealth.  Despite all these changes, however, economic activity 
remains very weak (League of Arab States, 2005).   
The banking sector is one of the most important sectors to have benefited from the 
reforms, since the changes here have in turn helped other sectors to achieve the 
government’s economic goals. The most significant of these reforms has been the 
decision to allow foreign banks to operate in Libya, which has brought new expertise 
and modern banking operations into the country (Libyan State Law No. 1, 2005).  The 
arrival of the Libyan Stock Market (LSM) in 2006 represented another crucial change 
in the Libyan economy. These changes are expected to support the banking sector, the 
investment environment and the internal and external oucomes that regulate business 
in Libya’s banks and financial institutions.  
Although the financial sector in Libya is playing an increasingly important role in the 
country’s economic growth and in shaping its developmental policies, it remains 
underdeveloped compared with banking sectors elsewhere in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region (Saidi, 2005). According to the World Economic Forum  
(Chami et al., 2012, p.17), “Libya had better macroeconomic conditions [in 2010] than 
the regional average, reflecting primarily its record of large fiscal surpluses and low 
debt”. However, it ranked low in terms of international measures of governance. This 
is a matter of concern, since it has been suggested that under-performance and unstable 
banking activity can slow economic growth (Ehtawsh, 2012; IMF, 2013).  
This can be exacerbated in countries such as Libya, where financial markets are often 
weak. Realising that the effectiveness of the banking sector is closely tied to the 
effectiveness of the Libyan economy as a whole, experts are calling for banking market 
reform as part of a wider strategy to improve the Libyan economy (Ehtawsh, 2012). 
Bank failure “can result in systemic crises with adverse consequences for the economy 
as a whole” (Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010, p.189), as has been seen in a number of 
countries. Libyan banks – both public and private – are still unsophisticated by 
international standards in terms of their strategies and operations, but since effective 
corporate governance is crucial to the improvement of Libya’s financial systems, CG 
is high on the agendas of the government and public and private banking institutions 
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(Bengdara, 2007). As Brennan (2006) points out, preferential lending by government-
owned banks to prioritised sectors of the economy in the name of industrial and 
development policy or to politically favoured borrowers is widespread, but this often 
leads to conflicts of interest when the politicians' objectives are incompatible with the 
aim of maximising public economic welfare. Good corporate governance is crucial to 
improve the country’s financial systems, but as yet, the Libyan government has done 
little to support it at the policy level.  
Libya is soon to join the World Trade Organization (Porter and Consultants, 2010), 
making it even more essential for the country to improve corporate governance if it is 
to minimise the risk of corporate failure and attract investment. According to the IMF's 
Country Report (2008) and AFDB Economic Brief (2011), the Libyan authorities have 
already made good progress, particularly in bank restructuring and privatisation. 
However, corporate scandals continue to raise questions about governance in the 
country. There is no doubt that one of the most important tasks facing the Libyan 
banking sector at present is the creation of supportive structures and conditions to 
improve the practice and efficiency of corporate governance in the sector. According 
to Larbsh (2010, p.247):  
“Research on corporate governance in developing economies is still 
limited and has only recently become a major focus of attention for 
academics, international organisations and governments…the role 
and responsibilities of the Board of Directors and the obstacles to 
disclosure and transparency in Libya might be a fertile field of future 
research.”   
1.3. Research Aims and Questions 
This study aims to examine the practices, roles and responsibilities of boards of 
directors in the Libyan banking sector and to identify those internal and external 
factors that facilitate or hinder boards in performing these roles and responsibilities 
effectively. These aims may be broken down as follows: 
1. To explore the actual/current practices, roles and responsibilities of boards of 
directors in the Libyan banking sector. 
2. To study the perceptions of board members concerning their roles and 
responsibilities.  
3. To identify the internal and external factors that affect boards’ performance of 
these roles and responsibilities.  
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4. To ascertain how boards of directors feel they contribute to efficient corporate 
governance in the Libyan banking sector. 
A thorough literature review (see Chapters Two, Three and Four) highlighted the key 
knowledge gaps in terms of CG practice in the Libyan financial sector. This led to the 
development of the following research questions: 
1. What are the international corporate governance regulations regarding the roles 
of the board of directors and how does practice in the Libyan banking sector 
reflect or diverge from these regulations? 
2. How do boards of directors perceive their roles and responsibilities as 
contributing to efficient and effective corporate governance? 
3. What are the factors that facilitate or hinder boards of directors in carrying out 
their roles and responsibilities in the Libyan bank sector ? 
4. What internal corporate governance mechanisms do board members see as 
contributing to efficient corporate governance in Libyan banks? 
1.4. Methodology and Methods 
To address the research questions, a pragmatic approach was adopted. A mixed-
method approach combining both qualitative and quantitative research methods 
allowed triangulation of the findings (Stiles and Taylor, 2001). The data was collected 
via two methods:  questionnaire survey and semi-structured interviews.   
The findings of the literature review guided the design of the questionnaire, the aims 
of which were to provide insight into the nature and characteristics of boards of 
directors in the sample companies and to elicit the attitudes of different groups towards 
current practice. The literature review encompassed previous studies pertaining to 
corporate governance in a range of countries, such as the USA and UK, and guidelines 
issued by professional bodies. Particular attention was paid to the new Libyan State 
Law No. 1, (2010), issued by the Libyan government, and to other legislation 
incorporating elements of the Corporate Governance Code (2010). Data was also 
collected from a number of archival sources, including companies’ annual reports and 
articles of association, bank memoranda, and publications from Libya’s Central Bank, 
private sector publications and government publications. Conceptual analysis was 
employed to compare the findings with current practice among BODs in the Libyan 
banking sector.  
The questionnaire was administered in person to board members, financial managers, 
internal auditors, members of sub-committees, board secretaries and research and 
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development staff. These groups were purposively selected. The questionnaire 
employed a range of question formats, including Likert scales, and the results were 
analysed using SPSS. 
The data gathered via the questionnaire was used to frame the questions for the semi-
structured interviews. These were conducted in the second stage of the research to 
confirm the results obtained from the questionnaire survey and to obtain more specific 
information about corporate governance practices in the Libyan banking sector. They 
allowed deeper exploration of the roles and responsibilities of the board of directors in 
the Libyan context and of the differences between the private and public banking 
sectors. Open-ended questions allowed the respondents to reveal their perceptions 
without constraint. Libya’s banking industry consists of sixteen operating banks, each 
of which is obliged by law to have a managing director/CEO (who may or may not 
serve on the board), a chairman of the board, from three to five executive directors 
(depending on the size of the board) and from three to five non-executive directors. In-
depth interviews were conducted with board chairmen and managing directors of all 
sixteen banks, with the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Libya and with 
representatives from the other surveyed groups. The interviews were transcribed and 
analysed thematically using Nvivo software.  
1.5. Main Findings and Contribution of Thesis to Knowledge 
Drawing on the review of the relevant literature, the results of the empirical study and 
the researcher’s observation, the following are the study’s main findings: 
1. Libyan banks have already incorporated a number of key international CG 
principles into their own practice, despite the fact that CG is still seen as a new 
concept for Libya and one that requires more attention. 
2. This study has developed a framework that is more relevant to an emerging 
market such as the LBS. Furthermore, this theoretical framework has been 
empirically tested. 
3. BODs and executive managers in most Libyan banks have so far paid 
insufficient attention to the improvement of corporate governance, and there 
are still CG failings within the banking sector.  
4. The board is perceived as playing an important strategic role. Most directors 
enjoy this role more than the control and service roles. 
5. The effect of internal and external factors such as board size, composition, 
diversity and structure are issues of significant concern for boards in the LBS. 
Ownership structure has a strong, direct effect on board roles in all three 
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sectors, and the involvement of foreign partners has had a significant effect on 
the development of board roles and corporate governance in the LBS.  
6. Islamic law has a major effect on corporate governance practice and BOD 
decisions. These decisions must take into account the wish of traders and 
clients that transactions be conducted according to Islamic law. 
7. The weakness of the legal framework and the accounting profession, low levels 
of disclosure and transparency, and an unstable managerial environment are 
the major impediments preventing BODs from carrying out their roles 
effectively. 
8. The Shari’ah committee has influence on executive management and supports 
the board’s three roles by giving guidance and preparing control reports. It 
facilitates the application of governance principles. Most Islamic bank 
managers in the sample explained that Islamic banks work in the same way as 
commercial ones, but provide products and services which conform to Islamic 
rules. 
 
The main contribution of this study is that it is one of the first to attempt to examine 
board roles and the factors affecting board performance in the Libyan banking sector. 
The link between board composition and firm performance has been examined 
exhaustively in western literature (Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009), but less corporate 
governance research has been conducted in Islamic countries such as Libya, making 
these countries a potential arena for investigation (De Andres and Vallelado, 2008; 
Bremer and Elias, 2007). It is hoped that this study will open the door for more research 
in this area, and that the findings will not just be of interest to the Libyan academic 
community, but that they will also help Libya in its journey to becoming a market 
economy. It has been argued that as the factors shaping the mechanisms of corporate 
governance vary from country to country, so too will the resulting CG framework (El 
Mehdi, 2007; Hussain and Mallin, 2002; Okike, 2007). This is the theoretical basis of 
the current study, which contends that corporate governance in Libya cannot be 
explained using frameworks designed for other countries. By focusing on the specific 
context of the LBS, the study addresses a gap in the corporate governance literature, 
but this also enables it to examine the discrepancies between theory and practice.  
Finally, the study seeks to give some insight into CG provision within the Islamic 
banking system. In recent years, many Libyan banks have introduced Shari'ah 
supervisory boards (SSBs) into their systems to ensure that all activities and 
transactions are in harmony with Shari'ah precepts (Islamic laws). However, little 
attention has been given to the impact of these supervisory boards on the performance 
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of boards of directors, either in general or specifically in Libya. The current study, 
therefore, seeks to enrich the corporate governance literature by looking at how SSBs 
support the board of directors in its role as an internal CG mechanism. 
1.6. Personal Perspective 
Before embarking on an academic career, the researcher worked as a manager at one 
of Libya’s major banks and sat on boards in both public and private companies. In 
more than ten years as a board member, the researcher encountered several 
governance-related challenges. These experiences have led him to look for ways to 
apply theoretical perspectives to practical experience and have been a critical 
motivation for this study. 
1.7. Overview of the Research  
The first chapter introduces the background to the research and outlines the research 
problem before discussing the study’s aims and presenting the research questions. The 
methodology and methods that were applied are briefly discussed. The chapter then 
discusses the various ways in which the study aims to contribute to our understanding 
and knowledge. It concludes with a summary of the structure of the thesis. 
The literature is reviewed in Chapters Two, Three and Four. Chapter Two describes the 
development of the Libyan business environment and banking sector and discusses the 
role of private and public banks in the Libyan economy. This chapter also outlines the 
legal framework governing CG and the board’s role in the LBS. 
Chapter Three focuses on the definitions and theories of corporate governance and 
describes the main CG models that have been developed in accordance with the OECD 
Principles: these are the Anglo-American model (the unitary system) and the German 
model (the dual system). The chapter then discusses corporate governance in 
developing countries and from the Islamic perspective.  
Chapter Four focuses on the roles and responsibilities of corporate boards. It defines 
the BODs’ service, control and strategic roles and considers the internal and external 
factors that are reported to affect board effectiveness.  
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Chapter Five describes the methodology and methods that were deployed to answer 
the research questions. It discusses the various data collection methods, including the 
selection of the population sample, the design, piloting and administration of the 
questionnaire survey, and the interviews. 
Chapter Six is allocated to the descriptive analysis of the results of the questionnaire 
survey and interviews. This section focuses specifically on the first two research 
questions; it examines the extent to which current international guidelines regarding 
the board’s strategic, control and service roles are reflected in practice in the LBS, and 
it highlights how board members perceive the BODs’ role and responsibilities in terms 
of control, service and strategy. Any differences between the private, foreign and 
public banking sectors are highlighted and discussed. 
Chapter Seven aims to answer the first, third and fourth research questions by 
examining the factors that facilitate or hinder the BODs’ performance of its roles and 
those internal corporate governance mechanisms that board members feel contribute 
to efficient corporate governance in the LBS. The chapter also discusses the 
respondents’ perceptions regarding some of the issues that emerged in the experimental 
data. 
Chapter Eight summarises the findings and compares them to the findings discussed 
in the literature review. The chapter acknowledges the limitations of the study and 
discusses its contribution to knowledge and its implications for professional practice 
and policy. The model of board roles is also presented in this final chapter. It concludes 
with a number of recommendations and suggestions for future research. 
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Figure 1-1 Structure of the thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One  
Introduction 
Chapter Two  
The Libyan Context 
 
Chapter Three 
The nature of corporate governance 
 
Chapter Four: Corporate Boards, the 
roles and responsibilities of the board 
 
Chapter Five 
Research methodology 
 
Chapter Six: The Role and 
Responsibility of the Board of 
Directors in Libya banking sectors. 
Chapter Seven : Corporate 
governance and Factors that 
facilitate or hinder  Libyan 
boardrooms’ effectiveness. 
Chapter Eight  
Summary and Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Shalba 2016 11 
 
Chapter 2: The Libyan Context 
2.1. Introduction  
Before discussing the theoretical framework of the study, it is important to give an 
insight into its context. The main purpose of this chapter is to assess the extent to which 
current board practice in the Libyan banking sector reflects international corporate 
governance guidelines. The chapter presents an overview of Libya's economic 
environment, including the development of economic reform in the country, before 
focusing specifically on the banking sector. The chapter describes the ownership 
structure of the sector, the development of the banking system and the development of 
Islamic banking in Libya. It concludes by discussing the legal framework as it relates 
to CG in the sector, and the extent to which this reflects international CG principles. 
2.2. General Background 
Before the discovery of oil, Libya was one of the world’s poorest countries (Altunisik, 
1995). The Libyan economy was agriculture-based until the early 1970s, when the 
government began the drive towards economic development (Agnaia, 1997). The 
economy, which is centrally managed, relies on the oil sector as its main source of 
income – the country has virtually no other resources (Selway, 2000). According to 
Chami et al. (2012), oil revenues account for about 90% of total revenues for the 
government. Despite the discovery of oil, however, many Libyans continue to live in 
relative poverty. Libya’s socialist transformation, which took place in the eighties, 
accumulated serious economic problems for the country; economic activity became 
paralysed and living standards for many were low. The majority of the population 
depended on the state for salaries and pensions from the public treasury. The economy 
was further damaged by international sanctions in the nineties. Since these were lifted 
in 2003 (with the US following suit in 2004) (Varoudakis et al., 2006), the Libyan 
government has enacted a number of economic reforms to strengthen the role of the 
private sector. Despite all these changes, however, economic activity remains very 
weak and there are still restrictions on the transfer of funds into and out of Libya 
(League of Arab States, 2005).   
The reform programme itself has not been without problems. As the legislation 
pertaining to economic activity has proliferated, problems have emerged; articles 
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contradict each other or are ambiguous, making implementation difficult, and there are 
too many bodies trying to enforce them. More importantly, all this legislation has done 
little to ensure that companies provide their shareholders with accurate and timely data. 
Furthermore, Libyan banks – both public and private – are still unsophisticated by 
international standards in terms of their strategies and operations.  
Since effective corporate governance is crucial to the improvement of Libya’s financial 
systems, CG is high on the agendas of government and public and private banking 
institutions (Bengdara, 2007).  Libya is also under pressure to improve CG because 
one of the ways it is seeking to overcome its economic problems is by opening its 
doors to investors from developed countries (Porter and Yergin, 2006). An effective 
CG system is vital to reassure both internal and external investors that they and their 
rights are fully protected. 
2.2.1. Overview of the Libyan Environment 
Located in north-east Africa, Libya covers an area of around 1.76 million square 
kilometres. Although possessing a relatively small population of around 6.2 million, 
Libya is the fourth-largest country in Africa (and approximately half the size of 
Europe) (Oxford Business Group, 2008; Pratten and Mashat, 2009). Chad and Niger 
are positioned to the south and south-west of Libya; Egypt and Sudan to the east; 
Algeria to the west; and Tunisia to the north-west. The majority of the population 
speaks Arabic. Unlike many other Arab countries, Libya is home to numerous 
religions, but the majority of Libyans (97%) are Sunni Muslim and members of the 
Malikite sect (Mashat, 2005). The culture is profoundly influenced by Islam, and there 
is a strong belief in personal privacy and family values (Oxford Business Group, 
2008). 
Libya's wealth lies in oil and gas production. As Figure 2.1 (EIA, 2012) shows, it 
possesses the largest oil reserves in Africa, producing 1.6 million barrels of oil per day 
(around 94% of the country’s foreign exchange) (CBL, 2010; Pratten and Mashat, 
2009). The country’s close proximity to Europe makes its oil industry particularly 
attractive to international companies. According to Mashat (2005), Libya is:   
“a developing country which has experienced dynamic changes over 
a short period of time. One of Europe's biggest North African oil 
suppliers and an active member of OPEC, crude oil at very low cost 
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might mean that this country possesses a significant world economic 
standing.” (p.11)   
Figure 2-1: African proved oil reserve holders, 2012 
 
 
Figure 2-2: The oil production stream in Libya, 2000-2012 
 
 Source: EIA (2012)  
 2.2.2. Historical Development of Economic Reform in Libya 
The reform programme since 2005 has been driven by the government’s decision to 
move away from its ownership role to that of a prudent regulator. With technical 
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assistance from international institutions and private consulting firms, it is 
restructuring the entire economy, diversifying it away from oil and promoting the role 
of the private sector. It has, for example, reduced interest rates to encourage demand 
for loans by the private sector, encouraged domestic and foreign private investment, 
developed new tax and customs privileges for publically listed institutions and reduced 
taxes on imports (Twati and Gammack, 2006). The move towards privatisation and 
restructuring of the public sector has seen the transfer of company ownership from the 
state to employees and the general public. Investment promotion policies, civil sector 
engagement in all economic activities and the reduction of government expenditure 
are all part of the government’s strategy to improve the effectiveness of the Libyan 
economy. Reflecting this shift in economic policy, a private investment boom is 
underway and the private sector’s share in the economy is growing at a rapid pace. In 
2009, Libya’s integration into the global economy took a step forward when Standard 
& Poor and Fitch gave it investment ratings of A-stable/A-2 and BBB/stable 
respectively (CBL, 2010). Considerable progress has already been made in liberalising 
and opening up the economy, and the government is committed to accelerating and 
broadening the reform process in the years ahead (CBL, 2010).  
The banking sector is one of the most important sectors to have benefited from the 
reforms, since the changes here have in turn helped other sectors to achieve the 
government’s economic goals. The most significant of these reforms has been the 
decision to allow foreign banks to operate in Libya, which has brought new expertise 
and modern banking operations into the country (Law No. 1/2005). The arrival of the 
Libyan Stock Market (LSM) in 2006 represented another crucial change in the Libyan 
economy. These changes are expected to support the banking sector, the investment 
environment and the internal and external outlines that regulate business in Libya’s 
banks and financial institutions. (External outlines include economic factors, the laws 
and regulations governing stock companies, and the accounting and auditing 
profession, while internal outlines refer to the practices and procedures applied inside 
the firm which derive from external outlines) and its articles of association. These 
articles determine the relationship between stockholders, the relationship between the 
stockholders and the firm, that between the firm and its board of directors and between 
the firm and external authorities. 
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2.2.3. The Libyan Stock Market 
Developing countries are associated with low real income and low income per capita. 
As such, the expansion of capital is difficult. The stock market is one of the main tools 
for attracting the financial resources needed for economic development; it creates new 
investment opportunities, offers a range of financial resources and fosters an 
environment good for investment, thanks to privatisation and investment promotion 
policies. The first step towards setting up a Libyan stock market was the issuance by 
the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) of Decree No. 9 in 2004. Libya’s stock market is still 
relatively small and new, but it should nevertheless help regulate the disclosure of 
accounting and financial information, improve control and therefore raise investors’ 
trust, especially as it operates according to international accounting and auditing 
standards (until national standards can be issued). A new stock market law (No. 
1/2010) was issued in 2010 with the aims of further facilitating registration, 
accelerating dispute resolution and increasing foreign participation. Overseeing the 
LSM is a national stock market commission, which is responsible for managing market 
transactions and protecting investors from fraud and deficient financial reporting. 
2.2.4. Libya’s Accounting Profession 
In most developing countries, accounting practice is not aligned with modern 
accounting concepts either theoretically or practically. In their respective studies of 
accounting practice in Libya, Beitul-Mal (1990) found that accounting principles and 
procedures are not applied consistently even by similar companies, while Mustafa 
(2009) concluded that auditing procedures are applied only on figures other than 
accountability. Auditing operations focus on final budget and income statements, and 
auditing reports are adversely affected by the lack of domestic accounting and auditing 
standards. This results in incomplete and unreliable accounting information which is 
ineffective for analysis and decision-making purposes. 
As the trend towards privatisation continues, investors in Libya are searching for 
predictable economic environments which offer trusted systems and low levels of risk. 
By putting pressure on boards of directors to improve accounting/auditing information 
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and systems, shareholders are not only helping improve governance, they are also 
helping to raise the standard of performance of the accounting profession. 
2.2.5. Ownership Structure  
Prior to 1993, ownership structure in Libya was such that the government dominated 
the primary public utilities and services; since then, however, private companies have 
been allowed to enter various economic sectors, including the banking sector, and there 
are now 32 companies listed on the LSM. The majority of Libyan banks now have 
three groups of shareholders: the state, private block-holders and foreign/other Libyan 
banks (see Table 2.1). Libyan regulations mandate the disclosure of ownership where 
this exceeds 10% of the bank as well as board ownership. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that ownership structure is an important determinant 
of corporate governance practice. Where ownership is concentrated, for example, large 
owners are additionally incentivized to take an active interest in the firm and to monitor 
its managers (Pederson and Thomsen, 1997) – although Prowse (1998) suggests that 
large institutional shareholders may be lax about protecting their interests if they have 
governance problems of their own. On the other hand, tensions may arise between 
large shareholders and other stakeholders (exacerbating the agency problem). Highly 
concentrated ownership may also make important mechanisms of shareholder 
participation – such as voting during shareholder meetings – less effective. If general 
assemblies are perceived to be less democratic, this may have an impact on the 
attendance of other shareholders. This is likely to make reforming corporate 
governance even more difficult. 
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Table 2-1: The ownership structure of Libya’s commercial banks 
Source: adapted from CBL (2012) 
2.3. Libya’s Banking Sector 
The banking sector makes a major contribution to the Libyan economy, but its reform 
is also helping other sectors to achieve the economic goals of the state. The reform of 
the Libyan banking sector (LBS) began in 1993, when the General People's Congress 
issued Law No. 1/1993, which dealt with banks, monetary issues and credit. This law 
allowed Libyan private banks and foreign banks to enter the Libyan banking market, 
in accordance with its terms and under the supervision of the CBL. This was followed 
in 2005 by Law No. 1/2005. This law facilitated the development of banking 
operations in Libya by encouraging more private banks to enter the market. Over the 
next few years, four of Libya’s public banks became privatised, and the CBL issued 
its approval for foreign banks to open representative offices in Libya. As the country’s 
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economic reforms got underway, these early steps were designed to support the 
investment environment.  
The last five years have witnessed a major transformation of Libya’s banking 
infrastructure with further privatisations, mergers, initial public offerings and the 
opening of foreign banks – of the seventeen commercial banks currently licensed in 
the country, four have strategic foreign partners. A new CBL structure has now been 
finalised. This will bolster the monetary policy framework and banking supervision 
and also help in establishing an organisational structure. 
2.3.1. The Central Bank of Libya (CBL) 
The CBL is the supreme monetary authority in Libya. It is an independent financial 
institution wholly owned by the government. Government laws, most recently Law 
No. 1/2005, define the CBL’s purposes as being to maintain monetary stability and 
facilitate the growth of the national economy. The CBL issues bank notes, monitors 
the banking system and oversees banking activity in general. As the government’s 
bank, it shares responsibility for designing the country’s monetary and fiscal policies. 
As the banks’ bank, it issues loans to commercial banks and other credit institutions.  
The CBL’s role is to regulate credit and banking policy and supervise its 
implementation within the framework of the government’s general policy. A 
programme of institutional reform has underpinned Libya’s transformation; at its core 
is the development and restructuring of the banking sector. Since 2005, the CBL has 
been gradually liberalising the entire banking system with the aim of restructuring and 
modernising the commercial banks. An important component of the CBL’s strategy 
has been to open the Libyan market gradually to foreign banks in order to develop the 
Libyan banking sector and improve its regional and international competitiveness 
(CBL, 2010). 
2.3.2. Public Commercial Banks 
The first public commercial banks were established in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
following changes to the political system in Libya. The credit market in Libya is 
heavily reliant on commercial banks, both public and private. Both types of bank 
provide traditional banking services such as the cashing of cheques made out to and 
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by customers; services relating to documentary credits, documents for collection and 
letters of credit; and the issuance and management of instruments of payment, 
including monetary drawings, financial transfers, payment and credit cards and 
travellers’ cheques. The bank’s deposits represent the main financial resources in 
commercial banks.  
2.3.3. Private Commercial Banks 
Law No. 1/1993 on banks, cash and credit allowed for the first time the establishment 
of private banks in Libya. The introduction of private banks has raised the quality of 
banking services in Libya as competition has replaced the public sector monopoly. 
However, these banks are still in the early stages of growth and, as yet, account for 
only a small percentage of the volume of the Libyan banking market (CBL, 2006). 
2.3.4. Libyan/Foreign Banks (Mixed Ownership) 
Law No. 1/1993 allowed foreign banks to start activities in the Libyan market, 
although this was limited to the opening of representative offices only. Law No. 1/2005 
went further by declaring (in Article 67-3) that the CBL may permit the establishment 
of banks with foreign capital. It may also permit foreign banks to hold shares in 
domestic banks and to open branches or offices in Libya according to the terms and 
conditions established by the Board of Directors of the CBL, providing the head office 
of the foreign bank has a specific nationality, the bank is subject to the supervision of 
the monetary authority in the country where the head office is located, and the capital 
allocated for the branch's activity in Libya is at least $50 million. After the issuance of 
Law No 1/ 2005, the Governing Council of the CBL began to take practical steps to 
enable foreign banks to open representative offices in Libya. For example, Resolution 
No. 41, issued on 14/09/2006, authorised three foreign banks to open offices: these 
were BNP Paribas, HSBC and the Arab International Bank of Tunisia (CBL, 2006).  
2.3.5. Specialised Banks 
According to paragraph (ii) of Article 65 of Law No. 1/2005, a specialised bank is an 
entity whose main purpose is to finance and grant credit for specific activities and 
whose basic activities do not include the acceptance of demand deposits. This type of 
bank was created to finance specific types of activity such as mortgages, or agricultural 
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or industrial projects. As such, they play a limited role in the credit market. They 
provide credit only to group members, or they are mainly savings institutions. This 
study does not include specialised banks because they operate differently from other 
commercial banks. 
 2.4. Historical Development of the Libyan Banking System  
The development of the banking system in Libya may be linked to the political changes 
that have taken place in the country and beyond; each of these changes, whether 
positive or negative, has had a considerable impact on the development of the sector. 
At each stage, the importance of the sector has increased and its impact on the national 
economy has grown. The key stages in the development of the sector may be broken 
down as follows: 
Phase (1) from 1993 to 2005: This phase was a result of the huge changes in the 
banking sector at the international level, including bank restructuring and the 
emergence of so-called universal banks. The quality of services offered by these 
organisations was one of the factors that prompted the restructuring of the Libyan 
economy and the trend towards privatisation. A number of laws were issued allowing 
private companies to operate in various economic sectors, including Law No. 1/1993, 
which permitted private and foreign banks to open branches in Libya (CBL, 2010). 
Phase (2) from 2005 to 2010: This stage was the beginning of the move towards 
economic liberalisation and market-oriented competitiveness following the issuance 
of Law No. 1/2005. This law stipulated that commercial banks must take the form of 
Libyan joint-stock companies with paid-up capital of at least 10 million Libyan Dinars 
(LD) divided into shares, where the value of shares shall not exceed 10 million LD. 
The shares may be held by individuals, or by public or private legal entities, according 
to the rules and conditions stipulated by the CBL. The implementation of this law saw 
foreign banks enter into partnerships with local banks, the integration of many banks 
and the privatisation of others, and an overall diversification of banking services. 
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Table 2-2: Structure of Libyan commercial banking sector at the end of 2004 
Amounts are in million LD.      Source: CBL (2009) 
The most important developments to take place in this period are outlined below (CBL, 
2010): 
1. Resolution No. 58/2006 by the CBL’s Board of Directors approved the merger 
of 41 regional banks to create the National Banking Corporation. The new bank 
became the largest private commercial bank in the Libyan market. 
2. Resolution No. 9/2007 by the CBL’s Board of Directors approved the merger 
of three more regional banks with the National Banking Corporation. The 
merger allowed these three private banks to satisfy the capital criteria so they 
could continue to operate. 
3. In 2007, the CBL granted licences to six new private banks to operate in a 
manner consistent with Law No. 1/2005. 
4. BNP Paribas was chosen by the Libyan authorities to become the strategic 
partner of the Sahara Bank in July 2007. The Sahara Bank was partly 
privatised, with BNP Paribas holding a 19% stake and management contracts. 
BNP Paribas was given the option to raise its stake to 51% within three to five 
years if the reform measures and benchmarks agreed on with the CBL at the 
time of sale were met. 
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5. Resolution No. 3/2007 by the CBL’s Board of Directors authorised the sale of 
the CBL’s shares in the capital of the Wahda Bank. Following the successful 
conclusion of the deal to privatise the Sahara Bank, the CBL declared that 
BADEA (the Arab Bank) would be its strategic partner in the privatisation of 
the Wahda Bank on 13/02/2008. The Arab Bank paid 210 million euros for a 
19% stake in the bank. It subsequently assumed control of the management of 
the Wahda Bank and increased its equity holdings to 51%.  
6. In accordance with the CBL board’s strategic plan for restructuring Libya’s 
banking sector, Resolution No. 50/2007 authorised the merger of the 
Gumhouria and Umma banks. The new bank became the largest public 
commercial bank in Libya.  
7. Resolution No. 1/2008 by the CBL’s board authorised the establishment of a 
joint Libyan Qatari Bank, following agreement between the Qatar National 
Bank and the CBL to establish a joint bank with shared capital. 
8. On 11/05/2008, an agreement was reached between the National Bank of Abu 
Dhabi (United Arab Emirates) and the CBL to set up the First Gulf Libyan 
Bank (FGLB). Resolution No. 23/2008 of the CBL’s Board of Directors 
authorised the establishment of the bank. The FGLB is now a fully-fledged 
commercial bank based in Tripoli. Ownership of the bank is shared equally 
between the Economic and Social Development Fund of Libya and the First 
Gulf Bank, one of the UAE's leading financial institutions with headquarters 
in Abu Dhabi and assets of over $28 billion. The authorised capital of FGLB is 
$400 million and the paid up capital is $200 million, making it one of the larger 
equity-based banks in Libya.  
2.5. The Development of Islamic Banking in Libya 
Islamic principles govern all aspects of a Muslim’s life, including “…the conduct of 
business and commerce. Muslims ought to conduct their business activities in 
accordance with the requirement of their religion to be fair, honest and just towards 
others” (Lewis, 2001, p.108).  Libya was one of the first countries to codify Islamic 
Shari’ah law and incorporate it into its legislative system (Alzoreiky, 2010; Grassa 
2015). In the early days of its independence from Italy, Libya drew on the legislation 
of a number of other states to create its own legislative framework. However, much of 
this outside legislation was incompatible with Shari’ah law, so in 1969 the Libyan 
legislature appointed a committee of Shari’ah scholars to review and, where necessary, 
amend existing commercial and civil legislation to bring it into line with the principles 
of Islamic law.  These changes marked the beginning of the legislature’s efforts to 
modify individuals’ business dealings to bring them into line with the provisions of 
Shari’ah. The injunction against usury – reinforced by the urgings of preachers and 
clerics – made many citizens reluctant to deal with conventional banks, and in the years 
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since then, there has been growing public demand for Libyan banks to adopt working 
practices consistent with the provisions of Shari’ah law (Alzoreiky, 2010). 
While post-Arab Spring changes in the political agenda have led several Arab 
countries to Islamise their financial systems to some degree, the Libyan transitional 
government (CBL, 2012) had chosen to pursue a policy of full Islamisation even before 
the events of 2011. This represents a radical change in strategy compared to previous 
regimes, though care has been taken to implement it “step-by-step” (Alzoreiky, 2010). 
The shift towards Islamic banking started with the opening of designated windows 
within traditional commercial banks. These provided Islamic banking services and 
products through separate and independent offices administered by the Supervisory 
Board of Islamic Banking. In the second phase, banks set up designated branches to 
carry out Islamic banking activities. These branches had their own financial centres 
and specialist managers. In phase three, following the issuance of Banking Act No. 
1/2005 (Article 16), traditional branches transferred over to the Islamic banking system. 
Alzoreiky (2010) argues that this gradual changeover allowed the philosophy of 
Islamic banking to become gradually integrated with the traditional banking system 
and encouraged coexistence rather than confrontation between the two systems. This 
strategy has been successful in a number of Muslim countries. 
In a survey conducted among ordinary Libyans, Alhajam (2013) found strong popular 
support for the implementation of Islamic banking, since most Libyans prefer to avoid 
interest-based banking transactions. He concluded that: "The majority of respondents 
believe that the former regime was responsible for the underdevelopment of the 
Islamic banking and finance sector in Libya" (p.1). Alhajam’s respondents expressed 
the view that Islamic banks will contribute significantly towards social development 
through their corporate social responsibility activities; indeed, some believed that the 
government should regulate these banks in terms of their delivery of social 
programmes.  
As the demand for Islamic products grows in Libya, more and more of the country’s 
banks are offering Islamic products and services (though they all continue to offer 
conventional services). According to the CBL, nine out of the sixteen banks in Libya 
now provide some kinds of Islamic products and Islamic windows (CBL, 2012). 
Gumhouria Bank is a leading bank providing Islamic products, with 24.65 billion LD 
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in assets under management (Gumhouria Bank, 2012). The Sahara Bank has also 
adopted a strategy to establish branches that provide purely Islamic products for its 
customers, while Bank Suath of Afrikah is moving towards a full focus on Islamic 
banking (CBL, 2010). Discussing the recent trend towards Islamic banking, the 
Governor of the CBL (2012) said that the Central Bank supports the development of 
Islamic products and services. 
Unlike conventional banks, Islamic banks must follow Islamic teaching, which 
prohibits Riba, Gharar and any transaction that does not comply with Islamic rules. 
Vogel and Hayes (1998, p.114) explain that: "…Islamic law has many complex rules, 
all designed to avoid Riba and Gharar". According to the Hadith (SAW) of Prophet 
Mohammed (peace be upon him), every loan that attracts a benefit is Riba (Vogel and 
Hayes (1998) argue that “loan” means the loan of fungibles, including money). This 
benefit, or interest, is considered unfair and exploitative. In Islam, money may not be 
used as a commodity in this way; as the risk is not being shared equitably between the 
lender and the borrower, the interest is effectively “…profit which has not been earned" 
(Belalet al., 2014, p.3). It is beyond the scope of the current study to discuss the details 
of this particular debate within Islamic banking, but this brief explanation may give 
some insight into the issues facing boards of directors in the LBS. 
2.5.1. Special Provisions in Islamic Banking Windows 
Under Law No. 1/2005 and its 2012 amendment (Law No. 47/2012), Islamic banks 
and Islamic windows must provide banking services and engage in financial practices 
that are consistent with the provisions of Islamic Shari’ah law. Accordingly, the CBL’s 
Decree No. 9/2010 sets out rules and principles for offering Shari’ah-compliant 
banking services in Libyan commercial banks (Grassa, 2015). These services must 
include: accepting clients’ funds into current accounts1; accepting investors’ funds into 
joint, no strings attached and dedicated investment accounts; funding economic 
                                                 
1 The 2012 amendment gives Islamic bank current account holders of not less than three years 
standing the right to attend general assembly meetings as observers and to choose one of their 
number to represent them on the board of directors. 
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activities in ways that do not contravene the provisions of Islamic Shari’ah law, for 
example through Mudharabah and Musharakah contracts, as authorised by the bank’s 
compliance and control body and approved by the Central Authority for Shari’ah’h 
Compliance and Control; investing clients’ funds in joint investment accounts in 
accordance with the Mudharabah system or according to a special agreement with the 
client; and undertaking direct or financial investment for Islamic banks or for other 
banks or joint ventures.  Article 100b of Act No. 47/2012 prohibits Islamic banks from 
taking “interest on debts whether incurred or paid in all cases of borrowing or 
depositing, depending on the fatwa of the Shari’ah supervisory board”.  
Under Decree No. 9/2010 and Article 100 of Act No. 47/2012, Islamic banks are 
required to appoint a Shari’ah supervisory board comprising a minimum of three 
experts in Islamic Shari’ah law and Islamic banking (though in practice, some banks 
rely on a single advisor) (Grassa, 2015). These scholars are highly regarded for their 
integrity and honesty, and respected for their knowledge of the Qur'an and Sunnah 
(Banaga et al., 1994). The board’s members are appointed and remunerated by the 
BOD (Grassa, 2015).  Initial appointments are for three years and members may be 
reappointed. They must be chosen from among those listed in the CBL’s register of 
control teams, and no one can serve on more than one board. The Shari’ah supervisory 
board is responsible for monitoring the business activities and operations of the bank 
to ensure they are not in breach of the provisions of Islamic Shari’ah law, and for 
reviewing the bank’s budgets and final accounts – this includes verifying how well the 
bank is performing against criteria set by the Central Shari’ah Supervisory Board2. The 
supervisory board must also be ready to carry out any other duties assigned to it by the 
CBL. Table 2.3 sets out the respective duties of the board of directors and the SSB. 
In addition to the obligations set forth in Article 83 of Law No. 1/2005 regarding 
auditors and compliance, any bank engaging in Islamic banking activities is also 
required to have a Shari’ah auditing and review department. This department is under 
the direct supervision of the board of directors, who also appoint its manager (on 
                                                 
2 The Central Shari’ah Supervisory Board (which is appointed and paid for by the CBL) 
consists of five specialists in Islamic Shari’ah law and three experts from the fields of 
economics, law and banking. It has authority over all local Shari’ah supervisory boards. 
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recommendations from the head of the department or two board members). The 
department’s duties include: auditing and reviewing the bank’s daily operations, in 
accordance with international auditing standards for scrutinising Islamic banking 
operations; preparing periodic and quarterly reports for the bank’s board of directors 
and a financial report for its Shari’ah supervisory board; and liaising between the 
administration in the bank, the Shari’ah supervisory board and the external auditor.  
The bank’s Islamic banking department is supervised by the general manager of the 
bank. The department is entrusted with a number of tasks, including the application of 
Islamic financial activities and coordination with other departments to ensure the 
independence of Islamic banking. 
Table 2-3: Roles of the board of directors and SSB 
 
2.6. The Libyan Legal Framework and Corporate Governance  
Corporate governance is important in developing countries, especially in countries like 
Libya which are undergoing major economic change but which are still deeply rooted 
in the social and economic structures of the past (Faraj and El-Firjani, 2014). There 
has been a significant increase in the number of foreign investors wishing to learn more 
about the nature and extent of Libyan corporate governance, and the country has come 
under pressure from the World Trade Organization (WTO) to improve its corporate 
governance systems so that it can be opened up to international competition (Porter 
and Yergin, 2006). This, on top of the general concern being expressed about corporate 
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governance in developed and developing countries alike, has prompted the Libyan 
government to issue CG guidelines for the banking sector. However, according to Mr 
Ahmmed Ragab, the General Manager of the Gumhouria Bank, corporate governance 
is still in its early stages in Libya. The guidelines issued by the CBL in 2006 and 
amended in 2010 are considered essential reading for boards of directors in 
commercial banks, but they are neither mandatory nor legally binding; they do no more 
than promote responsible and transparent behaviour in line with international best 
practice (CBL, 2012). Even so, Libyan banks, both listed and unlisted, are required to 
disclose in their annual report which provisions have been implemented and which 
have not, and to explain the reasons for non-compliance (Libyan Law, 2005). 
According to the OCED Principles (2004), the foundation of any corporate governance 
is the basic legal framework; corporate governance should be consistent with the rule 
of law. Johnson et al. (2000) and Denis and McConnell (2003) have asserted that the 
legal regulatory system has a significant impact on the robustness of corporate 
governance within companies. This can be explained by the fact that a country’s legal 
system determines the methods via which corporate governance codes are 
implemented and enforced. In Libya, corporate law, like the rest of the country’s legal 
system, follows the precepts of Shari’ah law. At the same time, it draws heavily on law 
from developed countries, particularly French Civil Law (Otman and Karlberg, 2007). 
The purpose of this section is to provide a brief overview of the current legislation 
pertaining to the role and responsibilities of the board of directors and its sub-
committees.  
2.6.1. Role of the Board of Directors 
Boards of directors set strategy, manage risk and supervise the executive 
administration to ensure they are serving the shareholders’ interests. Under Libyan 
commercial law (No. 23/2010), the shareholders’ assembly appoints the members of 
the board, determining the maximum and minimum number as in the articles of 
association (although Law No. 1/2005 stipulates this should be five to seven members). 
A board member may be a non-shareholder. Stock companies in Libya have no rules 
regarding the formation of the board hierarchy, the ratio of executives to non-
executives, or the term served by NEDs. If not appointed by the assembly, a chairman 
is chosen by the board members from among themselves. The chairman is usually the 
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company’s executive manager, except in commercial banks, where the executive 
manager is not permitted to be on the board. Board members’ bonuses and profit shares 
are determined in the articles of association and are subject to limits. The CBL’s 2010 
guidelines require that the board should consider the interests of all stakeholders – 
shareholders, employees and owners. It must review board members’ salaries and their 
strengths and weaknesses, and resolve any conflicts of interest between executive 
managers and board members.  
Article 68 of Law No. 1/2005 defines the board’s duties as: to select an executive 
management capable of running the firm efficiently and effectively, to execute the 
company’s policies and check the soundness of procedures, including transactions 
indicators, to assess the company’s situation and compare it to similar companies, and 
to evaluate present and future risks. The board is responsible for setting the company’s 
general strategy, and for ensuring its policies are responsive to changes in the law, 
guidelines or general economic conditions. It is also charged with deciding how much 
to pay managers who have been assigned special tasks, with calling shareholder 
meetings and with preparing an annual report on the company’s activities.   
Law No. 1/2005 stipulates that the board of directors may delegate its authority for a 
specified period to an executive committee selected by board members. This 
delegation does not involve any essential change to the company, but it allows the 
board to operate more efficiently by exploiting members’ specialist skills in key areas 
(such as auditing, planning bonuses or risk management). The CBL’s CG guidelines 
(2006/2010) advise that such committees may act for the board in all areas except 
budget ratification or the raising or reducing of capital. These committees gather 
separately (at least every three months) and provide periodic reports for the board. In 
Libya’s commercial banks, a special unit called the compliance unit reports directly to 
the board of directors. This unit checks that the bank is complying with the CBL’s 
directions and commands, that daily work standard are being adhered to, that it has 
sufficient capital and that the tasks assigned by the board are being carried out.  
Libyan commercial law (Act No. 23/2010) gives shareholders the right to exercise 
authority over board members’ actions. To ensure that shareholders are well-informed 
enough to be able to do this, the law requires stock companies to form a special 
committee to monitor the company’s operations. The rules relating to the appointment, 
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running and duties of the audit committee are set out in the 2010 CG guidelines. It is 
the job of this committee to monitor the activities of the management and to review 
the accounts and other paperwork to check their accuracy and conformity with the law. 
The internal auditing unit (required under Article 69 of Law No. 1/2005) audits the 
bank’s daily work, liaises between the bank management and external auditors, and 
prepares quarterly reports for the board. Libya has been influenced by western 
professional practices in this regard; most western countries and specialist 
international bodies regard auditing as the most important governance tool, and listed 
companies in the west are required to have an audit committee (Shareia, 2014). Internal 
auditing is regarded as essential in terms of credibility assurance. The process should 
reveal risk factors and areas requiring risk management by independently assessing 
the efficiency and effectiveness of transactions and the company’s compliance with 
laws, policies and internal regulations. The audit committee assists the company in 
fulfilling its responsibilities by overseeing the preparation of financial statements, 
ensuring full disclosure, assessing the quality and independence of both external and 
internal auditors and liaising between the two (it is authorised to appoint these external 
auditors). The committee is formed by a board of directors’ resolution and consists of 
a chairman plus two members without executive responsibilities. It gathers at least 
once every three months, or when the need arises (Article 479).  
2.6.2. The 2006/2010 CG Guidelines 
Since the board of directors and its committees are considered the first line of defence 
against incompetent management, they are a core mechanism of corporate governance. 
This is reflected in the 2006/2010 CG guidelines (also known as The Libyan Handbook 
of Institutional Governance), which describe at length the standards and 
responsibilities expected of the board of directors and its sub-committees. The 
guidelines (and Article 70 of Law No.1/2012) emphasise that board members must be 
qualified for their posts and clearly understand their governance role. They must not 
be put under any pressure that might affect their performance. The guidelines highlight 
a number of key points: 
A. Since the board of directors is mainly responsible for the soundness of the 
company’s transactions, every member is individually important. Each 
member must satisfy the qualification requirements set by the company and 
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its stakeholders. They must also fulfil all entry requirements under banking 
and commercial law (the same applies for election to the chair). 
B. While individual performance is important, it is also crucial that the board 
can work harmoniously together. The number of board members must be 
small enough to facilitate accountability but large enough to achieve 
diversity. 
C. Delegation of selected duties and responsibilities to relatively small 
committees can increase the effectiveness of the board as it allows 
members to employ their specialised skills to manage important areas (such 
as auditing, planning bonuses and risk management).  
D. The minutes of meetings, whether of the board, the company, shareholders 
or supervisory bodies, constitute an official permanent register of the 
company’s decisions and resolutions. They are considered the authoritative 
record of these meetings, in the event of confusion or misunderstanding. 
E. The board is responsible for determining the direction of the company by 
formulating its aims, plans, policies and strategies for success.  
 
The foregoing discussion illustrates that as far as the role and responsibilities of BODs 
are concerned, many of the international governance principles issued by the OECD 
are already represented in Libyan law, specifically in Commercial Law No. 23/2010, 
Bank Law No. 1/2005 and the CBL’s Resolution No. 68/2005 relating to articles of 
association in commercial banks. One of the strongest guarantees already offered by 
Libyan commercial law is the establishment of the audit committee as the supreme 
regulatory authority after the general assembly. The Libyan Handbook of Institutional 
Governance (2006/2010) reaffirms this interest in governance in its emphasis on the 
important part played by the audit committee. 
2.7.   Obstacles Faced by the Libyan Banking Sector 
The last decade has seen Libya’s banks offer a growing range of services and play an 
increasingly important role in the economy and in wider society. However, the sector 
remains underdeveloped compared with banks elsewhere in the MENA region. The 
2002/03 Financial Development Index (Saidi, 2005) illustrates that the Libyan banking 
sector is the lowest-scoring among the MENA countries at 1.3 (the average score is 
5.5). This is a matter of concern, since it has been suggested that under-performance 
and unstable banking activity can slow economic growth (Ehtawsh, 2012). This can 
be exacerbated in countries such as Libya, where financial markets are often weak. 
Realising that the effectiveness of the banking sector is closely tied to the effectiveness 
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of the Libyan economy as a whole, experts are calling for banking market reform as 
part of a wider strategy to improve the Libyan economy (Ehtawsh, 2012). 
The government and public institutions still dominate ownership of Libyan banks. This 
may be considered an obstacle to the development of effective CG in these insitutions. 
Porter and Yergin (2006) have argued that the Libyan government controls, directly or 
indirectly, the majority of assets and enterprises in Libya through a substantial 
portfolio of industries, financial institutions and real estate. Together, these account for 
the overwhelming majority of economic activities in the country. Government 
interference hinders corporate activity in public companies, but even in those that have 
already been privatised, where the government owns shares, it exercises undue 
influence, to the consternation of private investors. 
Mullineux (2006, p.2) argues that government ownership of banks and preferential 
lending practices create conflicts of interest, especially in cases where politicians' 
objectives are incompatible with maximising public economic welfare. The legal 
system supports the development of good corporate governance, but the banks’ CG is 
also “embedded in and conditioned by” wider government policies. The impact of 
these policies was particularly strongly felt under the previous regime. For 42 years, 
the regime had strict control over the banking market, especially lending activities. 
This caused problems in terms of both the banks’ operations and the identification of 
their objectives. Libyan banks extended loans according to guidelines set by the 
regime, confident that the government would step in and provide support in times of 
trouble. This led them to be reckless at times, for example by loaning to failing 
businesses. This reckless approach to lending helped undermine banking regulations. 
At the same time, managers lacked autonomy, there were skills gaps  in the workforce. 
This, in turn, led to further risk taking and unorthodox banking activity.  
Since its establishment in 1956, it has been the job of the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) 
to oversee and regulate the country’s banking sector. The CBL has had to respond to 
numerous problems and crises in the industry over the years, which have necessitated 
the creation of new regulations to maintain the strength of the sector. For example, 
when regional banks were established in 2000 and 2001, they faced serious liquidity 
problems from the beginning. By the end of 2004, there were significant problems 
with improper loans and mismanagement. Board members in these banks were 
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borrowing heavily from the banks and defaulting on repayments. By 2005, the Tripoli 
Bank was technically insolvent and was unable to settle the claims of local depositors 
(CBL, 2005). The CBL therefore stepped in and, in Resolution No. 58/2006, approved 
the merger of 41 of the regional banks into the National Banking Corporation. The 
new bank became the largest private commercial bank in the Libyan market (CBL, 
2011). 
The CBL has also had to intervene in individual banks. In 2006-2007, for example, it 
suspended the operations of the Al-hliah Tagowrah Bank when the bank got into 
financial difficulties. When serious financial irregularities in the bank’s operations 
came to light in 2008, it forced the board to dismiss the managing director. Similarly, 
when the Al-Wafa Bank experienced liquidity problems in 2006, the CBL replaced the 
serving CEO with one of its own staff nominated three new board members and sent 
its own deputy governor to board meetings. It also asked the board to limit the general 
manager's and branch managers' authority to give loans (CBL, 2006). When, in mid-
2006, the CBL discovered that most board members had obtained huge loans from the 
bank, it referred the bank’s case to the Minister of Finance, who passed it to the Council 
of Ministers. The chairman of the board refused to resign, so he was dismissed by the 
Minister of Finance. The bank is now directed by a trusteeship council appointed by 
the Minister of Finance and the CBL (CBL, 2012). 
Several studies (e.g. Al-Ghiryany, 2004; Al-Tekhtash, 2004; Hamadu, 2010) have 
highlighted another problem faced by the banking sector: the lack of laws and bylaws 
regulating the accounting and auditing profession in Libya and its inconsistent 
application of accepted professional standards. The shift towards privatisation and the 
need to attract foreign investment are making it increasingly important that 
accountants and auditors are both aware of and committed to internationally accepted 
professional standards. Disclosure and transparency are crucial to Libya’s economic 
development; investors are more likely to be attracted by predictable, well-regulated, 
low risk environments than they are by tax breaks or customs facilities. In other words, 
not only does Libya’s legislation need to be updated to reflect the increasing emphasis 
being placed on governance, privatisation, disclosure, transparency and accountability, 
but the accounting and auditing profession itself needs to establish an organisation that 
is capable of developing professional standards that are harmonious with international 
practice and that can help it respond to these new realities 
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According to the World Economic Forum (Chami et al., 2012), “Libya had better 
macroeconomic conditions [in 2010] than the regional average, reflecting primarily its 
record of large fiscal surpluses and low debt”. However, it ranked low in terms of 
international measures of governance (see Figure 2.3). Only on political stability did 
Libya rank better than the international average.  
Figure 2-3: Governance measures for MENA countries plus Norway, 2010 
 
2.8. Conclusion 
This chapter sheds light on the characteristics of Libya's economic, cultural and legal 
environment. It is clear from the discussion that the evolution of the banking sector 
has been influenced by Libya’s economic development over the twentieth century, 
particularly the expansion of oil production and the move from public to private 
ownership. The decision to focus on commercial banks in this research mainly stems 
from the economic importance of this sector. Banks are central to the economy in that 
they hold the savings of the public and finance the development of business and trade. 
As such, scrutiny of their efficiency is fully justified, and it is in the interests of a wide 
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variety of stakeholders – regulators, customers, investors and society as a whole – that 
their financial reporting is accurate. Bank failure “can result in systemic crises with 
adverse consequences for the economy as a whole” (Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010, p.189), 
as has been seen in a number of countries. In other words, the collapse of a commercial 
bank affects a wide range of stakeholders, not just shareholders. 
 
There are increasing numbers of investors – both local and foreign – in Libya since 
liberalisation. However, Libyan companies – both public and private – are still 
unsophisticated by international standards in terms of their strategies and operation. 
Moreover, policy instability and inefficient government bureaucracy pose significant 
barriers to foreign and local businesses alike (Porter and Yergin, 2006). Since effective 
corporate governance is crucial to the improvement of Libya’s financial systems (and 
to its ambition to join the WTO), CG is high on the agendas of government and public 
and private banking institutions (Bengdara, 2007). The main problem at the moment 
is the lack of systems and procedures to compel companies to implement CG 
mechanisms. The Libyan Stock Market and the Central Bank of Libya are the main 
players attempting to establish principles of good corporate governance, but CG is in 
its early stages in Libya and it is uncertain whether these initiatives are being respected 
and implemented. 
 
In Libya, as elsewhere, the control and supervision of the business environment is the 
province of corporate law. The chapter shows that the legal system already 
accommodates international CG principles regarding the role of the board of directors, 
but that the governance concept is currently most strongly linked to the audit 
committee mechanism. The chapter also highlights the high level of influence that 
Shari’ah law has on boards of directors in Islamic banks; any investigation of internal 
CG mechanisms in the Libyan banking system must take into account the significant 
role social and cultural factors play in shaping the roles of the board. Finally, the 
chapter examines the CBL’s role as banking sector regulator. This agency has played 
a significant role, monitoring, regulating and maintaining a stable framework to ensure 
the strength of the banking industry. This chapter having introduced the unique 
context, in which the Libyan banking system operates, the next chapter discusses the 
theoretical framework underlying the study.  
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Chapter 3: The Nature of Corporate Governance 
3.1. Introduction 
The aim of the research is to understand corporate governance in terms of the roles 
and responsibilities of the board of directors. This first necessitates an examination of 
the work already done in this field. Accordingly, this chapter has two main parts: the 
first part discusses the various definitions of corporate governance and the conflicting 
theoretical perspectives that underlie them. It also examines the contrasting approaches 
to corporate governance in relation to the role of the board of directors. The second 
part of the chapter reviews theoretical aspects of board structure, as reflected in the 
insider and outsider CG systems. The chapter ends by outlining the key characteristics 
and underlying principles of the Islamic system of corporate governance. 
3.2. Definitions of Corporate Governance 
According to Solomon (2010, p.12), "There is no single, accepted definition of 
corporate governance" among scholars and managers. Clarke (1993) asserts that 
corporate governance means different things to different people, while Sheridan and 
Kendall (1992) suggest that every country has its own idea of what the term means. 
Blair (1995, p.3) defines corporate governance as: "the whole set of legal, cultural and 
institutional arrangements that determine what publicly traded companies can do, who 
controls them, how the control is exercised, and how the risk and returns from the 
activities they undertake are allocated".  
The many different definitions in the literature vary in scope, depending on the 
discipline and the theoretical background of the policy maker, practitioner or 
researcher concerned (Solomon and Solomon, 2004). Narrower definitions focus on 
the relationship between companies and their shareholders. For example, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) assert that: Corporate governance deals with the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment. Narrow definitions stress the importance of shareholders’ interests, largely 
ignoring the interests and goals of other stakeholders. 
In contrast, Demb and Neubauer (1992, cited in Turnbull, 1997, p.183) claim that: 
"Corporate governance is the process by which corporations are made responsive to 
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the rights and wishes of stakeholders". Broader definitions of corporate governance 
view corporations as being responsible and accountable not just to shareholders but to 
a range of groups, including employees, creditors, customers and society as a whole 
(Keasey et al., 1997; Solomon and Solomon, 2004; Mallin, 2007; Tricker, 1994; Baker 
and Owsen, 2002). Turnbull (1997, p.181) takes a very broad view, suggesting that 
corporate governance is: "all the influences affecting the institutional processes, 
including those for appointing the controllers and/or regulators, involved in organizing 
the production and trade of goods and services". 
The OECD (1999, p.11) defines CG as: 
"a set of relationships between a company's management, its board, 
its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also 
provides the structure through which the objectives of the company 
are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined." 
Finally, Solomon and Solomon (2004, p.14) define corporate governance as: "the 
system of checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, which ensure 
that companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a 
socially responsible way in all areas of their business activity." 
These last definitions acknowledge not just the rights of shareholders and stakeholders 
but also the responsibilities of the board of directors – the particular focus of this study. 
The BODs’ role in corporate governance is emphasised in the 1992 Cadbury Report, 
which asserts that: "it is the ability of boards of directors to combine leadership with 
control and effectiveness with accountability that will primarily determine how 
well...companies meet the society's expectations of them" (1992, p.9). This suggests 
that the key to understanding corporate governance is to examine the BODs’ role and 
its interactions with senior management, shareholders and stakeholders in both its own 
and other companies (Cochran et al., 1988). 
3.3. Theoretical Framework 
The UK law sees CG as the sole responsibility of shareholders (Deakin and 
Konzelmann, 2003). However, Monks and Minow (2008) identify three sets of players 
who are directly involved in corporate governance: the shareholders (the owners), 
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directors and managers (whose job it is to protect the economic interests of 
shareholders and serve as their agents). The range of actors involved creates the 
potential for conflicts of interest to emerge; Jensen and Meckling (1976), for example, 
propose a theory of the firm which focuses on the conflicts of interest which may arise 
between shareholders, managers and debt holders (see McColgan, 2001). A huge body 
of literature has evolved to explain the nature of these conflicts and to discuss the 
problems associated with CG, though researchers offer competing interpretations of 
why these problems arise and how they should be addressed. There are major 
differences on what should be considered system errors, how these errors affect 
economic growth, and how to create a more effective system.  
Three major schools of thought have influenced the development of corporate 
governance: agency theory, institutional theory and stakeholder theory. These are 
discussed in the following sections, along with stewardship theory and resource 
dependency theory. It is worth noting at this point that, as Tricker (1996, p.31) observes:  
“Stewardship theory, stakeholder theory and agency theory are all 
essentially ethnocentric. Although the underlying ideological 
paradigms are seldom articulated, the essential ideas are derived from 
Western thought, with its perceptions and expectations of the 
respective roles of individual, enterprise and the state and of the 
relationships between them.” 
3.3.1. The Agency Problem   
In the days before the emergence of the financial markets, owners tended to manage 
their own companies; however, the appearance of the financial markets has given rise 
to a new phenomenon: the habitual or serial investor (Solomon, 2010). The result is 
that modern companies are not normally managed by their owners but by specialist, 
experienced managers. In this separation of ownership and management lie the roots 
of the agency problem; conflicts of interest may arise between the two groups, 
especially if the managers are primarily motivated to serve their own interests rather 
than those of the owners. The problem may be exacerbated when shareholders attempt 
to monitor the activities of managers or to align managerial interests with their own 
objectives. Problems may also arise if shareholders come into conflict with 
bondholders (debt agency) (John and Senbet, 1998). 
  
Shalba 2016 38 
 
The separation between ownership and control and the agency problem are the main 
reasons for the emergence of the governance concept (John and Senbet, 1998). All CG 
definitions recognise the potential for conflict between insiders and outsiders over the 
generation of value (Pergola and Joseph, 2011). An agency problem can reduce 
efficiency, diminishing the value of the owners’ investment; conversely, implementing 
governance mechanisms that will maximise the operational efficiency of the company 
is the best way to achieve economic gains. These mechanisms must be built into the 
company’s governance systems and its contracts (John and Senbet, 1998), though as 
Hart (1995) notes, contractual negotiation and implementation can be expensive, and 
a contract cannot encompass all contingencies. 
3.3.2. Ownership Structure 
The financial literature has focused heavily upon the relationship between corporate 
governance and ownership structure. Hart (1995) argues that all shareholders can 
contribute to the maximisation of profits or minimisation of costs when no agency 
problem is present. In these circumstances, arbitration is rarely necessary as 
differences do not normally occur. Solomon (2010) highlights the power major equity 
holders can have on company governance: 
“Ownership structure is no longer widely dispersed, as in the model 
presented by Berle and Means (1932), but is now becoming 
increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few major institutional 
investors. Some of these dominant investment institutions may now 
be seen as insiders, rather than outsiders, influencing company 
management directly.” (p.12) 
He argues that ownership structures have as much influence on CG systems as legal, 
cultural, religious, political or economic factors. 
3.3.3. Agency Theory 
Agency theory has been of great interest to researchers of corporate governance (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; King and Wenb, 2011; Manosa et al., 2007; Berle and Means, 1932; 
Renders and Gaeremynck, 2012), who have used its assumptions, models and 
arguments to understand ownership structure, board practices, agency conflicts, 
corporate governance reform, capital structure and debt (Manosa et al., 2007). In 
developing countries, authors such as Farooque et al. (2007a; 2007b) have used agency 
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theory to examine CG structures and issues and to identify ways of improving 
governance. Only a few studies have investigated corporate governance in Islamic 
contexts or attempted to develop alternative, Islamic-oriented models of CG (Hasan, 
2009), but these have shown that, even in so-called Islamic corporations, the main 
objective is to maximise shareholder wealth (Hasan, 2009). This implies that in 
practice, many Islamic corporations follow the agency-theory-based Anglo-Saxon 
model of corporate governance (Lim, 2007, p.737-738).  
The underlying assumption of agency theory is that where management and ownership 
are separated, managers may not necessarily act in the best interests of shareholders; 
they may have different interests and may not expend resources to maximise the latters’ 
wealth (Berle and Means, 1932; Gillan, 2006; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). Hence, the main focus for agency 
theorists is on identifying and strengthening mechanisms that will discipline 
managerial opportunism and mitigate its negative effects on shareholder wealth 
(Kosnik, 1987). 
Eisenhardt (1989, p.89) explains that: "Specifically, agency theory is directed at the 
ubiquitous agency relationship, in which one party (the principal) delegates work to 
another (the agent), who performs that work". Agency theory, which has been a 
fundamental tenet of economics for decades, assumes that there is an inherent conflict 
between the interests of these two groups (Okpara, 2011). Realigning these interests 
incurs additional costs known as agency costs, a large proportion of which go on the 
board of directors’ monitoring and controlling activities.  
Agency theory views the board as the “ultimate internal monitor...whose most 
important role is to scrutinize the highest decision makers within the firm” (Fama, 
1980, p.294). Directors “do not occupy their seats to help management manage, but to 
own the business on behalf of shareholders” (Carver, 2000, p.79). In other words, the 
board is primarily a tool for minimising agency costs and safeguarding shareholders’ 
interests (Choi et al., 2007). It has also been described as a way for some managers to 
exercise control over other managers (Stiles and Taylor, 2001). As a mediating 
mechanism, the board is expected to resolve any conflicts of interest between agents 
and principals. 
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The nature of the agency relationship can only be changed by effective governance – 
by developing mechanisms and processes of governance and implementing them 
without prejudice in the best interests of both clients and agents (Christopher, 2010). 
It is appropriate that this investigation should draw on agency theory, given that 
companies are widely seen as associations or networks of explicit and implicit 
contracts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) between their various stakeholders and society 
as a whole (see Figure 3.1). 
Figure 3-1: The firm as a network of contracts 
Source: Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
Concerns have been raised about the adequacy of agency theory as a way of 
understanding CG. However, according to Aguilera et al. (2008), corporate governance 
extends beyond the relationship between shareholders, the board of directors and 
managers; they argue that internal and external environmental forces expand the scope 
of this interdependent relationship and affect the governance model. In a similar vein, 
both Filatotchev (2008) and Roberts (2009) emphasise that to properly understand a 
company’s corporate governance, it is necessary to take into account the regulatory 
environment. Researchers have sought to overcome what they see as the constraints of 
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agency theory by proposing a dual methodology approach to gain a more inclusive 
view of corporate governance (Christopher, 2010). 
3.3.4. Institutional Theory  
Daily et al. (2003) argue that the social aspects of the evolution of governance have 
received scant attention in agency theory, while Paredes (2005) asserts that it is 
ineffective at explaining the major CG issues in developing countries. Instead, these 
authors point to institutional theory as a useful alternative. Institutional theory posits 
that many of the dynamics affecting the corporate environment stem from cultural 
norms, values and rituals (Scott, 2013). Thus, the social and cultural environment 
should also be taken into account when investigating corporate governance practices 
(Scott, 2013). Stedham and Beekun (2000) assert that institutional theory sees the 
BODs’ as having two primary roles: linkage and administration. Its linkage role 
involves establishing relationships between the corporation and the external 
environment, while its administrative role is to oversee the performance of top 
management, in particular, the CEO.   
Institutional theory asserts that over time, organisational behaviour and practice, 
including the role of the BOD, are shaped by the institutional environment (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; Fried et al., 1998; Peng et al., 2004; Scott, 2008). The theory is 
concerned with explaining the mechanisms by which organisations seek to align their 
practices and characteristics with prevailing social and cultural values in order to 
obtain legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This may involve adopting structures 
and practices which are considered legitimate and socially acceptable by other 
organisations in the same field, irrespective of their actual usefulness (Scott, 2013; 
Rodrigues and Craig, 2007; Hasan, 2008). A number of researchers have demonstrated 
that organisations wanting this legitimacy – and to be seen as modern, rational, 
responsible and compliant – must undergo a process of institutional isomorphism 
(Carruthers, 1995; Rodrigues and Craig, 2007), modifying their operations to match 
the presumed values and beliefs of social and organisational life (Al-Omari, 2010). 
Failure to do so may even cause the organisation to lose legitimacy (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Carruthers, 1995).  
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identified three types of isomorphism, which loosely 
correspond to Scott’s (2008) three pillars of institutionalisation (regulative, cognitive 
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and normative). Coercive isomorphism occurs in response to pressure from 
government, regulators or stock exchanges, for example, in the form of 
legal/regulatory requirements mandating board structure or behaviour (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2008). Organisations react to this regulative pillar by 
implementing the recommendations, for example, by enhancing board independence 
or establishing audit committees. Thus, organisational processes change over time and 
governance structures “fulfil ritualistic roles that help legitimize the interactions 
between the various actors within the corporate governance mosaic” (Cohen et al., 
2007, p11).    
Mimetic isomorphism, explains Scott (2013), is motivated by a desire to adopt others' 
practices because they are perceived as successful and worthy of adoption. In a similar 
vein, Rodrigues and Craig (2007) describe it as an organisation mimicking the actions 
of similar, but more legitimate or successful, organisations in the institutional 
environment. The organisation may adopt similar processes because it thinks they 
actually are more effective, but it may equally be because it knows they are deemed 
legitimate and socially acceptable by other similar organisations (Saudagaran, 1997). 
This is similar to Scott’s cognitive pillar, which suggests that firms and boards behave 
the way they do in response to cognitive pressures (Peng et al., 2004). Like coercive 
isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism can lead to CG practices becoming more similar 
over time (Braiotta and Zhou, 2006; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) as organisations 
imitate other organisations to reinforce their legitimacy (Cohen et al., 2007). 
The final form of isomorphism is normative isomorphism, which occurs in response 
to pressure from group norms to adopt certain institutional practices (Clarke, 2004). 
Normative pressures can trigger changes in board structure and process even when 
there are no regulative or cognitive pressures (Miller-Millesen, 2003).  According to 
the normative pillar, firms and boards embrace the norms, values, beliefs and 
expectations that are least likely to cause them to be seen as different and consequently 
singled out for criticism. Thus, firms going through performance difficulties are likely 
to make changes based on normative pressures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) and adopt 
structures and processes that will draw greater normative approval or enhance their 
moral legitimacy (Scott, 2000; Suchman, 1995), even if these changes threaten the 
performance of the firm (D’Aunno et al., 1991). Zucker (1987) notes that firms and 
boards act in a specific way just because they have become an accepted way of 
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accomplishing them. In the banking sector, for example, banks may be influenced to 
adopt CG guidelines because this is expected by international banking organisations 
such as the BCSB or OECD. 
Although the Libyan government has developed regulatory CG frameworks that are 
consistent with internationally recommended practice, the gap reported by previous 
researchers between de facto and de jure compliance (Larbsh, 2010) indicates that 
these regulatory requirements are poorly enforced. This suggests a low level of 
coercive isomorphism in the LBS. In respect of mimetic isomorphism, the main 
reasons for mandating CG in the LBS were pressure from international lending 
institutions, particularly the WB and the IMF, and a desire to promote a more legitimate 
or successful image by following globally recommended practices, since Libya lacked 
the expertise to develop national standards of the same quality (IMF, 2013; Bengdara, 
2007). As far as normative isomorphism is concerned, while the last decade has seen 
Libya make major efforts to develop its educational and professional frameworks to 
promote CG, the gap between de facto and de jure compliance signals that this has 
been insufficient to improve the quality of BODs’ performance or accounting 
professionalism. One might conclude that although the LBS appears to have 
encouraged all forms of institutional isomorphism, the measures taken have in fact 
been little more than window dressing designed to impress external organisations such 
as the WB and the IMF and to gain their financial and political support and legitimacy.  
Since the low level of de facto compliance may be an outcome of the interaction 
between the cultural context and institutional pressures, it is imperative to consider the 
influence of this context. For example, with the respect to such influence, decoupling 
may be the result of cultural barriers that have led to boards in the LBS having a poor 
understanding of international CG guidelines; banks may believe they are applying 
CG, when infact they are not complying fully. The review of the forms of institutional 
isomorphism suggests that they should be seen as complementary, though in the 
researcher's view, normative isomorphism should come before coercive isomorphism 
as this is less likely to result in such a decoupling. The adoption of CG in an emerging 
market requires careful preparation, mainly by developing the national cultural values 
to attribute the same importance to CG compliance as is found in the developed 
countries where the standards were initially developed.  
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This study draws on institutional isomorphism theory to explain the influence of 
corporate governance mechanisms on the levels of compliance with board of director 
role requirements in Libyan banking sector. In addition, it provides an overview of 
what board members see as the main barriers to full compliance. 
3.3.5. Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory situates the company within a larger system. The legal 
infrastructure provided by the host society determines the nature of the company’s 
activities, but whatever these activities, its central purpose is to create wealth or value 
for shareholders by converting their shares into goods and services (Turnbull, 1997). 
According to Blair (1995, p.322) 
“The goal of directors and management should be maximising total 
wealth creation by the firm. The key to achieving this is to enhance 
the voice of and provide ownership-like incentives to those 
participants in the firm who contribute or control critical, specialised 
inputs (firm specific human capital) and to align the interests of these 
critical stakeholders with the interests of outside, passive 
shareholders.” 
The key principle in stakeholder theory is that companies operate by the key principle 
in stakeholder theory is that companies operate by the creation of value requires inputs 
from a range of stakeholders. They should therefore be governed for the benefit of all 
stakeholders – not just shareholders but managers, suppliers, customers, employees 
and the community as a whole. This needs a sound understanding of the needs of the 
different stakeholders and how they are affected by the activities of the company 
(Freeman et al., 2004). The interdependence between firms and their strategic 
stakeholders is recognised by the American Law Institute (1992), which states that: 
“The modern corporation by its nature creates interdependences with a variety of 
groups with whom the corporation has a legitimate concern, such as employees, 
customers, suppliers, and members of the communities in which the corporation 
operates” (cited in Turnbull, 1997, p.3).  
The corporate law of most western countries places the interests of shareholders ahead 
of other stakeholders, but the stakeholder model takes a broader view; it sees the role 
of governance as being to achieve an appropriate balance between shareholders and 
other stakeholder groups and to guide the activities of the company so they do not 
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favour the shareholding group at the expense of others. This is crucial, since any 
perceived unfairness may lead to groups withdrawing from the system (Clarkson, 
1995). In stakeholder theory, companies are seen as social entities with the power to 
impact on the welfare of many people. As such, it has been argued, they have a 
responsibility to promote equality and social justice (Letza et al., 2004). This is a recent 
development in corporate governance (Brennan and Solomon, 2008) and has led to a 
number of studies focusing upon companies’ social responsibility (Unerman and 
Bebbington, 2007; Collier, 2008; Parker, 2007; Solomon, 2010). 
Stakeholder theory allows organisations to maximise shareholder value by providing 
managers with a means to understand the different needs of multiple stakeholders and 
reconcile them with the purposes of the organisation (Christopher, 2010). Sundaram 
and Inkpen (2004) argue that stakeholder theory challenges directors to cater for all 
stakeholders. The theory sees the board of directors as the means through which the 
firm is able to take into account the legitimate interests of stakeholder groups and 
individuals who affect (or are affected by) the activities of the firm (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995; Freeman et al., 2004). This may require directors to be more actively 
involved in designing company strategy (Anchor and Dehayyat, 2010; Baxt, 1999, 
cited in Hendry and Kiel, 2004). It has been argued that stakeholder theory 
complements agency theory by allowing for more inclusive approaches to corporate 
governance (Solomon, 2010).  
According to Choudury and Hoque (2004), the ultimate goal of governance in Islamic 
banking is to foster social justice. These authors (2006) suggest that in Islamic 
countries, social wellbeing takes priority over the maximisation of shareholder wealth, 
and the professional objective of directors, managers and auditors should be to satisfy 
the needs not just of shareholders but of all stakeholders and of Allah. This perspective 
is clearly more in keeping with the stakeholder approach to CG than with the 
shareholder approach. While western corporations separate ownership and control, in 
Islamic corporations, ownership, control and benefits are to be shared. The aim of 
corporate governance is to enhance accountability, transparency and trustworthiness – 
values which are central to Shari’ah law.  
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3.3.6. Resource Dependency Theory 
Resource dependency theory complements stakeholder theory in that it addresses some 
of the consequences that arise from having a wide stakeholder base (Christopher, 2010). 
The theory suggests that firms depend on other organisations within society for their 
economic success and therefore focuses on the external linkages and networks of the 
firm (Pettigrew, 1992; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Resource dependency theory 
suggests that an external stakeholder’s ability to command vital resources gives it 
power; in other words, if it brings in resources that are necessary for the company's 
success, it will gain power relative to the internal stakeholders. This suggests that the 
latters’ ability to govern the firm depends not just on the relative size of their equity 
holdings, but also on the tangible and intangible resources they bring to the firm (Child 
et al., 1997). 
According to this theory, the BOD is the focal link between the company and its 
external network (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). It serves as an “optative” mechanism 
through which a company can build links with the external environment to either 
secure resources or protect itself against environmental adversity, for example by 
inviting acknowledged leaders from other sectors to serve on the board (Stiles and 
Taylor, 2001, p.16). It also enhances and consolidates the firm’s place and power in 
the market (Kosnik, 1987; Pettigrew, 1992). Directors’ professional expertise as 
lawyers or bankers can enhance organisational functioning, while their personal and 
professional networks can facilitate access to the resources the firm needs. In this way, 
the board acts to manage strategic uncertainty. 
3.3.7. Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship theory, which derives from psychological and sociological approaches, 
postulates that the interests of directors and management are aligned with those of the 
shareholder. It assumes that managers want to be good stewards of the corporate assets 
(Stiles and Taylor, 2001), that BODs and CEOs work for the wider interests of the 
business and that over time, senior executives tend to come to think of the firm as an 
extension of themselves (Clarke, 2004; Wheelen et al., 2014). In fact, senior managers 
are more likely than shareholders to take a long-term view of firm performance (Mallin, 
2007). Stewardship theory recognises that managerial behaviour may be motivated by 
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non-commercial considerations such as a desire for attainment and appreciation, 
gratification from achieving positive performance, respect for authority and a strong 
work ethic (Donaldson, 1990). As such, it posits that boards with a higher proportion 
of executives will outperform those with a lower proportion (Sundaramurthy and 
Lewis, 2003). Inside directors are especially valued for their operational expertise and 
knowledge (Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Langevoort, 2001), though  non-executive 
directors are also seen as vital for improving board efficiency. The main emphasis is 
on the board’s potential to provide advice to executives and to participate actively in 
the formulation of strategy (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003).   
Under stewardship theory, the separation of ownership and control is seen not as a 
potential problem but as a positive development that can work to the benefit of the 
firm. The depth of knowledge, commitment and access to current operating 
information and technical expertise possessed by managers are seen as vital to the 
effective running of the firm – so much so that they outweigh any agency issues that 
may arise (Learmount, 2002). Stewardship theory favours the concentration of power 
and authority in the hands of management rather than the board as the best way to 
enhance the firm’s economic performance. Finally, it encourages small boards in the 
belief that this supports positive communication and better decision making (although 
it does not specify what constitutes “small” or how companies can decide what is the 
best board size for them) (Monks and Minow, 2008). 
Corporate governance literature draws on a range of theories to explain the BOD’s role, 
from agency theory, which focuses on its monitoring function, to resource dependency 
theory, which focuses on its ability to bring in resources, to stewardship theory’s 
emphasis on the board’s strategic or advisory role, to institutional theory’s claim that 
it plays linkage and administrative roles, to stakeholder theory, which sees the BOD’s 
role as being to manage stakeholders and improve the social performance of the firm 
(Freeman et al., 2004). Clearly, no single theory can provide a complete understanding 
of the role played by the BOD. 
This research draws primarily on agency theory because it establishes the relationships 
between shareholders, board and management – the main players in governance. This 
theory focuses on the board’s monitoring function and how the separation between 
ownership and management might lead managers to collude against owners (Abdul 
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Rahman and Ali, 2006). However, the study also recognises stakeholder theory’s 
assumption that corporations do more than merely maximise shareholder wealth; since 
they deliver outputs to a range of stakeholders, their efficiency should be considered 
within the broader social context. The analysis also draws on institutional theory. This 
argues that firms adopt CG mechanisms either because they are coerced into it by 
legislators or in imitation of other companies. The study investigates these 
assumptions by examining how the CG Code is being implemented in the LBS and the 
extent to which banks are behaving similarly. By employing a combination of theories, 
the study seeks to gain a more comprehensive picture of corporate governance and a 
deeper understanding of board functions. Each theory should give insight into how the 
structural attributes of boards can influence board processes and their ability to 
perform the roles expected of them. 
The second part of this chapter examines the theoretical aspects of board structure, as 
reflected in the various international models of corporate governance. 
3.4. Insider and Outsider Control 
Countries following civil law, such as France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, 
promote a CG approach that encompasses all stakeholders; it aims to balance the 
interests of shareholders with those of workers, directors, creditors, suppliers, clients 
and wider society (Solomon and Solomon, 2004). Known as the insider model of 
corporate control, it gives those closest to the company’s actual operational procedures 
the most control (Department of Treasury, 1997, cited in Mulili and Wong, 2011). 
Conversely, countries following common law, including Australia, the UK, USA, 
Canada and New Zealand, promote the outsider or Anglo-Saxon model of corporate 
governance, which prioritises shareholders' profits or benefits. Investors hold a 
company's management accountable for achieving its objectives and maximising 
returns (Mulili and Wong, 2011, p.15). While the insider-dominated system tends to 
be associated with a two-tier board model, boards in the outsider-dominated system 
tend to be unitary. 
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3.4.1. The Outsider Model (The Anglo-Saxon Model) 
This liberalist approach to CG, which is found in the USA, the UK, Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, South Africa and other Commonwealth countries (Tricker, 1994), 
emphasises the interests of shareholders and their right to be involved in corporate 
decision making. It takes the view that the firm is the property of investors (Scott, 1997) 
and that managers are agents whose only task is to increase the value of the 
shareholders’ contribution (Fisher and Lovell, 2008).  
Nestor and Thompson (2000) argue that the classic outsider systems are found in the 
USA and UK, and that they are characterised by: 1) dispersed equity ownership with 
large institutional holdings; 2) company law that recognises the primacy of 
shareholders; 3) a strong emphasis on the protection of minority investors in securities 
law and regulation; and 4) relatively strong requirements for disclosure (p.5). Figure 
(3.2) shows how this works in terms of the decision-making process, although since 
share ownership is usually widely dispersed in the Anglo-Saxon model, in practice, 
shareholders have little impact on management. It is not surprising then that in this 
system, companies require solid legal protection to safeguard shareholders from the 
consequences of management under-performance or malfeasance (Hasan, 2009). 
Figure 3-2: The Anglo-Saxon model of corporate decision making 
 
Source: Cernat (2004) 
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The Anglo-Saxon model has several ways of motivating managers to work in 
shareholders’ interests. Accounting reports (Roe, 2003) and quoting activities allow 
shareholders to monitor and control management, but the main mechanism is the board 
of directors, which in the outsider model is selected by the owners. Boards in the 
Anglo-Saxon model tend to be unitary, or single-tier, and comprise both executive and 
non-executive members (according to the Cadbury Report (1992), increasing the 
number of NEDs strengthens the board’s control over management). The chairman of 
the board is selected by the board members and his role is to create a bridge between 
managers and investors. His sole responsibility is to run the board; to ensure that it 
meets regularly that directors have the information they need to contribute in meetings 
and that everybody has the opportunity to speak at board meetings (Mallin 2007, 
p.126). There is a clear distinction between the CEO of the company and the chairman 
of the board. 
3.4.2.The Insider Model (The Two-Tier Board) 
Solomon and Solomon (2004, p.149) define the insider-dominated system of corporate 
governance as one in which publicly listed companies are controlled by a small group 
of institutional shareholders (e.g. banks, other companies or government). The insider 
model, which is found in a number of countries in Continental Europe and in Japan, is 
also known as the relationship-based system, as shareholders and the companies in 
which they invest have a very close relationship. This model reflects stakeholder 
theory in that it takes into consideration the interests of stakeholders, as well as those 
of shareholders. For instance, employees participate in decision making through trade 
unions and work councils (Cernat, 2004, p.153). 
The insider model is characterised by two-tier boards. A management board and a 
supervisory board are both installed. The management board addresses operational 
issues, is controlled by the CEO and made up of executives only. The supervisory 
board oversees strategic decision making and supervises the management board. The 
company chairman attends the supervisory board’s meetings in a non-executive 
capacity (Solomon, 2010). This separation of the administrative and monitoring 
functions is designed to avoid conflicts of interest arising between owners and 
managers (Dahya et al., 2002). 
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Unlike the Anglo-American model, the insider model legitimises the participation of 
large firms and banks in the governance of firms; there is not therefore the same 
fragmentation of corporate ownership and executive domination of BODs in this 
model as is found in the Anglo-Saxon model (Rubach and Sebora, 1998). The cross-
holding among companies also has the effect of creating networks of firms that are 
joined in ownership. These major shareholders also play a greater role in CG than in 
the Anglo-Saxon model, overseeing administration and monitoring and disciplining 
management (Wei, 2003). Figure 3.3 depicts the insider model. 
Figure 3-3: The insider model of corporate governance 
 
Source: Cernat (2004) 
The insider model is widely practised in Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Switzerland and Japan, among others. The following section examines in detail the 
German version of the insider model. 
3.4.3. The Germanic Model 
The stock market plays a less significant role in the economies of Germanic countries 
than in Anglo-Saxon countries. Sweden, the Netherlands and Switzerland have the 
equivalent of 41.7% of GDP in market capitalization and 6.5% of gross fixed capital 
formation in terms of new capital raised through public offerings. In these countries, 
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companies are more likely to seek alternative sources of capital and there are fewer 
private shareholders (Prowse, 1998; Gilpin, 2001). This may partly explain why the 
German model of CG sees the company as an institution or social entity whose job is 
to serve the interests of a range of stakeholders, not just shareholders (Weimer and 
Pape, 1999). The effectiveness of the model is measured in terms of the return on social 
capital (Roe, 2003), with efficiency criteria being “focused on the maximisation of 
stakeholder value rather than shareholder value” (Goergen et al., 2008. p.1). This 
means that employees, investors, lenders and shareholders are all entitled to influence 
the decisions and strategies made and set for the firm (Monks and Minow, 2008), 
though the chairman’s casting vote gives slightly more power to shareholders (Hopt 
and Leyens, 2004, p.7).   
Like other insider models, the German model has a two-tier board structure. The board 
of directors is divided into a supervisory board, which consists of non-executive 
members and is elected by shareholders in the general meetings (Mallin, 2007), and a 
management board, which consists of executive members and is appointed by the 
supervisory board. Mallin (2007) explains that: the co-determination principle for 
compulsory employees are also represented in supervisory board which then 
comprises one-third employees representative or one-half employee representative 
respectively. The German Corporate Governance Code (2010, p.8) sets out in detail 
the functions of management boards: 
“The Management Board is responsible for independently managing 
the enterprise in the interest of the enterprise, taking into account the 
interests of the shareholders, its employees and other stakeholders, 
with the objective of sustainable creation of value. The Management 
Board develops the enterprise's strategy, coordinates it with the 
Supervisory Board and ensures its implementation.”  
Table 3.1 summarises the main features of corporate governance within the outsider 
and insider systems. 
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Table 3-1: Main features of insider and outsider systems 
 
3.4.4. Corporate Governance Reform in the UK 
Although the UK and USA corporate governance systems both follow the outsider 
model, they differ in a number of ways. The UK is recognised as a world leader in 
corporate governance reform, largely as a result of the growing interest being shown 
in CG issues by the country’s directors, institutional investment community and 
government (Solomon, 2010). For this reason, it is discussed here as a prime example 
of the outsider model. 
Insider systems Outsider systems 
Firms are owned predominantly by 
insider shareholders who also wield 
control over management. 
Large firms are controlled by managers but 
owned predominantly by outside 
shareholders. 
Little separation of ownership and 
control, so agency problems are 
rare. 
Separation of ownership and control, which 
engenders significant agency problems. 
Hostile takeover activity is rare. Frequent hostile takeovers act as a 
disciplining mechanism on company 
management. 
Ownership is concentrated among 
a small group of shareholders 
(founding family members, other 
companies through pyramidal 
structures, state ownership). 
Ownership is dispersed. 
 
Excessive control by a small group 
of insider shareholders. 
Moderate control by a large range of 
shareholders. 
Wealth transfers from minority 
shareholders to majority 
shareholders. 
whereas moderate control by a large range of 
shareholders is exercised in outsider systems. 
Company law offers weak investor 
protection.  
Company law offers strong investor 
protection. 
 
Potential for abuse of power by 
majority shareholders. 
Potential for shareholder democracy. 
 
Majority shareholders have more 
'voice' in their investee companies. 
Shareholding is characterised more by 'exit' 
than by 'voice'. 
 
 
  
Shalba 2016 54 
 
The first attempt to tackle the issue of corporate governance in the UK was in 1991, 
when a committee was established to examine the financial aspects of CG. Chaired by 
Sir Adrian Cadbury, it became known as the Cadbury Committee. This committee was 
established due to ongoing concerns over financial reporting and financial 
accountability standards following corporate scandals such as Maxwell, BCCI and 
Polly Peck, amongst others. The extensive use of creative accounting, abandonment 
of accounting standards and inefficient auditing processes also contributed. Joint 
behaviour undermined the city's self-regulation system, in which the Cadbury 
Committee was a major shareholder. 
The committee’s work culminated in the production of the Cadbury Report in 1992. 
The report, which defined corporate governance as “…the system by which companies 
are directed and controlled”, emphasised that: 
“Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their 
companies. The shareholders' role in governance is to appoint the 
directors and the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an 
appropriate governance structure is in place. ... The Board's actions 
are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders at the AGM.” 
(p.14)   
The Cadbury Committee was followed in 1995 by the Greenbury Committee, which 
was set up to investigate managers’ wages and bonuses. These were attracting growing 
public attention because of the widening wage gap that was emerging in newly 
privatised industries. Accordingly, the committee prepared a report and a code of best 
practice on manager remuneration (Greenbury, 1996). Both the Cadbury and 
Greenbury committees recommended a new committee be appointed to review their 
findings. In November 1995, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) set up the Hampel 
Committee to introduce the implementation of corporate governance standards. The 
Hampel Committee amended and merged the Cadbury and Greenbury codes into one 
single combined code which was updated to take into account any new developments 
arising from the earlier reports (England and Wales,, 1999; Higgs, 2003). The 
Combined Code, which was imposed on the London Stock Exchange in 1998 (Garratt, 
2003), has supported the development of corporate governance in the international 
arena, including Libya (its recommendations were taken into account when Libya’s 
CG guidelines were revised in 2010). The Higgs Review of 2003 further modified the 
Combined Code, which was reissued in August 2003 (Garratt, 2010). Appendix A 
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(Table 1) summarises the key reforms that have guided the development of corporate 
governance in the UK. 
3.4.5. Corporate Governance in the United States 
The 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act was the USA’s response to a series of major corporate 
collapses (e.g. Enron and WorldCom). The act acknowledged the significance of 
auditor autonomy and stipulated that there should be no conflict of interest in the 
relationship between auditor and auditee. The SEC has since instituted a number of 
rules designed to ensure that the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley are implemented. Many 
of these rules may be traced back to the recommendations made by the various UK 
committees, such as the Hampel Report’s recommendation that companies should 
establish remuneration, appointment and audit committees staffed mainly by 
independent directors. 
3.5. International CG Initiatives: the OECD Principles 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 1999) set up 
an inter-governmental task force to devise a standard, globally accepted corporate 
governance framework (Solomon and Solomon, 2004). The task force, which included 
representatives from the 29 OECD governments, the EU Commission, the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund, the Bank for International Settlements, and from the 
business, labour and investment communities, produced its principles of corporate 
governance in 1998. According to Collier and Zaman (2005), this was the first inter-
governmental attempt to develop an international approach to corporate governance. 
Responses to the OECD Principles have been mixed. Frederick (1999, cited by 
DaviesSchlitzer, 2008) argues that they provide a point of reference for countries 
aiming to develop their own corporate governance system, but Monks and Minow 
(2008) claim that this is all they can do, given that little can be done to enforce them. 
Turnbull (1999), meanwhile, cautions that the ethical integrity of the principles risks 
being taken for granted simply because they are being promoted by institutions like 
the OECD. Critics have also pointed out that the principles are broad enough to be 
interpreted in several ways.  
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The sixth principle in the OECD framework (see Appendix A.2) stipulates that: “The 
corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the company, 
the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s accountability 
to the company and the shareholders” (OECD Principles, 1999; 2004). Directors are 
expected to monitor and assess managers’ performance and to be responsive to 
shareholders and other relevant stakeholders. In its boardroom guide, the OECD (2008, 
p.95) identifies an extensive list of board functions which it sees as central to the 
supervision of management performance. These include: 
1. Reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, major plans of action, risk policy, 
annual budgets and business plans; setting performance objectives; monitoring 
implementation and corporate performance; and overseeing major capital 
expenditures, acquisitions and divestitures. 
2. Monitoring the effectiveness of the company’s governance practices and 
making changes as needed. 
3. Selecting, compensating, monitoring and, when necessary, replacing key 
executives and overseeing succession planning. 
4. Aligning key executive and board remuneration with the longer-term interests 
of the company and its shareholders. 
5. Ensuring a formal and transparent board nomination and election process. 
6. Monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest between management, 
directors and shareholders, including misuse of corporate assets and abuse in 
related party transactions. 
7. Ensuring the integrity of the corporation’s accounting and financial reporting 
systems, including the independent audit, and that appropriate systems of 
control are in place, in particular, systems for risk management, financial and 
operational control, and compliance with the law and relevant standards. 
8. Overseeing the process of disclosure and communications. 
The OECD Principles may be used as the basis of governance methodology at both 
state and corporate level, though since the demand for and requirements of CG vary 
from country to country according to the culture, legal framework and prevailing 
corporate structure, simply importing them may not be useful. Mallin (2007, p.21) 
observes that a number of countries that have adopted the OECD’s CG code have made 
repeated amendments. However, she emphasises that although these countries have 
widely differing legal backgrounds, cultural and political contexts, business forms and 
ownership structures, in all cases, the introduction of the code has been motivated by 
a desire for transparency or accountability and to increase investor confidence in the 
stock market as a whole. 
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3.6. Corporate Governance in Developing Countries 
The last two decades have seen a great increase in corporate governance research. Up 
to and throughout the nineties, most corporate governance research focused on the 
USA and UK, with some work being done in other developed countries like Japan and 
Germany (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). However, more research is now being done 
across both developed and developing countries; Solomon and Solomon (2004) list 24 
countries outside the USA and UK where CG research has been conducted.3 Libya 
does not feature on this list as researchers have only recently begun to explore 
corporate governance in the country (e.g. Larbsh, 2010). This is perhaps not surprising, 
given that Libya is still in the early stages of corporate governance reform. 
The relative lack thus far of CG research in developing countries is largely due to the 
fact that most of these countries are not as advanced in terms of CG practice as their 
industrialised counterparts. The corporate governance mechanisms that have reduced 
the possibility of mismanagement arising from fraud or errors and increased investor 
confidence in developed market economies have not worked as well in developing 
countries (Okeahalam and Akinboade, 2003; Black and Khanna, 2007), where there 
tends to be more political interference and less demand for corporate control (Gibson, 
2003; Singh, 2003). Aintablian and Al Boustany (2008) also point to continuing 
misperceptions surrounding CG; for example, they argue that executives in MENA 
banks are not fully supportive of efforts to improve CG because they mistakenly see 
the process as one that requires heavy investment but yields little financial return. 
Finally, while the majority of businesses and corporations in some developing 
countries are family-owned or small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), in other 
economies, state-owned enterprises dominate production, consumption and the labour 
market (Young et al., 2008). In other words, as Samaha (2010) points out, developing 
countries are not a homogeneous group; the diversity of their CG practice may be 
                                                 
3 Countries listed include: Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, The Czech Republic, 
France, Germany, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Russia, 
South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. 
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partly attributable to the fact that they are at different stages of political development 
or have adopted different economic philosophies.  
The environmental differences between developed and developing countries mean that 
research findings from the former are not always generalisable to the latter; Baralexis 
(2004) highlights that companies in developing countries are more likely to be poorly 
managed and unlisted, and those using the financial information are more likely to be 
unsophisticated. This means that CG is also likely to be perceived differently. 
Nevertheless, both developing countries themselves and international institutions such 
as the World Bank are attempting to address the issue of corporate governance in 
developing economies. Numerous conferences, workshops and meetings have been 
hosted by the World Bank and other international organisations with the aim of 
improving CG practice (Saidi, 2004), and many developing countries are trying to 
develop their own CG codes, with varying degrees of success.  
Among those authors that have investigated CG in developing countries, McGee (2008) 
compared how corporate governance principles (as identified by the World Bank, IMF 
and the OECD) are applied across Asia (in Malaysia, Vietnam, Pakistan, Korea, 
Philippines, India, Indonesia and Thailand). His findings indicate that CG practices in 
these countries are still weak and that they are all struggling to implement their own 
corporate governance guidelines. Okike (2007) identified similar difficulties in Nigeria. 
Examining the roles played by the Corporate Affairs Commission, the government, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Nigerian Stock Exchange, shareholders’ 
representatives, directors, auditors and audit committees, he found that despite the 
government’s best efforts (including changing company legislation and establishing a 
Code of Best Practice for all Nigerian listed companies), corporate governance 
mechanisms are still largely ineffective because the enforcement mechanisms are weak. 
The problems can be exacerbated by political instability. Mangena et al. (2012) 
examined the effect of severe political and economic crisis on corporate governance 
in Zimbabwe. Using panel data from the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange for the period 
2000-2005, they studied the relationship between board and ownership structures and 
firm performance before and after the presidential election. They found that board size, 
ownership concentration and executive directors’ share ownership increased after the 
election, while the proportion of non-executive directors fell. Employing a system 
  
Shalba 2016 59 
 
generalized method of moments approach, they found that performance was positively 
related to board size and ownership concentration after (but not before) the presidential 
election. Performance was negatively related to executive directors’ share ownership 
in the post-presidential election period, but positively related in the pre-presidential 
election period. The relationship between performance and the proportion of non-
executive directors was negative and significant in both periods. 
Other CG research in developing countries has highlighted the importance of the 
outside director or non-executive director role. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found a 
significant relationship in Malaysia between the selection of non-executive directors 
and the extent of voluntary disclosure, while Hussain and Mallin (2002) found that 
Bahraini boards are mainly controlled by non-executive directors and there is clear 
separation between the CEO and the chairman. In the majority of cases, non-executive 
directors were found to be relatively independent, having been selected (by the board 
as a whole or by major shareholders or the CEO/chairman – none of the companies in 
the study had a nominations committee) for their skills, business experience and 
reputation (Hussain and Mallin, 2003). The authors acknowledge that it is unclear how 
effective the nomination appointments process is and that directors tend to be fairly 
entrenched, but they are nevertheless cautiously optimistic: 
"Whilst Bahrain does not have a CG code per se, the company law 
reforms contain some interesting provisions that will contribute to 
the CG framework in Bahrain. Amongst these provisions is one that 
excludes directors from being on more than three boards. There are 
therefore some encouraging features and developments in CG in 
Bahrain." (2003, p.249) 
The importance of outside directors was also highlighted by Solomon et al. (2003) in 
their study of Taiwanese listed companies. The researchers employed questionnaire 
surveys to examine what directors see as being the role and function of the board in 
these companies. They found that the board of directors is seen as the most important 
instrument in Taiwanese CG, and once again, outside directors play a vital role. The 
researchers concluded that their findings support the agency theory perspective on 
corporate governance; respondents attributed such importance to outside directors 
because they are seen as improving corporate accountability to shareholders. 
(Interestingly, their results revealed that few Taiwanese companies have established 
remuneration or audit committees.) 
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Geller (2009) conducted a study of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Mexico, 
focusing on the characteristics of 198 directors in a sample of seventeen banks. The 
study found that a high proportion of directors had received their higher education 
abroad, mainly in the USA and Europe, and a high proportion had previous banking 
experience (76.5%). Only 5.6% of directors were female, and 52.5% had finance, 
economics or accounting qualifications. Board sizes varied from four to seventeen 
directors, with the average being 9.62 directors. 30.85% of independent directors had 
a banking background. 
Researchers have so far demonstrated mixed results in terms of the advance of CG in 
MENA countries. Bremer and Elias (2007) investigated the challenges facing 
corporate governance in Egypt, using historical, empirical and interview data to 
analyse the structures of capital markets, the government’s privatisation policy, board 
structure, the culture and the legal environment. They concluded that although major 
obstacles remain, recent developments indicate that momentum may be building for 
change. Also in Egypt, Samaha (2010) examined the impact of board independence 
and the presence of an audit committee on the level of disclosure in a range of 
information categories (ownership structure and exercise of control rights, financial 
transparency and information, auditing, corporate responsibility and compliance, and 
board and management structure and process). The results revealed that disclosure is 
not yet a fully established practice in Egypt and that its advantages have yet to be 
realised. Furthermore, there is no significant association between the presence of an 
audit committee and disclosure levels. 
In Tunisia, Khanchel El Mehdi (2007) examined the relationship between corporate 
governance and corporate performance, concluding that CG is weakened by ownership 
concentration, poor regulation and a limited legal framework in tunisia companies. 
Taktak and Triki (2012), meanwhile, explored the governance characteristics of 
Tunisian listed banks in an attempt to detect how their internal governance 
mechanisms affected efficiency during the period 2002-2009. They found that 
efficiency was affected by the structure and size of the board of directors and by the 
ownership structure and that private banks were more efficient than public ones. 
The above literature review provides evidence that developing countries as far apart 
as Bahrain, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordon, South Korea, India, Brazil, Argentina, South 
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Africa and Turkey all recognise the importance of corporate governance and have tried 
to establish effective CG codes. Many of these studies compare corporate governance 
across countries. Most concentrate on the CG model used in each country, while others 
focus on issues such as ownership structure, the board of directors' role and current 
disclosure practices. 
Larbsh (2010) is one of the few authors to have explored corporate governance practice 
in Libya. He found that the corporate governance framework is less developed than in 
neighbouring countries, with the result that accountability is weak. The opaque 
economic structure, outdated legal system, cultural and social norms, political 
interference and lack of accounting professionalism all have an adverse effect on the 
corporate governance framework. Finding that the stakeholder model of corporate 
governance is more acceptable in Libya and that the board of directors is the main 
internal mechanism of CG, Larbsh argued that BODs need to be more responsible and 
to act on behalf of all stakeholders. Larbsh’s study offered an initial understanding of 
CG practice within Libya’s developing, transitional economy, but it was conducted 
before the 2011 revolution, following which “Libya embarked on a radically new 
chapter in its history” (BBC, 2014). To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the 
current study is the first to focus on the listed and unlisted commercial banks which 
play such a key economic role in developing countries, and the first to concentrate on 
Libya. In exploring the current role of BODs in the Libyan banking sector, it addresses 
a gap in the accounting literature. It also adds to the limited research examining the 
views of regulators and officials on how to reduce the obstacles that inhibit effective 
corporate governance. 
3.7. Corporate Governance from the Islamic Perspective (the Islamic 
System) 
Few studies have been conducted on corporate governance from the Islamic viewpoint 
or on governance arrangements within the Islamic financial domain, despite the fact 
that Islamic financial institutions have been operating with great success for the last 
forty years and are making a growing contribution to global finance (Yunis, 2007). The 
trend for Islamic corporate governance has grown in response to a rising demand from 
Muslim communities around the world. Khalifa (2003) explains that people want 
transactions to be conducted in accordance with Islamic Shari’ah law because they 
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believe this guarantees a level of moral and social responsibility, and the promotion of 
social and environmental well-being. 
Table 3-2: Empirical studies on the role of the board in developed and 
developing countries 
 
In Islamic institutions, as elsewhere, corporate governance relates to the structures put 
in place to manage and organise the corporation so that it fulfils its corporate goals, 
the first of which is to safeguard the rights and interests of all shareholders. However, 
the Islamic model adopts a broader approach to decision making, taking into account 
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Islamic socio-scientific principles underpinned by the deific oneness of Allah 
(Choudhury and Hoque, 2004). Berger (2011) points out that: “religion has been the 
historically most widespread and effective instrumentality of legitimation”, and this is 
certainly the case in the Islamic world. As in the west, corporate governance plays a 
significant role in ensuring Islamic organisations achieve their objectives and aims; 
unlike in the west, these aims must take into account Maqasid Shari’ah 4 , or the 
objectives of Islamic law. However, since these also stipulate that an organisation’s 
major aim should be to maximise shareholders’ profits and protect their interests, in 
practice, many Islamic corporations espouse the Anglo-Saxon or western approach to 
corporate governance (Lim, 2007, p.737-738).  
Having said this opponents of the Anglo-Saxon model question the relevance of the 
principle-agent association or the agency issue in the Islamic context. In fact, the 
literature shows that many Islamic establishments adopt a completely unrelated theory 
of corporate governance or an adapted version of the stakeholder-oriented paradigm 
(Hasan, 2009). This is because Islamic corporate governance activities are required not 
just to protect the interests of shareholders but also to support social welfare.  As in 
other CG models, the board of directors represents the owners in monitoring and 
supervising business operations, but in the Islamic model, managers possess a 
fiduciary responsibility to administer the affairs of the company on behalf of all 
participants, not just the shareholders. This has led authors such as Hasan (2008) to 
characterise the governance model in the Islamic economic system as stakeholder in 
nature. This system is based on the principle of participation, with all shareholders 
sharing a belief in the Tawhid or the oneness of God. It should be noted at this point 
that although the Tawhid5 and Shar’ah6 may be the epistemological basis of corporate 
governance from the Islamic perspective (Lewis, 2006), it is unclear how far they 
inform corporate governance structures in practice. Major organisations, including 
                                                 
4 Refers to the corpus of Islamic law based on divine guidance as given by the Qur’an and the Sunnah 
and embodies all aspects of the Islamic faith, including beliefs and practices. 
5 Allah is the: “Creator, Owner and Source of all things and has entrusted mankind to use and manage 
all things wisely.  In return for the use of the physical universe, mankind agrees to be accountable for 
how they use and manage the universe” (Farook, 2007). 
6 Refers to the corpus of Islamic law based on divine guidance as given by the Qur’an and the Sunnah 
and embodies all aspects of the Islamic faith, including beliefs and practices. 
  
Shalba 2016 64 
 
IFCs, seem more inclined to adopt CG models that are grounded on rationalist 
principles and, as indicated above, many corporations in practice follow the Anglo-
Saxon model of governance. Emphasis should therefore be placed on the empirical 
rather than theoretical study (Hasan, 2009) of the Tawhid/Shurah-based model, more 
details of which are given below. 
The Tawhid and Shari’ah (Islamic law) 
Since the Islamic faith is grounded on the principle of Tawhid (Al-Faruqi, 1995), 
corporate governance theory also originates from this perspective. Allah says in the 
Holy Qur’an: 
 “Men who remember Allah standing, sitting, and lying down on 
their sides, and contemplate the (wonders of) creation In the heavens 
and the earth (with the saying): ‘Our Lord Not for naught hast thou 
created all this! Glory to Thee! Give us Salvation from the 
Chastisement of the Fire.” (3:191)  
In this verse, the fundamental principle of governance is expressed; all of God’s 
creatures have a purpose behind their existence, and this purpose lies in being the 
world’s vicegerent. While entrusting mankind with this responsibility, Allah is still all-
aware and all-knowing (Chapra, 1992). Since Allah knows everything, and all 
mankind is accountable to Him, this means that within the corporate governance 
paradigm also, all parties are accountable and responsible for their actions before 
Allah. 
The principle of accountability (hesab) features several times in the Qur'an. According 
to Surah Ibrahim Verse 51: “that Allah may require each soul according to its desert; 
and, verily, Allah is swift in calling to account”. Individuals are held to be accountable 
both to Allah and to the Muslim community for their actions and words, whether bad 
or good. The verse: “O you who believe! When ye deal with each other, In transactions 
involving future obligations In a fixed period of time, Reduce them to writing” (Al-
Baqarah Verse 282) urges full and truthful disclosure, while Surah Al-Anfal (Verse 27) 
enjoins trustworthiness: “O you who believe! Betray not Allah and his Messenger, nor 
betray knowingly your Amanat (things entrusted to you and all the duties which Allah 
has ordained for you)”. Thus, corporate employees are required to pledge that they will 
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conform to standards of ethical behaviour in their business dealings, and all forms of 
cheating and usury are prohibited (Murtuza, 2002). 
As the paying of interest is not permitted under Islamic teaching (Choudhury and 
Hoque, 2006), the financial system is instead based on cooperative instruments such 
as Mudharabah and Musharakah. Lewis (2001) explains that in a Mudharabah 
partnership, one partner takes on the managerial role and the other partners are 
stakeholders, while in a Musharakah partnership, all partners share managerial 
responsibility, whatever the extent of their involvement. Not everyone is in favour of 
this, however; Chapra (2007, p.338) argues that investors were exposed to a wide range 
of threats when “Islamic banks began to engage in risk-sharing behaviours such as 
Mudharabah and Musharakah”. 
The key debates within Islamic CG concern two fundamental principles of Islamic 
law: the property rights principle and the obligation (both explicit and implicit) to 
honour contracts. According to Nienhaus (2006), Islamic corporate governance has to 
be value-oriented and uphold equality and righteousness for all participants. Several 
verses in the Qur’an7 address property rights. Surah 57:7 says: “Believe in Allah and 
His Messenger and spend of that whereof He made you trustee”, implying that property 
ownership is by the grace of Allah. The obligation to fulfil one’s contractual duties is 
made explicit in Surah 5:1: “O you who believe, fulfil contracts”. A contract sets out 
the rights and duties of the participants and should be considered binding by all those 
involved, whether individuals, communities or organisations. 
Organisational management in Islamic corporate governance is based on the principles 
of the Shur’ah and is collaborative, cohesive and progressive in nature. The top level 
of management is assigned to the Shari’ah supervisory board, which plays a major role 
in terms of advising and overseeing the activities of the company and confirming that 
these adhere to Shari’ah teachings (Delorenzo, 2002). In this respect, the Islamic 
model is like the German CG model; that is, it operates a two-tier system with a 
supervisory board and a management board. Bhatti and Bhatti (2010) argue that the 
Shari’ah supervisory board plays an important role in preventing the administration 
                                                 
7  Al Qur’an: The Holy book of Muslims, consisting of the revelations made by God to Prophet 
Muhammad (peace be upon him).  
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from acting unethically. The Shari’ah board coordinates and joins concepts and their 
implementation within the regulatory boards of Islamic financial organisations (Lewis, 
2001). According to Choudhury and Hoque (2006), the reason behind this is to avoid 
discrepancies between the separate boards and support the development and 
dissemination of new products. The nature of ownership mechanisms in Islamic 
corporate governance means that owners and investors share legal ownership, rather 
than it being assigned solely to shareholders.  
The Libyan financial system and its CG have been significantly impacted by western 
financial systems, even though the philosophy and institutional context that govern 
accounting in Libya are very different from those in the west (Ahmad and Gao, 2004). 
One of the major differences between the two is how the concept of responsibility is 
perceived (Maali et al., 2006). In the west, firms are only accountable to their 
stakeholders, particularly shareholders, while in Islamic countries, as discussed above, 
each Muslim is explicitly held accountable to God for all their commercial activities 
(Lewis, 2001; Maali et al., 2006).  
 3.8. Conclusion 
This chapter begins by reviewing the various definitions of corporate governance and 
the theoretical perspectives that have been developed to explain CG. It then examines 
the models that have been developed to describe corporate governance in developed 
countries. These are the two-tier board or insider-dominated system and the unitary 
board or outsider-dominated system. The chapter briefly considers the role BODs play 
in corporate governance in the UK (outsider) and German (insider) models before 
discussing the principles of corporate governance developed by the OECD. The 
chapter ends by discussing some of the research that has been conducted on CG in 
developing countries and introducing the Islamic system of corporate governance. The 
OECD principles identify several factors which are perceived to be central to board 
effectiveness, including board independence, the separation of the roles of 
management and directors and the setting up of independent board committees. The 
next chapter discusses the roles and responsibilities of corporate boards and the impact 
that these and other factors have on the ability of BODs to perform these roles 
effectively.  
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Chapter 4: Corporate Boards: The Roles and Responsibilities of 
the Board 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the literature relating to the roles and responsibilities of the 
board of directors. It begins by discussing the board’s role in three key areas – strategy, 
service and control – before examining how internal factors such as board size and 
composition, CEO/chairman duality and board committees affect the board’s ability to 
perform these roles effectively. Finally, it considers how the board’s role and 
effectiveness are affected by factors such as ownership structure and the legal, political 
and cultural context. The main purpose of this chapter is to investigate in general terms 
the board’s roles and responsibilities in regard to corporate governance and the 
obstacles it faces when carrying out these roles and responsibilities; the analysis 
chapters will address how these issues are perceived by individuals working in the 
Libyan banking sector. 
As the link between shareholders and management, the board of directors is at the heart 
of the company (Solomon and Solomon, 2004). The apex of the internal governance 
structure (John and Senbet, 1998; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009), it has the power to 
positively influence firm performance by carrying out its assigned roles effectively 
(Levrau and Van Den Berghe, 2007b; Maassen, 2002). It has been described as: "…the 
most important and frequently used supervisory mechanism for management actions" 
(Dehaene et al., 2001, p.387); in other words, it is the first line of defence against 
managers who would act contrary to shareholders’ interests. It has also been described 
as the principle governance mechanism for shareholders in diffusely held firms 
(Brennan, 2006; Daily et al., 2003). According to Jensen (1993), the board sets the 
rules for the CEO and provides counsel for the firm. It is generally responsible for the 
appointment and replacement of the CEO and senior managers, and for approving 
major initiatives in the firm (Petrovic, 2008). On behalf of shareholders, it monitors 
whether strategic objectives are being met by the management; indeed, strategic 
guidance is considered one of its main roles (OECD, 2003; Aguilera, 2005). 
The literature suggests that a clear understanding of board roles is necessary in any 
discussion of board effectiveness (Lauenstein et al., 1983). This has led numerous 
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authors to attempt to conceptualise the roles of the board (Stiles and Taylor, 2001; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Huse, 2005), but there is as yet no general consensus 
on what these roles are (Johnson et al., 1996; Roberts et al., 2005). Although much is 
expected of directors in terms of involvement, their roles are often ill-defined (Petrovic, 
2008). Consequently, a range of roles have been attributed to the board of directors 
(Huse, 2005), reflecting the complexity of what it does (Petrovic, 2008). 
Understanding board roles is made even more difficult by the fact that there is often a 
significant gap between literature and practice. The best-known study of boards, 
conducted by Mace in 1971, concluded that most boards did not set company 
objectives, formulate policies or select strategies and that there was a considerable gap 
between what directors did in practice and what the business literature said they should 
do (see Brennan, 2006).   
The nature of the board’s contribution and, crucially, the expectations placed on it 
depend on which theoretical perspective is adopted. For example, the agency 
perspective features prominently in corporate governance and board literature, firstly, 
because it offers a comprehensive definition of the role of the board and secondly, 
because it recognises that governance structures often fail to protect the interests of 
shareholders. Far from ignoring the potential for conflict between agents and principals, 
agency theorists actually build their notions of governance around these conflicts 
(Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Thus, this theory posits that the major role of the board is to 
reduce any divergence of interest between shareholders and management, thereby 
minimising agency costs and protecting shareholders' investment. 
As highlighted above, the corporate governance literature identifies a range of roles 
that are played by BODs (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Maassen, 2002), but it suggests that 
the board’s main role is to ensure the firm’s management is performing properly. This 
role normally comprises five functions: direction (advice), executive action (strategy), 
service and resource support (resource dependence), supervision (monitoring) and 
ensuring accountability (Brennan, 2006, p.580). The three most critical board roles 
have been identified as the service role, the control role and the strategic role. These 
have been studied from a range of theoretical perspectives (see Zahra and Pearce, 1989; 
Maassen, 2002; Hung, 1998; Johnson et al., 1996; Levrau and Van Den Berghe, 2007b; 
Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1996; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004b; 
Vance, 1983). In practice, the strategic role may overlap with the service and control 
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roles, implying that two or more roles may operate concurrently (Maassen, 2002; 
Zahra, 1990). Since it is impractical to untangle board roles, it is necessary to adopt an 
integrated approach when considering board performance (Bhagat and Black, 2002; 
Mintzberg, 1983; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004a). The following sections offer a summary 
of the main board roles and their relationship to the various theoretical perspectives. 
4.2. The Control and Monitoring Roles  
Minichilli et al. (2009) argue that the board’s control role encompasses behavioural 
control, output control and strategic control. The perceived need for behavioural 
control derives from agency theory. It is internally focused and consists in monitoring 
the behaviour of the CEO and top managers (Boyd, 1995) to ensure that they are 
operating in the interests of shareholders. Output control, which derives from both 
agency theory and stakeholder theory, has an external focus and involves monitoring 
the firm’s financial performance. The asymmetry of information between directors and 
managers makes the direct observation of management behaviour difficult, so this is 
done indirectly by monitoring firm performance and whether it is meeting shareholders’ 
and stakeholders’ expectations (Eisenhardt, 1985; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Finally, 
strategic control, which is based on agency theory and the legal view of the corporation, 
involves evaluating and monitoring the management’s strategic decision making 
(Stiles and Taylor, 2001). This task is particularly important when critical choices are 
being made, such as whether to acquire a new firm, divest a division or negotiate a 
takeover bid (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Combining its 
control and strategic roles, the board monitors the external environment to identify 
new opportunities. The ongoing reassessment of priorities is considered essential for 
organisational learning and renewal (Lye, 2011; Simons, 1994). Limpaphayom and 
Connelly (2004) and Carpenter and Westphal, (2001) associate board involvement in 
the initiation and monitoring of corporate strategy with good corporate governance. 
Agency theorists emphasise that the most important function of boards is to monitor 
the actions of "agents" (managers) so that the interests of "principals" (owners) are 
protected (Eisenhardt, 1989). This monitoring function is clearly vital; Carter and 
Lorsch (2004) point out that poor performance and financial manipulation by high-
profile companies in the USA and elsewhere have reinforced the idea that boards 
should focus more on their supervisory function. The main objective of both 
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monitoring boards and supervisory boards is to exert control over management, but 
while the former seeks to protect shareholders’ interests, the latter defends the interests 
of almost all stakeholders (Tüngler, 2000, p.260). In either case, the growing emphasis 
on the monitoring function is having tangible effects on how directors work. Heidrick 
and Struggles (2007, cited in Faleye et al., 2009) report that 84% of respondents in 
their survey of directors indicated that they now spend more time on monitoring and 
less on strategy, while according to Steger (2004), a board may focus exclusively on 
its monitoring role when it is sure that top management is directing the company 
efficiently. Samaha and Dahawy (2011) assert that the BOD is considered the primary 
internal mechanism for monitoring management performance in the Arab world.   
Hillman et al. (2008) argue that appointing non-executive/independent directors is the 
most effective way to ensure the board fulfils its monitoring role. Director 
independence makes the board better able to ensure the integrity of the company’s 
financial and non-financial reporting and board remuneration (OECD, 2004). It also 
reassures investors that their investments are being safeguarded (Pass, 2004). However, 
Ezzamel and Watson argue that combining the monitoring and supervisory functions 
can “…restrict significantly the effectiveness of non-executive directors in performing 
their monitoring role” (1997, p.64). This role may also be weakened because NEDs 
are not accountable to shareholders (although Kakabadse et al. (2010, p.1075) reject 
the notion that stricter regulations should be introduced to compensate) and they may 
have extensive commitments elsewhere. In practice, despite the monetary incentives 
that non-executive directors receive, many have marginal input into the monitoring of 
top management.  
The primary obstacle to understanding the monitoring role and the relationship 
between board and management is the definition of control itself. Berle and Means 
(1932) argue that control rests with the individual or group of people who possess the 
power to choose the board of directors; in other words, control may be defined as the 
ability to select the board. This power may fall into the hands of management for a 
number of reasons; for example, Westphal and Zajac (1997) point out that the CEO’s 
control over the selection procedure is a crucial factor facilitating management control. 
Stiles and Taylor (2001), meanwhile, argue that managers are able to dominate firms 
because they have a better understanding of the institution than directors, are more 
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able to control data and appoint most of the employees. As such, they are able to initiate 
far-reaching courses of action and influence strategy. Accordingly, a number of authors 
define control as the authority to determine corporate policy, set up key long-term 
targets and aims, implement courses of action and distribute resources to meet targets 
(Chandler, 1962, cited in Stiles and Taylor, 2001). 
According to Nicholson and Kiel (2004b), there are three main reasons why corporate 
governance research has mainly centred on the monitoring and control role of the 
board of directors: these are the increasing popularity of agency theory, the fallout 
from recent corporate scandals and the growing legislation surrounding board duties. 
The agency perspective suggests that as a firm grows in size; its ownership becomes 
more diffuse; as owner power reduces, managers’ discretion over the firm increases 
(Berle and Means, 1932; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). In these circumstances, the board 
serves as a mechanism to address any conflicts of interest that may arise between 
executives and shareholders and to bring their interests into congruence so as to 
promote company efficiency and maintain shareholder value (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2003).  
High profile scandals such as Enron and WorldCom have highlighted serious 
weaknesses in corporate governance and led to massive losses of shareholder capital 
(Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003). In several cases, the prime cause has been the board’s 
failure to monitor and control management effectively. The US Senate report on Enron, 
for example, revealed that the board failed in its fiduciary duty by not questioning 
managers about complicated financial transactions in which the firm was involved 
(Adams, 2008). Reviews of corporate governance practice in the MENA region have 
revealed a similar lack of supervision from BODs (IFC and Hawkamah, 2008; ROSC, 
2009). As a result, there have been increasing calls for boards to show greater vigilance.  
Finally, the board’s oversight and control duties have been significantly expanded in a 
number of developed countries following the introduction of legislation such as the 
Combined Code (UK), and the OECD Code (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004a). These 
developments reflect the fact that as corporations become an ever more integral part 
of society, stakeholders are demanding higher standards of governance and greater 
accountability from boards (Ingley and Van der Walt, 2001). They give additional 
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weight to existing company by-laws and capital market listing rules, which already 
require boards to exercise effective control over management in the interest of 
shareholders (Vagliasindi, 2008). 
The literature notes a number of gaps between theory and practice when it comes to 
board roles and corporate governance, especially in countries where corporate 
governance codes and principles are less developed (Monks and Minow, 1991). In 
most developing countries, for example, ownership is concentrated in the hands of a 
few people and/or institutions, meaning that some shareholders play a disproportionate 
role in the director selection process. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), “as 
ownership gets beyond a certain point, the large owners gain nearly full control and 
prefer to use firm-generated private benefits of control that are not shared by minority 
shareholders” (p.759). Claessens et al. (1999, p.6) describe some of the CG problems 
this can create, such as: “controlling shareholders enriching themselves by not paying 
dividends, or transferring profit to other companies they control”.   
This study seeks to arrive at a better understanding of the board’s control role by 
identifying how it operates in practice – including the roles played by executive and 
non-executive directors. A number of internal and external factors affect the BODs’ 
performance of its control role; for example, the composition and structure of the board 
are key determinants of whether the management controls the board or vice versa 
(Thomsen, 2004; Coombes and Wong, 2004). These internal and external factors will 
be discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
4.3. The Service Role  
Scholars investigating the BOD’s service role have tended to concentrate on the 
support that directors offer by introducing valuable assets into the company and 
advising and assisting CEOs rather than their preparedness or ability to oversee 
executives. The board’s service role is generally explained in terms of resource 
dependency theory and stakeholder theory (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2005; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). Stakeholder theory sees the BOD’s role as being to manage 
stakeholders and improve the social performance of the firm (Freeman et al., 2004). 
Thus, Wang and Dewhirst (1992) argue that selection to the board should be based, in 
part, on the individual’s ability to contribute to managing stakeholders.  
  
Shalba 2016 73 
 
Board members support the management using their own professional and personal 
expertise to provide appropriate advice in areas where the firm lacks knowledge. 
Resource dependency theory suggests that firms require resources from the external 
environment to create value. These resources may include finance and capital, or links 
to suppliers, customers and important stakeholders (Freeman and Evan, 1991; Ayuso 
and Argandona, 2009). For example, evidence from developed countries shows that 
the executives of financial institutions are often appointed as external directors as a 
means of accessing credit (Daily et al., 2003).  
Stakeholder theory suggests that the board should not only expand the firm’s 
boundaries, but that it should also enhance its social performance. The board’s 
objectives should be to identify the firm’s key stakeholders and to manage any 
potential conflicts of interest. To this end, it should include representatives of the 
various stakeholder groups to ensure that all their interests are safeguarded (Freeman 
and Evan, 1991). As far as the shareholders are concerned, one way the board can 
demonstrate its effectiveness is by maintaining strong contacts with them. Another way 
in which it signals its credibility and legitimacy is by bringing in reputable NEDs; as 
Daily et al. (2003) argue, this demonstrates to the market (as well as the shareholders) 
that the firm has effective corporate governance mechanisms in place. 
According to Mintzberg (1983), boards perform at least four service-related tasks. 
Firstly, they must work with external influencers to secure connections to important 
industrial stakeholders. Secondly, they must seek to establish contacts with outsiders 
to secure critical external resources, including funds (Maassen, 2002). Thirdly, boards 
must act to enhance and maintain the reputation of the company within the community, 
performing ceremonial tasks on its behalf, presiding over shareholders’ annual 
meetings and representing it at press conferences and public meetings (Pearce and 
Zahra, 1992). Lastly, boards should counsel managers in their decision making and 
implementation. According to Lorsch and Young (1990), a good deal of directors' time 
is spent directing the CEO, with many seeing this as their main responsibility. They 
note that this value as expert advisors is why there are so many active and retired CEOs 
on corporate boards.    
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Directors clearly see themselves as playing a service role; many report that they 
dedicate a substantial proportion of their time and effort to enhancing decision-making 
policies. Recent research provides empiric support for these claims, indicating that 
boards influence the strategic management process through their assessment of 
strategic enterprises and, occasionally, their participation in strategy design. Johnson 
et al. (1996) note that this finding is likely to stimulate further conceptual development 
and empirical investigation of the board’s service role.  
It has been argued that the service role can come into conflict with the monitoring role. 
Faleye et al. (2011) show in their empirical research that intense monitoring by the 
board will lead to weakened corporate innovation, while Holmstorm (2005) debates 
whether BODs that monitor intensely risk demolishing the trust-based relationship 
between the board and the management. This might hinder the flow of information and 
make directors less effective as advisors. Similarly, Chancharat et al. (2012) argue that 
a CEO who feels controlled by independent directors may be reluctant to give them 
the information they need to perform their service role.  
In the Libyan banking sector, the lack of transparency surrounding board appointments, 
the lack of induction programmes for new directors and the overall lack of opportunity 
for professional development mean that very few directors are even aware of their 
service function. 
4.4. The Strategic Role 
Boards have come under increasing pressure from regulators, private and public 
organisations and the market to play a more active role in strategy development and 
implementation. This pressure began with the OECD's Principles of Corporate 
Governance, which state that the corporate governance structure needs to confirm the 
strategic direction of the organisation (1999), and it has been consolidated in courts of 
law (Bosch, 1995). A strong link has been identified between the board’s involvement 
in strategy and organisational effectiveness, but so far, the literature has largely ignored 
the key question of what “involvement in strategy” actually means (Stiles and Taylor, 
2001). Those studies that have addressed this issue disagree on how involved the board 
should be in strategic decision making.  
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From a legal perspective, the monitoring and reviewing of strategy is seen as a 
fiduciary duty (Stiles and Taylor, 2001), but the management literature takes a broader 
view of the board’s strategic role, suggesting that it encompasses everything from the 
identification of corporate goals, environmental scanning and the development of 
visions and frameworks, to the identification, testing and implementation of individual 
strategies (Pearce and Zahra, 1991). Goodstein et al. (1994) summarise the strategic 
role of the board as being to make strategic decisions that will help the organisation to 
adapt to serious change, including environmental change. 
Agency theory’s postulation that the role of the board is to limit conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and management has obvious implications for the board’s 
monitoring and control responsibilities (Eisenhardt, 1989), but its relevance to the 
board’s strategic role is less clear (although Zahra and Pierce (1989) maintain that 
agency theory recognises the vital importance of the board’s strategic role and supports 
board involvement in the formulation of the company’s mission statement, the 
development of strategy and guidelines for its implementation, and the monitoring 
process). In practice, the main hurdle facing boards that want to take on a strategic role 
is usually a CEO determined to retain control over the company’s strategies and 
activities (Mace, 1971). 
4.4.1. Strategic Involvement  
Academics generally differentiate between the preparation and assessment stages of 
strategy development (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). At the planning stage, board 
participation may vary from working with senior staff to develop strategic guidance, 
to simply passing management's suggestions. At the assessment stage, boards may be 
categorised according to the extent to which they challenge or accept management's 
distribution of resources (Judge and Zeitmal, 1992). Two broad schools of thought 
have emerged on board involvement in strategy; these are commonly known as 
"active" and "passive" (Golden and Zajac, 2001; Levrau and Van Den Berghe, 2007a). 
The literature identifies a broad spectrum of possible approaches from both active and 
passive boards (see Table 4.1). 
  
Shalba 2016 76 
 
Table 4-1: The range of active and passive boards 
Source: Stiles and Taylor (2001, p.42) 
Passive boards have little involvement in the strategic functions of the firm and leave 
strategy-related tasks to management (Brennan, 2006; Pye, 2002; Minichilli and 
Hansen, 2007). Even if the board does play a role (through its non-executive directors), 
it is unlikely to initiate strategy (Pye, 2002). The passive school sees boards solely as 
an instrument formed in response to a legal obligation (Stiles and Taylor, 2001). Board 
judgements are dependent on management/CEO control (Mace, 1971), making boards 
little more than a “rubber stamping” tool with little or no impact on the strategic 
direction of the company (Hendry and Kiel, 2004; Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). Studies 
taking this view have mainly focused on how boards oversee and ratify strategies and 
have ignored any participation they might have in the formulation of strategy (Maassen, 
2002). 
The passive school is grounded in stewardship theory, which sees managers as 
responsible stewards who are unlikely to misappropriate resources because they are 
motivated by non-financial incentives (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). This means that 
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the firm must have in place a structure that facilitates managers’ aspiration for high 
performance in other ways (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). Boards are an important 
strategic device in this respect because they allow directors to use their professional 
expertise to help management (Levrau and Van Den Berghe, 2007a). 
The active school views boards as independent, self-governing bodies that guide 
management towards the achievement of missions and goals (Hung, 1998). It argues 
that a board’s functionality must go beyond the traditional control and service 
functions and include strategic activities if the firm is to remain competitive (Ruigrok 
et al, 2006; Ingley and Van der Walt, 2001; Hendry and Kiel, 2004; Stiles, 2001). Zahra 
(1990) and Zahra and Pearce (1989) argue that boards can involve themselves in the 
strategic activities of the firm by: (1) providing advice and counsel to the CEO and 
management, (2) refining strategic plans, (3) initiating their own analysis or suggesting 
alternatives, (4) probing managerial assumptions about the company and its 
environment, and (5) ensuring that executives agree among themselves on the 
company’s strategic direction. These activities facilitate the BODs’ involvement with 
management in the development of strategy and enable it to make strategic changes in 
emergencies.  
Evidence from developed countries suggests that firms are increasingly requiring their 
boards to be involved in strategic decision-making activities (Demb and Neubauer, 
1992; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Hendry and Kiel, 2004; Stiles and Taylor, 
1996). In contrast, evidence from developing countries suggests that boards are seldom 
involved in the development of strategy and do little more than rubber stamp strategies 
dictated by management (Saidi, 2005). Table 4.2 summarises some of the most 
important empirical studies investigating the roles played by the board of directors. 
The table indicates that these studies have mainly been conducted in the USA, the UK 
and a few European countries. Less is known about what boards do and their roles and 
responsibilities in African countries such as Libya.    
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Table 4-2: Empirical studies investigating the rolesof the board 
 
By contrast, firms in developed countries are increasingly encouraging their boards to 
take on broader responsibilities, including service and strategic tasks. Consequently, 
board appointments in these firms are being made specifically to attract the knowledge, 
skills and experience the board needs to perform these roles effectively (Bhagat and 
Black, 2002; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004b). However, research suggests that board 
performance is also influenced by a number of other factors, including the structural 
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attributes of the board and its internal processes. These factors are the focus of the 
following sections. 
4.5. Factors Affecting Board Efficiency 
A central thread in the CG literature is the debate over what factors affect board 
efficiency. A number of authors have focused on the operational aspect, concluding 
that efficiency is contingent on board structure. Several factors, such as board diversity, 
composition and size (Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009), as well as CEO or chairman 
duality, have been shown to influence board performance. Other authors have focused 
on the significance of underlying and dynamic forces. It has also been demonstrated 
that boards encounter two different kinds of problems, either of which can make them 
less effective. While “mechanical” problems associated with the board’s composition 
and arrangement are identifiable from outside the boardroom and may be resolved by 
applying systems and rules, “organic” problems arising from poor relationships and a 
lack of independence are more difficult to address (Sherwin, 2003).  
4.5.1. Board Diversity  
Kang et al. (2007) describe board diversity as the diversification in the structure of the 
board of directors, arguing that this is influenced by the size of the board and the 
industrial environment. While some aspects of diversity are clearly observable (e.g. 
sex, background, ethnicity, cultural and age group), others are less detectable (e.g. 
educational and professional background and business knowledge). The gender, racial 
and cultural composition of the board is one of the most hotly debated governance 
issues in developed economies. In the USA, for example, the race, ethnicity and gender 
of corporate directors are increasingly taken into consideration, while ethnicity has 
become a significant issue in Europe (Ruigrok et al., 2007).  
There are a number of advantages to having a diverse board. Agency theory posits that 
a board made up of directors from different ethnic groups and socio-economic 
backgrounds is more likely to be independent and therefore more likely to be effective 
in its supervisory function (Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003), while Baranchuk and 
Dybvig (2009) argue that the multiplicity of ideas, viewpoints, experiences and 
professional knowledge available to a diverse board will enhance its decision making. 
Bilimoria and Wheeler (2000) also show that diverse boards make better strategic 
  
Shalba 2016 80 
 
decisions, and that they are more innovative. This leads McNulty et al. (2005) to argue 
that boards should seek to appoint directors with a range of personal characteristics 
and abilities. In theory, a higher level of board diversity is an important indicator to 
both internal and external candidates (Rose, 2007) that competent individuals can 
reach the top positions within the company, whatever their gender or ethnicity. Having 
said this, BODs in developed and developing countries alike remain overwhelmingly 
male. In 1995, only 5% of board members in a sample of 350 British companies were 
women (Conyon and Millan, 1997). Smith et al. (1994) argue that women’s lack of 
involvement in board deliberation and decision making leads to less effective 
communication. Finally, having a diverse board made up of individuals from different 
backgrounds and communities can significantly increase a company’s ability to 
penetrate new markets (Carter et al., 2003). 
On the other hand, some authors have drawn on agency theory to argue that a more 
mixed board will not necessarily bring about more efficient supervision and decision 
making. Rose (2007) argues that some board members may be selected as a sign of 
tokenism and that their input will be marginalised. It has also been suggested that the 
diversity of backgrounds, interests and commitments increases the likelihood of 
clashes and cliques (Baysinger and Butler, 1985), threatening boardroom unity and 
inhibiting performance (Goodstein et al., 1994). If board members are selected on the 
basis of ethnic background or gender rather than merit or their ability to contribute 
constructively to the decision-making process, this may make the board less competent 
and adversely affect company performance.  
4.5.2. Board Composition: Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) 
Board composition, which is generally assessed as the proportion of outside directors 
on the board, is widely used as a measure of board effectiveness (Musteen et al., 2010; 
Goergen and Renneboog, 2000). It is widely believed that internal directors lack 
neutrality and independence from senior staff and administrators (Elloumi and Gueyie, 
2001), but there is no clear consensus on whether independent directors play a useful 
corporate governance role or whether they enhance shareholder wealth and financial 
performance (Solomon, 2007; Chancharat et al., 2012). While some theorists argue 
that NEDs are an important element within the board because they control and act as 
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a counterweight to executive directors and contribute to the general leadership and 
development of the firm (Ghosh, 2006; Abdelsalam and El-Masry, 2008; Mallin, 2007), 
others argue for more executive directors instead. The main quest as far as board 
composition is concerned is to identify the optimum ratio of outsider to insider 
directors. 
Johnson et al. (1996) argue that external directors make more active and effective 
observers than internal directors because they are objective and detached from the 
CEO and the company. Similarly, Jensen (1993) points out that the main aim of the 
board is to monitor the CEO and since: “it is almost impossible for those who report 
directly to the CEO to participate openly and critically in effective evaluation and 
monitoring of the CEO, the only inside board member should be the CEO” (cited by 
Goyal, 2012, p.4). However, Duchin et al. (2010) counter that: “Outside directors are 
less effective in monitoring and providing advice when the cost of acquiring data is 
high”. It has also been claimed that excessive supervision by outside directors can 
actually stifle managerial initiative (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), though Hill (1995) 
downplays the NED’s control role, arguing that while executive directors use their 
role to implement control mechanisms, non-executive directors operate only as 
consultants, giving advice to the board.  
Weir and Laing (2001) argue that executive directors should control the board because 
they help formulate corporate strategy and have specialist expertise and knowledge of 
the business. Kiel and Nicholson (2003) suggest that a high proportion of executive 
directors is associated with high access to information, which leads to high quality 
decision making, with potentially positive effects on financial performance. They 
argue that outside directors do not generally have the same access to informal 
information and knowledge within the company, and that consequently, NED-
dominated boards are more likely to make poor quality decisions which might impact 
on company performance. Ezzamel and Watson (1997) point to the damaging effect of 
conflict between NEDs and executive directors, arguing that this can weaken the 
BOD’s control role. They also question the efficiency of NEDs who may be serving 
on two committees at once.  
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Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, (2008) caution that the link between director 
independence and performance is unclear. When Bhagat and Black (2002) attempted 
to investigate this link by conducting a large-sample, long horizon study of the 
relationship between degree of board independence and long-term performance in 
large USA firms, they found no evidence to suggest that greater board independence 
leads to better firm performance. Rather, they concluded that inside directors bring 
valuable firm-specific skills, knowledge and information to the board. They observed 
that inside directors are likely to be conflicted but well informed, while independent 
directors are not likely to be conflicted, but they are likely to be comparatively ignorant 
about the firm. Unfortunately, research has shown that in the MENA countries, most 
outside directors lack both relevant knowledge/experience and material independence 
(CIPE, 2003; IFC and Hawkamah, 2008; Al-Akra et al., 2010).  
Stewardship theory idealises internal directors for their skill and knowledge (Stiles, 
2001) and argues that boards with a higher proportion of internal directors will be 
better able to perform their strategic role effectively than those with fewer internal 
directors (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). Advocates of stewardship theory assert 
that boards consist for the most part of non-executive directors who are only part-time 
and thus dedicate very little time to any one board. As such, Stiles (2001) argues, they 
might not have sufficient understanding of the corporate environment or the necessary 
skills or data access rights to have any real strategic impact. 
In contrast, supporters of agency theory argue that NEDs are necessary to ensure the 
board has enough autonomy to be able to safeguard shareholders’ interests (Johnson et 
al., 1996; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). Insider-dominated boards are more likely 
to be sympathetic to management preferences and therefore less effective in guarding 
shareholder interests against managerial opportunism (Musteen et al, 2010). Internal 
directors may also lack the confidence to challenge the CEO. Increasing the number 
of outside directors gives the board more freedom from the executives, particularly the 
CEO (Kula, 2005). It also brings other benefits; as independent voices within the 
boardroom (Solomon, 2010), non-executive directors help to reduce conflicts of 
interest between shareholders and company management, while their detachment from 
management and day-to-day tasks facilitates the board's control function (Johnson et 
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al., 1996) and means they are able to offer fresh perspectives (OECD, 2003; Roberts 
et al., 2005). Thus, posits agency theory, the higher the proportion of outsiders on the 
board, the more independent the board is and the better the governance.  
It is worth noting at this point that the proportion of outside directors varies from 
country to country. Goyal (2012) shows that the proportion of outside directors in large 
USA firms (particularly listed firms) has risen to approximately 55-60% since the 
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, while De Andres et al. (2005) found 
that in other OECD countries, 79-80% of board members are outside directors. 
However, these authors also found that retired executive directors who become non-
executive directors (so-called greys) may be less active – this begs the question of 
whether their previous relationship with the executive makes them less effective 
monitors. In the same way, an inexperienced NED might become a less effective 
monitor if they build up a close relationship with the executive directors (O'Sullivan 
and Wong, 1999). This is arguably a concern in the MENA countries; research done 
by the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE, 2003) in the region found that 
many NEDs are either inexperienced for their role in the company or have close ties 
with executives or the chairman of the board. 
Pfeffer (1972) shows that board size and composition are not random variables, but 
are in fact systematically related to the company’s need to deal with key external 
sectors to ensure successful operations and an adequate supply of resources. Bhagat 
and Black (1999) argue that such conclusions could be explained by firms’ limited 
power to stock price and accounting data; and that today's independent directors might 
not be independent enough. Many independent directors might not be doing enough to 
protect the interests of shareholders. This has led some to argue that these directors 
should be accountable to shareholders, or that their enthusiasm for monitoring 
management would be increased by aligning them more with shareholders. To this end, 
it has been suggested that paying non-executive directors in company shares rather 
than money would be the most constructive boardroom reform that companies could 
undertake. 
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Table 4-3: Empirical studies on board composition and performance 
 
4.5.3. Board Composition: Board Size 
Board size refers simply to the total number of people that sit on the board. While it is 
not strictly a demographic characteristic, it is widely studied as it can have significant 
impact on board operation. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) recommend that boards should 
have eight or nine directors, but there are conflicting opinions on the optimum size of 
the board (Musteen et al., 2010).   
Supporters of bigger boards argue that they have a greater diversity of skills, business 
contacts and experience at their disposal than smaller boards (Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006; Hussain and Mallin, 2003; Abd-Rahman, 2008), which leaves them better placed 
to subject managerial decisions to scrutiny and monitoring (Ezat and El-Masry, 2008; 
Tricker, 1994; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Having a large board can help balance the 
power of a dominant CEO and, some researchers argue, maybe good for corporate 
financial performance (John and Senbet, 1998). For example, Cheng’s (2008) study of 
CEO turnover in 1,252 firms found that firms with larger boards had less variable 
corporate performance. The assumption is that, since it takes more compromises for a 
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larger board to reach consensus, its decisions tend to be less extreme, leading to more 
consistent corporate performance. However, this assumption should be treated with 
caution, as empirical findings elsewhere regarding the link between board size and 
performance have been inconsistent. While De Andres et al. (2005) and Pathan and 
Skully (2010) show that smaller boards are linked to better business performance, 
Dalton et al. (1999), in a meta-examination of 131 samples (total sample size of 
20,620), note a positive relationship between board size and economic activity.  
On the other hand, large boards have a number of drawbacks. When Ocasio (1994) 
examined a sample of 114 USA industrial corporations over the period 1960 to 1990, 
looking for factors that affect CEO succession, he found that large boards were more 
likely to appoint ineffectual CEOs. Other possible problems include weakened 
communication and decision making, since the wider range of perspectives on a large 
board increases the chance of conflict (Musteen et al., 2010). Board members can also 
find it difficult to build the interpersonal relationships that further cohesiveness 
(Forbes et al., 1999). Finally, agency theory prefers smaller boards because they 
consume fewer pecuniary and non-pecuniary resources (Sonnenfeld, 2002), both in 
terms of remuneration to directors and the costs of board evaluation.  
There are several other points in favour of small boards; Fried et al. (1998) conclude 
that small board size, along with outsider representation, can engender high levels of 
participation in strategy creation, while Huyghebaert and Wang (2011) suggest that 
small boards are at less risk of being dominated by powerful shareholders, leaving 
minority investors less vulnerable to expropriation. Al-Akra et al. (2010) argue that 
small boards play a stronger monitoring role. Jensen (1993) argues that boards bigger 
than seven or eight people are less likely to perform their role effectively. Other 
empirical studies have supported Jensen’s argument; Lipton and Lorsch (1992), for 
example, also recommend limiting board membership to seven or eight people and 
encouraging ownership by board members. Core et al.’s (1999) study of corporate 
governance in 205 publicly traded USA firms showed the median board size to be 
thirteen members. 
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Table 4-4: Empirical studies on board size and performance 
 
Thus, there is no consensus in the literature on what constitutes the optimum board 
size. This may be because the majority of studies have been conducted to measure 
another variable in addition to board size (e.g. insider/outsider director ratio, CEO 
succession), which may have impacted the researchers’ assessment of the importance 
of board size. Secondly, the studies have been conducted across a range of businesses, 
environments and periods, and the outcomes may have been influenced by context. It 
may also be argued that diversified companies require larger boards than those 
operating in one area only – Pfeffer (1972) shows that the need for a large board 
increases as the company grows. Notwithstanding the diversity of their findings, 
however, the studies summarised above all suggest that size is an important element 
affecting how boards work; it is therefore a relevant factor when examining the role 
and responsibilities of the board.  
4.5.4. Board Process  
The board is a social system (Cascio, 2004) whose functioning is informed by 
interpersonal relationships, teamwork and debate. How boards organise themselves to 
work effectively, how directors relate to one another, how the board interacts with 
management, and how decisions inside and outside of the boardroom are made, 
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constitute board processes (Leblanc and Schwartz, 2007). These processes are the 
intervening variables between board characteristics and board performance. The 
literature explores a range of board process attributes, including the formal procedures 
to evaluate board members and executives, and the level of cooperative idea-sharing 
at board meetings. 
This study considers two specific board processes that have a significant influence on 
task performance: the director selection procedure and administrative operation. These 
two processes have been chosen because of their particular importance in the research 
environment – Libya. The administrative operation issue is important because 
infrastructural development is still in its early stages. 
4.5.4.1. Board Operations 
Board operations refer to the various administrative or operational activities that allow 
boards to run smoothly and enable directors to perform their various activities more 
effectively. Investigation here is likely to cover issues such as the use of board 
committees, the frequency and conduct of board meetings, the quality and timeliness 
of board papers and the evaluation process.  
Full and timely access to information is required for the board to be fully efficient. It 
will be more effective in its service role if the CEO and his team keep it well informed 
of the company’s problems and challenges, while for the performance of its strategic 
role, it needs to have access to information on both the external and internal 
environments. A well thought out agenda and any relevant data should be issued to 
directors in advance of meetings, and enough time should be allowed to enable a 
thorough discussion. Dissenting directors should feel able to express their opinions, 
but they should not be allowed to monopolise the discussion, and decisions should be 
made by a majority of directors rather than the CEO. Finally, accurate minutes should 
be kept to document progress (Vance, 1983).  
The link between board meeting frequency and company performance is an internal 
CG issue that is of growing interest to policy makers and researchers alike. Researchers 
are divided on whether frequent board meetings are a good thing or not. Supporters of 
regular meetings argue that all else being equal, more frequent board meetings leads 
to better managerial monitoring and therefore better protection of shareholders’ 
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interests (Habbash, 2010). Regular meetings give directors more time to discuss and 
set strategy (Vafeas, 1999) and, together with informal interactions, they create and 
strengthen bonds between directors. They also put managers in a better position to 
address emerging critical problems promptly (Mangena and Tauringana, 2006).  
Board meetings provide an opportunity for the board to assess the skill sets of its 
members and to propose any required changes (e.g. adding a new member). Brick and 
Chidambaran (2010) and Demb and Neubauer (1992) argue that such self-evaluation 
is good practice, and that boards should find time to evaluate how they work in order 
to become more effective. Sonnenfeld (2002) observes that regular attendance at 
meetings is considered the hallmark of a conscientious manager, and meeting 
frequency has likewise been employed in previous studies as an indicator of a board’s 
diligence. More frequent board meetings may indicate that directors are dedicated to 
their job and want to serve the firm by giving more of their time, but the limited amount 
of available evidence suggests that more frequent meetings are actually more likely to 
be a reaction to poor firm performance (Vafeas, 1999).  
Those who question the value of frequent meetings argue that they are not necessarily 
beneficial to shareholders. Vefeas (1999) asserts that they do not generally lead to the 
meaningful exchange of ideas, and that they are costly in terms of managerial time and 
directors’ expenses. Jensen (1993) even contends that boards in well-functioning 
companies should only need to meet relatively infrequently. 
4.5.4.2.  The Director Selection Process 
Monks and Minow (2008) point to a gap in the literature as far as the theoretical and 
practical aspects of board selection are concerned. Most corporate governance codes, 
including the UK’s Combined Code and the German Code, stipulate that directors must 
be selected on the basis of their skill and competence, and that election should be an 
easy-to-follow and transparent process. Prospective board members are generally 
chosen from a range of nominated candidates, but these can be difficult to find (Renton 
and Watkinson, 2001).  
Stiles and Taylor (2001) show that the level of board unity is a crucial determinant of 
how the board operates. It is perhaps not surprising then that in many countries, 
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director selection is, in practice, done informally and many directors are elected 
because they have close links to the CEO (Conger and Lawler, 2001; Conger et al., 
2002). Lorsch and Young (1990) found that CEOs can have a huge impact on the 
selection process, while Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) found that CEOs are prone to 
nominate directors who are sympathetic to their wishes and to whom they have other 
social or familial ties. Apart from being contrary to most CG codes, as Mallin (2007) 
argues, such appointments are unlikely to provide corporations with the knowledge 
and skills they need. Furthermore, as CIPE (2003) has shown, directors who have a 
close relationship with executives or the board chairman often feel obliged to support 
the interests of the controlling shareholders.  
Monks and Minow (2008) indicate that shareholders with extended powers are the 
most likely to want to influence the selection process. However, Olson and Adams 
(2004) argue that:   
“in selecting directors, shareholders will be best served by those 
directors who have attributes that make them effective and diligent 
custodians of the residual decisional power—those directors who 
understand the capabilities of the business and can responsibly select 
and monitor management corporate performance." (p.427)  
The power to select board members can sometimes rest almost entirely with a few 
large shareholders. This has led to calls for minority shareholders’ rights to be 
protected because, as Filatotchev et al. (2007) explain: "Where large investors gain full 
control over a company, they may follow their own interests, which need not coincide 
with the interests of other investors in the firm". Claessens et al. (1999) argue that this 
dominance of the board can have dire consequences, giving major shareholders the 
chance to control profit distribution or even transfer profits to another corporation. It 
is crucial that minority shareholders have representatives on the board so that they can 
be made aware of any such problems. 
4.5.5. Board structure :Board Committees  
Board committees are believed to help improve the effectiveness and efficiency of 
corporate boards (Jiraporn et al., 2009). Regulators in the UK, the USA and elsewhere 
recommend that both listed and non-listed businesses should set up committees to deal 
with issues such as auditing and the appointment and compensation of senior staff and 
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directors (Monks and Minow, 2008). Consequently, in many businesses, many of the 
board’s functions are now carried out by committees which report back regularly to 
the board. Carter and Lorsch (2004) argue that delegating tasks to board committees 
allows the board to achieve more in less time. 
4.5.5.1.   The Audit Committee   
The audit committee can help alleviate the agency problem between a company and 
its outside shareholders by overseeing the integrity of its financial reporting and 
preventing irregular or even fraudulent accounting statements (Klein, 2002). The idea 
of the audit committee (AC) dates back to at least the nineteenth century (Turley and 
Zaman, 2007), but it is only in recent years that it has become a widely used 
mechanism of corporate governance. However, Bavly (1999), while noting that ACs 
are playing an ever greater role, cautions that it is too early to evaluate the impact they 
are having on standards of corporate governance.  
The audit committee, which is a formal committee, is concerned with auditing, 
reporting and the company’s internal financial management. It has no decision-making 
authority and is not directly answerable to company stakeholders. To further guarantee 
its autonomy, it has no link at all with senior management. Spira (2003) suggests that 
the committee’s duty is to supply the board with specific output and suggestions that 
will strengthen the latter’s control over the company. Its aims should be to facilitate 
the work of the external auditor and to offer dependable and consistent financial data 
to users (Spira, 2003; Turley and Zaman, 2007). Both the Cadbury Report (1992) and 
the IIA (2009) indicate that internal auditors have higher expectations than external 
auditors when it comes to the quality of financial disclosure. The AC should contain a 
high percentage of independent external directors as these are considered more active 
and efficient observers, but these directors should have enough knowledge of the 
corporate and commercial background to be able to understand management. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) requires that one member of the auditing committee should 
be experienced in accounting or financial management. 
4.5.5.2. The Executive Committee 
There is usually one committee whose job it is to support the company’s management, 
for example by facilitating the decision-making process and identifying strategic 
  
Shalba 2016 91 
 
options. The executive committee may also make decisions on behalf of the full board 
(Carver and Oliver, 2002); as Stiles and Taylor (2001) point out, the limited amount of 
time available in board meetings means that the full board is unlikely to have the time 
to consider every strategic decision. Mallin (2007) argues that a board will generally 
respect the decisions made on its behalf by the executive committee, though others 
point to the danger of allowing critical decisions to be made without the participation 
of all board members (Xie et al., 2003; Carter and Lorsch, 2004). Charkham (1994) 
argues that the central role played by executive managers in these committees may 
create agency problems, for example if they are able to set goals that oppose the 
interests of others, but others believe that the presence of an executive manager creates 
balance (Carver and Oliver, 2002). They argue that any system that creates its full 
authority within the board of directors (EC made up entirely of directors is unlikely to 
question the role of the BOD)  is not a positive environment for questioning the role 
of the latter.  
4.5.5.3. The Nomination Committee and the Governance Committee 
The nomination committee is responsible for recommending potential new board 
members and senior managers to the BOD. Its work may also include the oversight 
and assessment of directors’ and senior managers’ performance and oversight of the 
organisation’s human resource policy. Mallin (2007) suggests that historically, 
directors have often been appointed primarily because they have personal links with 
existing board members, but that demands are growing in a number of countries for 
this to change. The OECD’s Principles (2004) of corporate governance stipulate that 
one of the BODs’ key functions is to ensure that board nominations and elections are 
conducted in a formal and transparent manner. The main function of the nomination 
committee is therefore to systematically assess the level of expertise and experience 
on the board and to use this information to draw up candidate outlines for future 
nominations (Mallin, 2007). However, the Higgs Report (2003) reveals that in practice, 
nomination committees tend to meet irregularly and that they are often not completely 
aware of the important role they play in the appointment process. The report underlines 
the significance of the nomination committee’s efforts and function. 
 
George, (2002. p, 22) shows that the main duty of the corporate governance committee 
is “to draft the governance principles”. Such principles should spell out job 
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descriptions for the parties involved in the internal governance of the firm, such as the 
CEO, subcommittee. Neubauer and Krapf (2004) argue that the corporate governance 
committee is also in charge of reviewing candidates' profiles prior to the board's 
election, appointing new members to the board of directors and evaluating the current 
members. Thus, the corporate governance committee is a tool in helping the firms' 
strategy and goals. In addition, such a committee encourages the board's directors to 
be more involved and active in the board's discussion as there is a separate body that 
evaluates their performance and contributions continuously . 
4.5.5.4. The Executive Remuneration Committee  
As part of its responsibility for top management remuneration (Jensen, 1993), the 
board of directors may establish a special committee known as the compensation or 
remuneration committee to determine executives' compensation within the framework 
of the company. Conyon and Peck (1998) argue that the theoretical significance of the 
compensation committee is evident as, without it, senior executives may seek 
increased salaries or bonuses that are not in keeping with the owners' interests. 
The OECD Principles (2004) stipulate that the committee should not be linked to the 
board and that it should be made up entirely of external directors. CEOs or executives 
serving on remuneration committees can create agency problems between 
management and shareholders (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003), whereas independent 
directors can be more objective (Petra and Dorata, 2008). Dahya and McConnell 
(2007) argue that having more outside directors on the committee makes it more 
independent and leads to better performance 
4.5.6. Board structure : The Role of the Chairman 
Board structure varies significantly from country to country (Mallin, 2007). Like 
composition and size, the internal administrative structure has a crucial impact on 
board efficiency (John and Senbet, 1998). According to agency theory, a board that is 
independent in terms of organisational structure will be better equipped to control the 
administration’s decision making (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Boards composed largely 
of inside directors are considered less likely than those with many outside directors to 
override management decisions that threaten shareholders' interests because these 
directors are subordinate to and therefore dependent on, the CEO.  
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Central to the board's effectiveness is the chairman, who is responsible for leading the 
board thoughtfully (Carter and Lorsch, 2004) and ensuring that the proper procedures 
are followed (Garratt, 2003). The chairman works for the board, not the other way 
round. Ultimately, control of board meetings is in the hands of board members, but the 
chairman is responsible for planning, preparing for and chairing these meetings 
(Renton and Watkinson, 2001). The board sets its own agenda, though the managing 
director may add any items he wants to discuss (Carver and Oliver, 2002).  
Stiles and Taylor (2001) show that while some chairmen see their function as being 
limited to running board meetings and communicating formally with top management, 
others broaden their remit, attending top management meetings and visiting different 
departments. The chairman's time commitment is significantly greater than that of 
other directors, as he is also tasked with liaising with the chief executive (this 
connection is particularly important, according to Carter and Lorsch (2004), meeting 
with other directors and maintaining external relationships. This is easier if he has an 
office in the company.  
4.5.7.  Board Leadership Structure and Chairman/CEO Duality 
CEO/chairman duality is another factor that has the potential to influence board 
effectiveness. According to Solomon, (2007): "the importance of splitting the 
chairman and chief executive derives from the extremely different functions which 
someone in each of these positions should carry out” (p.79). While the CEO is 
responsible for the day-to-day management of the firm, including implementing board 
decisions, the chairman is responsible for running the board, as described above.  
This view is echoed in agency theory, which posits that the board must be separate 
from management if it is to be effective in its monitoring role. Agency theorists suggest 
that separating the two roles will increase board independence and its ability to check 
managerial performance (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002), while Jensen (1993) points out 
that role duality compromises the board’s ability to carry out one of its key duties, 
which is to supervise the hiring, firing, assessment and remuneration of the CEO.  
Separating the two functions will make it easier for the board to remove a non-
performing CEO (Monks and Minow, 2008). In terms of the board’s service role, 
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advocates of separation argue that a non-executive chairman is more likely to be able 
to bring in outside resources than an insider (Chancharat et al., 2012). 
Weir et al. (2002) suggest that as an insider, the CEO tends to have better knowledge, 
understanding and experience of the strategic challenges and opportunities which the 
company faces than a non-executive chairman, while Laing and Weir (1999) argue that 
duality may be beneficial if the CEO is a dynamic individual who has built the 
company up from scratch. In this case, business experience and entrepreneurship may 
be more important than board structure in determining performance. Bach and Smith 
(2007), meanwhile, hypothesise that CEO duality provides structural power and 
enhances the likelihood of survival in high technology firms.  
However, the evidence so far on whether CEO duality is ultimately damaging to 
companies is inconclusive; Daily and Dalton (1994) found that it was powerfully 
associated with companies that went bankrupt, whereas Chaganti et al. (1985) found 
no link between CEO duality and company failure. On the other hand, Simpson and 
Gleason (1999) studied 375 banking firms in 1993 and found that combining the two 
roles actually reduced the probability of financial distress. This is consistent with the 
theoretical assumption that a dual CEO-chairman has the scope to pursue their own 
interests and is therefore less inclined to take risks. Similarly, Dey et al. (2011) studied 
CEO duality in 232 switcher firms over the period 2001-2009 and found that firms that 
split the CEO and chairman positions due to investor pressure subsequently announced 
significantly lower returns. Taking a different approach to the question, Faleye (2007) 
examined the effects of organisational complexity and CEO reputation on the relative 
costs and benefits of CEO duality, hypothesising that complex firms are more likely to 
vest the two positions in the same individual because the cost of separating them 
outweighs the marginal benefits to be gained. (The costs of sharing information 
between the CEO and chairman rises, while CEO flexibility becomes more valuable 
as organisations grow more complex.) Faleye indeed found that complex organisations 
are more likely to practise duality, and that firm performance improves when they do 
this.  
In spite of these mixed results, shareholder activists, institutional investors and 
regulators alike tend to hold the view that the CEO should not also serve as board 
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chairman. Shareholders are generally suspicious that such a close link compromises 
both parties’ ability to do what is necessary to maximise firm performance (Gibson, 
2003). As far as the MENA region is concerned, research (Aintablian, and Al Boustany 
2008) has shown that the two roles are usually separated. 
Table 4-5: Empirical studies on CEO duality and firm performance  
 
The range of findings in Table 4-5 may be explained by several reasons. First, some of 
these studies measured more than one variable, which may have influenced their 
results. Second, they were conducted in different contexts. However, the CG 
mechanism of separating the CEO and chairman roles may not be appropriate for all 
countries or even all companies in the same country. Finally, the studies employed a 
range of analytical approaches – again, this may have impacted on their respective 
outcomes.  
4.6. Other Issues Affecting Board Effectiveness 
The accounting literature has for many years debated the influence of cultural factors 
on the development of accounting practice. Larbsh (2010), for example, shows that 
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culture, environment and political structure have a major effect on accounting practice 
and corporate governance, while Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) conclude that 
accounting practice and disclosure are a function of a nation’s cultural values and 
cultural heritage, as these affect attitudes towards business-related fraud. The 
following sections conclude this exploration of the factors that affect board 
performance by considering how the board’s role and effectiveness as a CG 
mechanism are impacted by the prevailing legal system; expectations surrounding 
transparency, accountability and disclosure; the national culture; and ownership 
structure. 
4.6.1. Legal System, Accountability, Transparency and Disclosure  
Boards’ CG practice is affected by the prevailing political and legal systems, which 
reflect the cultural values underlying the business culture (McCarthy and Puffer, 2003; 
Saidi, 2004). According to Shleifer and Vishny, (1997); “Corporate governance 
mechanisms are economic and legal institutions that can be altered through political 
process. Therefore, corporate governance should be driven by cooperation between the 
private and public sectors and by broad-based political support”. However, this 
intermingling of business and politics can also inhibit CG; for example by preventing 
improvements in the enforcement environment and the adoption and implementation 
of public laws (Berglof and Claessens, 2006). In Nigeria, the government has 
attempted to instigate an effective CG system, but weak enforcement means it is 
largely ignored by Nigerian listed companies (Okike, 2007).  
The OCED Principles (1999; 2004) stress that the: "…corporate governance 
framework must ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material 
matters regarding the corporation, including its financial situation, performance, 
ownership, and governance of the company". This disclosure is an important 
mechanism for reducing the information asymmetry which results from the division of 
ownership and management (Mallin, 2007; Solomon, 2010). Mallin (2002) argues that 
basic procedures should be put in place to ensure that shareholders have access to 
information about the business at any point, while agency theorists argue that 
improving the flow of information is likely to reduce agency costs. Information 
asymmetry can directly affect the board’s ability to function effectively; giving top 
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management priority access to information that is not available to other directors can 
lead to conflicts during the decision-making process (Banks, 2004).  
The BOD plays a critical part in ensuring adequate disclosure practices are in place 
(Samaha, 2010; Samaha and Dahawy, 2011). The full disclosure of information by top 
management to both the internal environment (the BOD, especially non-executive 
directors) and the external environment (other stakeholders) is crucial to achieving 
transparency within the company. Transparency has clear benefits, but the costs of not 
being transparent are potentially massive (Kieron, 2011). Solomon (2007) argues that 
the desire to see an increase in corporate transparency is a major driver of corporate 
governance reform in all countries, though transparency means different things to 
different people. Garratt (2003) argues that transparency is a main tool in countering 
corruption. In nations with weak institutions, a lack of accountability and transparency 
about resource revenues can exacerbate poor governance and lead to corruption, 
conflict and inequality (Ross, 2001). Al-Twaijri et al. (2003) note that internal and 
external audits play a significant role in preventing fraud and promoting transparency. 
As indicated above, a lack of transparency between top management and other board 
members can weaken the board of directors and lessen its effectiveness.   
Accountability (both individual and corporate) is another crucial expectation that 
shareholders have of the BOD (Garratt, 2003). Boards are theoretically held 
collectively responsible by shareholders for any corporate failure, but Carter and 
Lorsch (2004) explain that in practice, it is often the CEO who is penalised or even 
fired, and that other board members rarely resign in these circumstances. This lack of 
accountability within boards is a worldwide problem, not just a phenomenon in 
developing countries. Too often, it means that unethical conduct goes unnoticed until 
disaster strikes (Garratt, 2003).  
4.6.2. Ownership Structure 
A number of studies (e.g. Wei, 2007) have ascribed national variations in corporate 
governance to countries’ different ownership arrangements. Li (1994) found that 
ownership structure has a significant influence over corporate governance practices; 
while McKnight and Weir (2009) show that ownership structure affects agency costs. 
Feldmann and Schwarzkopf (2003) emphasise the positive link between the level of 
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focused institutional ownership and the number of external members on boards and 
audit committees. Habbash (2010) argues that the right ownership structure ensures 
that no one shareholder group can exert undue influence, but Pagano and Roell (1998) 
posit that the ideal distribution of share ownership is achieved by going public, because 
this results in large external shareholders who are able to supervise management 
closely. Similarly, Henry (2010) argues that while good internal governance minimises 
agency costs, external shareholding is an alternative agency-alleviating tool. Denis and 
McConnell (2003) explain that large shareholders have the motivation to spend 
resources to monitor the management team; indeed, Berglöf and Claessens (2006) 
argue that they are the most important CG mechanism in developing countries. 
However, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point out that while vertical agency problems 
may arise between shareholders and managers, horizontal agency problems can 
emerge between majority and minority shareholders if the former attempt to 
redistribute wealth from other investors to themselves. 
Jaggi et al. (2009) argue that family ownership reduces executive management's ability 
to manipulate other shareholders. This is consistent with the procuration theory that 
insider ownership provides the best management structure for companies and leads to 
high quality financial reporting (Pedro Sanchez Ballesta and Garcia-Meca, 2005). In 
contrast, MENA-based research by CIPE (2003), Naser et al. (2006), ROSC (2009) 
and Tricker (2009) suggests that family ownership has a negative impact on firms’ 
financial performance. Finally, Samaha and Dahawy (2011) find a relationship 
between ownership structure and levels of monitoring and disclosure.  
4.6.3. Culture  
As companies become increasingly transnational, it is of growing importance that 
boards  become familiar with and know how to respond to the needs of customers and 
staff not just in their home country but wherever they operate (Garratt, 1998). Arguing 
that corporate governance is linked to corporate goals, and that these are directly linked 
to culture, Hofstede (2001) developed a framework to describe cultural differences in 
terms of four dimensions: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism versus 
collectivism, and masculinity versus femininity. Based on this framework, corporate 
governance is linked to corporate goals and these goals are directly linked to culture. 
Gray (1988), meanwhile, proposes that there is a link between social standards and 
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bookkeeping structures, and that the impact of culture can be measured by 
investigating these structures.  
Corporate governance has been shown to be influenced by social norms (Boytsun et 
al., 2011). For example, Falgi (2009) highlights the impact that social, cultural and 
economic factors have on CG practice in Saudi Arabia, and the challenges this can 
create. Local cultural values also have an impact on CG in Libya. Libyan culture is 
characterised by a strong sense of family, tribal and ethnic identity. The primacy of 
community and social networks creates barriers against private entrepreneurship, 
while the social norms that originally evolved to govern community life have extended 
to affect the behaviour of directors and top management in both public and private 
enterprises. Thus, it is not unusual to see board chairmen or CEOs repaying their 
obligations to their tribe (rather than to shareholders) through their recruitment 
practices or the diversion of assets. The same tribal loyalty is even evident among 
government ministers, with the result that board appointments often reflect nothing 
more than social obligations. No doubt, cultural forces and social systems will continue 
to be part of the way things are done in many developing countries, but the longer they 
are allowed to influence decision making in enterprises, the less likely it is these 
enterprises will improve their performance. It is therefore important for all 
stakeholders to know that everyone is better off when enterprises are managed in such 
a way as to maximise effectiveness rather than to benefit tribal or communal interests.  
In Islam, there are some unique characteristics pertaining to the theory of Islamic 
corporate governance (Lewis 2005; Suleiman, 2000). Abu-Tapanjeh’s, (2009) study 
which explored morality in the economic work in the monotheistic religions by 
providing justice and honesty and ensuring the protection of all parties’ rights and dues.  
These principles, which are encouraged by the Islamic religion, will lead to a 
strengthening of the market, creating incentives, the deviation in the behaviour of 
maximizing value and encouraging transparency. These are the key principles in 
religion (Bhatti and Bhatti 2010). Moreover, there is an argument stressed by Gooden 
(2001) that institutions seek, through administrative leadership, to achieve the goals of 
the ethical society and not only to maximize their profits. It can be said that governance 
must seek to achieve other goals, as religiosity will help to achieve the goals of 
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governance. This was confirmed by Rizk (2008) who stated that religion has a role in 
the formation of moral behaviour, such as honesty and truthfulness. 
An effective corporate governance system will boost foreign investors’ confidence and 
attract more investment into the country. Since this investment is particularly sought 
after by countries whose economy is dependent on natural resources (such as Libya 
and Nigeria), they are often keen to implement CG systems. The pressing question is 
how individual nations, particularly in the developing world, can balance their need to 
seek foreign investment with maintaining their individuality and preserving cultural 
integrity.  
4.7. Conclusion 
This chapter reviews the roles and responsibilities of the board of directors and the 
internal and external factors that affect its performance thereof. It identifies the BODs’ 
three main roles as being strategic, service and monitoring/control, and shows how 
these are shaped by the legal/regulatory, political and cultural context. External bodies 
may have a clear impact on the board's legal and formal status and obligations, but 
both its role and its effectiveness are also significantly affected by the company’s 
ownership structure and by internal board characteristics such as size, CEO duality 
and composition.  
In theory, the relationship between outside actors and the board of directors is 
commutative, with each influencing the role and responsibilities of the other, though 
in practice, this is not always the case. BOD/outside actor relationships vary from 
country to country and from company to company. They are shaped by a number of 
determinants, including the nature and ownership structure of the firm, the level of 
managerial professionalism, the nature of the industry, the country’s economic 
development and the prevailing corporate governance system. For instance, in 
developing countries, where concentrated ownership is common, BODs often have a 
strong relationship with large shareholders. Conversely, in highly regulated developed 
countries, they generally have powerful links with regulatory bodies.  
The findings from the literature review enabled the development of a preliminary 
conceptual framework describing the key internal and external factors affecting the 
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board’s role and responsibilities as a mechanism of corporate governance (see Figure 
4.1). The framework, which was adapted from existing models (see Nicholson and 
Kiel, 2004b; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Ingley and Van der Walt, 2001; Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989; Murphy and McIntyre, 2007), does not seek to indicate how great an 
influence each of these factors has, since this will vary across countries and industries. 
Rather, it was designed to facilitate investigation of their statistical effect on board role 
characteristics in the Libyan banking sector. 
Figure 4-1: Conceptual framework 
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Chapter 5: Research Methodology 
5.1. Introduction  
Having looked at the theoretical background to the current study in the previous 
chapters, this chapter addresses the methodology employed in this research. Creswell 
(2013) defines research methodology as the adoption of a scientific approach to collect 
data in order to respond to a research query and meet a research objective. The chapter 
therefore starts by reviewing the research objectives before discussing the assumptions 
surrounding social science research and describing the various research paradigms that 
were available to the researcher. The bulk of the chapter describes the methods that 
were employed to collect and interpret data. Primary emphasis was placed on selecting 
methods that would capture and preserve the depth and richness of the data throughout 
the research process. 
5.2. Research Objectives 
The overarching aims of this study are to examine the practices, roles and 
responsibilities of boards of directors in the Libyan banking sector and to identify the 
factors that facilitate or hinder them in performing these roles and responsibilities 
effectively. Libya provides a unique setting for the study in that Islam permeates all 
aspects of the culture, including the regulatory frameworks. Banking governance is 
also affected, with BOD performance being highly influenced by Shari’ah law. 
Another important aim of this research, therefore, is to study the nature of this impact 
and to establish whether Libyan BODs conform to boardroom norms in the banking 
sector in terms of their strategic, service and control/monitoring roles. The findings 
from the collected data were used to develop a conceptual model that allows a better 
understanding of BOD roles in the context of an Islamic and developing country. It is 
hoped that the findings will not only contribute to the literature but also provide 
insights that can be applied to CG practice in Libya to support its economic 
development.  
The aims outlined above were expressed in a series of research questions: 
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1. What are the international corporate governance regulations regarding the roles 
of the board of directors and how does practice in the Libyan banking sector 
reflect or diverge from these regulations? 
2. What are the perceptions of the board of directors concerning their roles and 
responsibilities with respect to efficient and effective corporate governance? 
3. What factors facilitate or hinder boards of directors in carrying out their roles 
and responsibilities in the LBS? 
4. What internal corporate governance mechanisms do board members see as 
contributing to efficient corporate governance in Libyan banks?  
 
The research objectives may thus be summarised as follows: 
1. To explore the actual/current practices, roles and responsibilities of boards of 
directors in the Libyan banking sector. 
2. To study the perceptions of board members concerning their roles and 
responsibilities. 
3. To identify the internal and external factors that affect boards when performing 
their roles and responsibilities in the LBS.  
4. To ascertain how boards of directors feel they contribute to efficient corporate 
governance in the public and private banking sectors. 
5.3. Research Philosophy and Methodology   
In the philosophy of knowledge, philosophical assumptions are abstract principles that 
combine beliefs about ontology, epistemology and methodology. These assumptions 
shape how researchers see the world and act in it, and provide criteria for evaluating 
the knowledge they produce (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). Before mapping out a 
research strategy and launching an empirical study, it is important to determine the 
philosophical and conceptual bases underlying the research (Collis and Hussey, 2013). 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2012) point out that identifying the philosophical standpoint is 
crucial to selecting the right research design. It may, for example, indicate that the 
researcher needs to develop a design that is outside their previous experience. Saunders 
et al. (2012) developed the “research onion” (see Figure 5.1) to show how the various 
philosophical assumptions support a range of social research paradigms representing 
different ontological and epistemological perspectives.  
 
 
  
Shalba 2016 104 
 
Figure 5-1: The research onion 
 
Source: Saunders et al. (2009, p.108) 
5.3.1. Research Paradigm 
Research paradigms are formed by the adoption of particular ontological, 
epistemological and methodological beliefs. As stated above, it is necessary to apply 
certain philosophical assumptions concerning how the world is perceived and how we 
can best understand it in order to address the research questions (Hughes and Sharrock, 
1997). This section compares the four major socal research paradigms in terms of their 
philosophical assumptions. Table 5.1 shows that positivism, realism, interpretivism 
and pragmatism each have their own area of interest and scope of applicability. Each 
paradigm views the world in a specific way, and this dictates how research questions 
are approached and data is analysed. The methodological approach and even 
assumptions about the nature of knowledge vary from paradigm to paradigm (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1994).   
  
Shalba 2016 105 
 
Table 5-1: Comparison of four research philosophies 
Source: adapted from Saunders et al. (2009, p.119) 
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5.3.1.1. Positivism and Interpretivism 
Collis and Hussey (2013) show that these two ontological standpoints are known by a 
range of names (see Table 5.2). Some favour  “phenomenological” over  
“interpretivist”, but the terms are widely used interchangeably. Positivism is linked 
with quantitative and deductive approaches, while interpretivism is associated with 
qualitative and inductive methods (Riege, 2003). 
Table 5-2: Alternative terms for the two main research paradigms or 
philosophies 
 
Source: adapted from Collis and Hussey (2013) 
At the heart of the positivist paradigm is the belief that: “The social world exists 
externally, and its properties should be measured through objective methods and not 
through sensation, reflection or intuition” (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012, p.22). 
According to Gilbert (2001, p.7):  
“This positive tradition posits that society can be explained 
‘scientifically’ according to laws and rational logics – whether these 
are based on social stages, social facts or on social systems is not the 
point here. However much they differed in their outlook, for each, 
sociology offered a positive, scientific tool for explaining social 
events.”  
Scholars employing the positivist approach seek to ascertain some of the facts or 
reasons behind a social phenomenon, but pay little regard to the subjective state of the 
actors involved. Positivist-oriented studies explain social phenomena in terms of laws, 
the latter then being applied to predict the incidence of the former (giving decision 
makers the opportunity to control them). Collis and Hussey (2013) argue that 
researchers selecting the positivist paradigm see the social and natural worlds alike as 
being governed by the sequence of cause and effect and fixed rules.  
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In contrast, the phenomenological paradigm seeks to understand human behaviour by 
examining the individual frame of reference of the respondent (Bryman and Bell, 
2015; Collis and Hussey, 2013). This paradigm was developed when critics of 
positivism argued that it is impossible to isolate human beings from their social 
environment, and that researchers themselves lack objectivity and cannot avoid being 
influenced in their enquiry by their own interests and views. Furthermore, using a 
single measure to attempt to make sense of a multifaceted phenomenon may yield 
results that are, at best, misleading (Collis and Hussey, 2013). The phenomenological 
paradigm highlights the subjective features of human action by concentrating on the 
implications of a social phenomenon rather than its measurement (ibid). It places 
emphasis on identifying the various constructions and values that people ascribe to 
their individual experience; hence, the stress is more on what people perceive and 
sense and how they interact with each other. According to Easterby-Smith et al. (2012), 
researchers should be aiming to make sense of people’s various experiences rather than 
trying to establish links with external influences or fundamental laws.  
Saunders et al. (2012) have summarised the advantages and disadvantages of the two 
paradigms (see Table 5.3).  
Table 5-3: Key advantages and disadvantages of positivism and phenomenology  
Source: Saunders et al. (2012) 
 Positivism 
 
Phenomenology 
Advantages  - Economical collection of large 
amount of data. 
- Clear theoretical focus for the 
research at the outset. 
- Greater opportunity for researcher 
to retain control of research 
process. 
- Easily comparable data. 
- Facilitates understanding 
of how and why. 
- Enables researcher to be 
alive to 
Changes that occur during 
the research process. 
- Good at understanding 
social processes.  
Disadvantages  - Inflexible: direction often cannot 
be changed once data collection has 
started. 
- Weak at understanding social 
process. 
- Often doesn’t discover the 
meaning people attach to social 
phenomena.   
- Data collection can be 
time-consuming. 
- Data analysis is difficult. 
- Researcher has to live with 
the uncertainty that clear 
patterns may not emerge. 
- Generally perceived as 
less credible by “non-
researchers”. 
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In the positivist paradigm, knowledge about social phenomena is gained through the 
gathering of facts; this knowledge should be value-free, objective and independent of 
social actors (Bryman and Bell, 2015). However, the phenomenological paradigm sees 
social phenomena and their meanings as being continually accomplished by these 
social actors (Gill and Johnson, 2010). It is a very different way of viewing the world 
than positivism. Phenomenologists are concerned with the study of phenomena – what 
things mean – in a social context, rather than with identifying and measuring these 
phenomena. They consider human experience a valuable source of data, rather than 
believing that truth can be identified simply by measuring the existence of physical 
phenomena (Saunders et al., 2012). The two paradigms each have their own strengths, 
and researchers should not fall into the trap of accepting one as better than the other 
(Saunders et al., 2012), but the phenomenological paradigm seems particularly 
appropriate for the investigation of directors’ perceptions of corporate governance and 
the social world of the LBS. Since the aim of this study is to understand directors’ 
perceptions of corporate governance in Libyan banking sector, in order to understand 
people and their opinions, I need to apply an ontological view and a method that 
facilitate my understanding of the social world.  
5.3.1.2. The Realist Approach 
Realism emphasises that there is an external reality that is independent of the 
researcher (Bryman and Bell, 2015) and largely autonomous (Sobh and Perry, 2006). 
According to Bryman and Bell (2011, p.29): 
“Realism shares two features with positivism: a belief that the 
natural and the social sciences should apply the same kinds of 
approach to the collection of data and to explanation, and a 
commitment to the view that there is an external reality to which 
scientists direct their attention (in other words, there is a reality that 
is separate from our descriptions of it).”  
However, although the realist approach re  tains the scientific method of the positivist 
approach, it acknowledges the subjective nature of social research and the inevitable 
role of values (Fisher, 2007). Interpretivisim is an ontological position that constitutes 
social phenomena and their meanings as continually being accomplished by social 
actors who give meaning to them (Bryman and Bell, 2015). The interpretive approach 
involves subjectively understanding the meaning, themes and different aspects of 
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phenomena (Hughes and Sharroch, 1997); it also allows the researcher to be part of 
the setting and to gain more in-depth data and knowledge on the topic. Realists accept 
that there is a social world that is not value-free and that is subject to interpretation. 
Noting the differences between the real world and these various interpretations, they 
seek to explain phenomena in context-specific terms (Riege, 2003). They see social 
structures as the product of specific social relationships. However, while they see these 
social structures as having an objective existence, they are real only in their effects; 
they are not permanent and unchanging. Fisher (2007) states that: “realist research 
shows there is a connection; interpretivism gives a possible description of how the 
connection may work” (p.57). 
5.3.1.3. The Pragmatic Approach 
The individual limitations of each of the above approaches meant that none of them 
was sufficient by itself to address all the research questions in the current study. By 
combining them, however, it was possible to minimise the effects of these limitations 
while exploiting their strengths. Saunders et al. (2012) argue that deploying only one 
paradigm might limit the researcher’s ability to explore the research area thoroughly 
and that it is advisable to adopt a more flexible approach to theorise the world being 
studied. Neuman and Benz (1998) also advocate a multi-dimensional approach to 
research, emphasising that the research objective should direct the methodology, not 
the reverse. Easterby-Smith et al. (2012) describe pragmatism as just such a multi-
dimensional approach.  
Patton (2002) argues that the central reason for taking a pragmatic approach is to 
address the practical objectives of the research. Thus, though aware of the logical 
independence of the different philosophical positions, a pragmatist will combine 
different approaches if this allows him to better address the research question, to make 
better decisions in terms of data collection, analysis and interpretation and to limit bias. 
The aim is to find what works best for the research questions and not allow the 
philosophical assumption of a particular methodological standpoint to limit the 
research. Pragmatism allows researchers to take advantage of the benefits of the 
mixed-method approach (Teddlie and Tashakkor, 2009).   
Following Burrell and Morgan (1994), this study rejects the ontological assumption 
that the world has no real pre-defined structure and adopts a realist approach. It deals 
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with regulators and autonomous individuals who perceive corporate governance as an 
actual functional aspect of the corporate environment in Libyan banks. Therefore, the 
underlying assumption of this study is that the corporate world can only be understood 
imperfectly or probabilistically, as suggested by Pansiri (2009). It argues that banks 
find it difficult to achieve good board practice and effective CG systems because of 
the range of socal actors involved.  
With regards to its epistemological position, this study aims to develop an 
understanding of phenomena as real and distinct from the researcher; hence, where 
possible, data was collected objectively and without bias. However, it was also 
necessary to study the feelings and attitudes of participants in order to gain a better 
understanding of board roles and the social processes involved. Accordingly, a 
pragmatic paradigm and mixed methodological approach were applied (Creswell, 
2013; Pansiri, 2009). 
The first stage of the data collection process was a quantitative survey, while the 
second was a series of qualitative semi-structured interviews with board members. 
Qualitative and quantitative data may be collected and analysed simultaneously or 
consecutively, with the second technique being used to explain and interpret the 
findings of the first (Pansiri, 2005, p.202). In this case, time and cost constraints 
rendered it necessary to conduct the quantitative and qualitative studies concurrently. 
Although the quantitative data was analysed first, as it was assumed that this would 
help the researcher better assess the current practices, roles and responsibilities of 
boards in the LBS, the quantitative and qualitative data analyses were intended to be 
mutually supportive. As a result in the interpretation section, data was mixed to 
elaborate on the themes and address the research objectives. 
5.4. Research Methods 
As indicated above, the study draws on data from a range of sources and employs a 
mixed-method approach to provide more perspectives on the BOD. According to Jick 
(1979, p. 608), the multi-method design “… can stimulate the creation of inventive 
methods, new ways of capturing a problem to balance with conventional data-
collection methods”.  The combination of quantitative and qualitative methods is one 
of the most widely used approaches in the social sciences (Collis and Hussey, 2013; 
Saunders et al., 2012), as researchers argue that different types of data can be mutually 
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enriching and each perspective can afford a new layer of understanding (Lee, 1991). 
In this case, quantitative data collected from the questionnaire revealed details of 
director demographics and characteristics, board composition and processes, and the 
extent of board compliance with codes of practice. This stage, which involved 
collecting and analysing numerical data and applying statistical tests, gave an initial 
insight into the role and characteristics of boards in the LBS (Hussey and Hussey, 
1997). The qualitative method was employed to address the second, third and fourth 
research questions. The semi-structured interview was believed to be the best way to 
investigate participants’ views, feelings and opinions as these are not quantifiable and 
cannot be determined without face-to-face communication (May, 1994).   
 
The adoption of a combination of research approaches, methods and techniques is 
usually referred to as triangulation (Collis and Hussey, 2013; Saunders et al., 2012). 
Collis and Hussey (2013) identified four types of triangulation, as shown in Table 5.4. 
Saunders et al. (2009, p.146) define triangulation as:  
“The use of different data collection techniques within one study in 
order to ensure that the data are telling you what you think they are 
telling you. For example, qualitative data collected using semi-
structured group interviews may be a valuable way of triangulating 
quantitative data collected by other means such as a questionnaire.” 
Table 5-4: Types of triangulation 
Source: Collis and Hussey (2013) 
Bryman and Bell (2015) point out that triangulation is widely utilised in the business 
and management research field as it allows the researcher to compensate for the 
Types of Triangulation  
 Data triangulation Where data is collected at different times or from 
different sources in the study of a phenomenon. 
 Investigator triangulation Where different researchers independently 
collect data on the same phenomenon. 
 Triangulation of theories Where a theory is taken from one discipline and 
used to explain a phenomenon in another 
discipline. 
 Methodological 
triangulation 
Where both quantitative and qualitative methods 
of data collection are used. 
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shortcomings of individual techniques and to cross-check results. Snow and Thomas 
(1994) argue that it increases the validity and robustness of findings. Stiles and Taylor 
(2001) ensured rigour in their study of UK boards by employing methodological 
triangulation. They conducted open-ended interviews with directors (and some other 
stakeholders); issued a questionnaire to company secretaries (n=121); compiled case 
studies of four UK public companies (which involved interviewing on average five 
directors from each company); and gathered extensive secondary and archival data. 
Demb and Neubauer (1992) also took a multi-method approach, interviewing 71 
directors from eleven multinational companies and issuing a questionnaire to attendees 
(n=137) at their board level courses at IMD in Lausanne. Lorsch and MacIver (1989), 
in their 1989 study of US boards, interviewed 80 directors, supplementing this with 
four case studies and a questionnaire (n=100). Peck (1995) provides a rare example of 
a study which uses observation, minutes and questionnaires to study the performance 
of an NHS Trust board. Fifteen board meetings were observed and board papers and 
minutes gathered. At the end of the process, a questionnaire was sent to the members 
of the Trust board with items measuring their “…perceptions of the roles that the board 
had been most successful at undertaking during its initial months” (p.146). 
This study employs both data triangulation and methodological triangulation in an 
effort to neutralise the influence of individual methods and make the findings more 
reliable. The findings from the quantitative and qualitative methods were subjected to 
comparative analysis to check consistency. For example, initial information on 
corporate governance and boards of directors in the Libyan banking sector was 
gathered by means of archival research; the data gathered from the questionnaires and 
interviews was then used to supplement and verify this information. A major source of 
uncertainty in any study employing a single research method is that it leaves untested 
alternative interpretations that might call the validity of the study’s findings into 
question. Gill and Johnson (2010) propose methodological triangulation as a way of 
promoting validity by reducing reactivity and respondent and researcher bias. Table 
5.5 presents the relationship between the methods used in this study and the research 
questions. 
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Table 5-5: Relationship between the methods used in this study and the research 
questions 
 
5.4.1. Research Access  
Informed consent is regarded as the cornerstone of ethical research, but securing this 
consent can be problematic in developing countries (Benatar, 2002; Lindegger and 
Richter, 2000). In western countries, the consent form is an important mechanism for 
enforcing confidentiality, but in developing countries such as Malaysia and Libya, an 
invitation to sign a consent form may be met with suspicion (Mertens, 2009). Ryen 
(2004) believes that an invitation to sign formal documents does not work in some 
cultures because it “may lead to alienation [and] it may enforce scepticism” (p. 232). 
Shareia et al. (2005) found in their research in Malaysia and Libya that people tend to 
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avoid writing their name or signing questionnaires because they think it might risk 
their position or they will be held responsible for what they have written. This problem 
has also been encountered by a number of NTU doctoral students who have conducted 
their research in Libya; with the result that some have abandoned consent forms 
altogether. Larbsh (2010) did not use consent forms for either his questionnaires or his 
interviews, while Busnaina (2011) used consent forms for his interviews but not his 
questionnaires. 
In this study, interviewees were asked to sign a consent form indicating their 
willingness to participate in the research, as it was felt that the formality of signing 
such a form would build more trust for the participant. The form constituted the second 
page of the interview schedule, after the information sheet. The interviewees were 
given time to read the consent form before starting the interview. 
A consent form was attached to each questionnaire, but completion was optional. The 
participants were reassured of the confidentiality and anonymity of the research in the 
information sheet, but the questionnaires were distributed under the supervision of 
bank managers and it was anticipated that respondents would be reluctant to fill them 
in if they were asked to write their names or sign a form for the reasons discussed 
above. This might have reduced the size of the sample and consequently the 
significance of the results. 
It should be noted that accessing data was a major challenge in the study, in particular 
because executive managers and BODs were reluctant to participate in any research. 
Even making initial contact was difficult. Over a period of five months, repeated 
emails were sent to banks requesting that archive material be sent by post to the 
researcher’s address in Libya or to his email, but without success. Between December 
2011 and April 2012, several follow-up communications were directed to the 
individuals responsible for compiling annual reports, but still no replies were received. 
Since it was evident that the research could not progress without the help of influential 
people, the researcher went to Libya and used his personal contacts to approach banks 
in person.  The necessary documents were finally made available in July 2012. The 
insular nature of Libyan banks, the busy schedules of bank employees and the 
confidentiality of the documents were all challenges that had to be overcome before 
the banks would share information. They were only convinced to cooperate with the 
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help of Nottingham Trent University (who gave official assurances of the 
confidentiality and anonymity of the research), and with the mediation/support of the 
Libyan embassy and the Director General of the CBL.   
 Although collecting data via questionnaires was not as difficult as accessing bank 
documents and archival sources, this was not an easy task either. Distributing the 
questionnaires and collecting the responses was difficult because of the enormous 
distances involved. Libya covers 1,774,440 square kilometres (679.182 square miles) 
and the banking sector is spread across several cities, so the researcher had to travel 
long distances, sometimes more than 1200 km, to distribute/collect the questionnaires. 
Once again, bank employees were often too busy to participate.  
Organising interviews, especially with CEOs and board chairmen, was also extremely 
difficult. Again, personal contacts were the main way the researcher was able to gain 
access to and build trust with the interviewees. Even so, respondents were reluctant to 
share any information with the researcher, citing confidentiality, and managers who 
had agreed to be interviewed repeatedly cancelled appointments on the grounds that 
they were too busy. Finally, through patience and persistence, the researcher was able 
to secure 24 interviews. 
5.4.2. Ethical Considerations 
In accordance with the requirements of NTU's Research Governance Policy 2006, the 
research instruments were submitted to the Ethical Committee for approval. As part of 
the application, the committee was provided with an overview of the fieldwork plan 
and an explanation of the steps that would be taken to protect participant 
confidentiality and data security. The plan was formally approved in July 2012.  
5.4.3. Data Sources and Sample Selection Criteria 
The potential sample for the study was all seventeen commercial banks operating in 
Libya. ( Table 2.1 chapter 2). The researcher met with sixteen of these banks, including 
four subsidiaries of foreign-held firms, six state-owned banks and six private banks. 
The remaining commercial bank was excluded from the research because it had been 
frozen by the Libyan government. Specialised banks such as mortgage lenders and 
agricultural banks were also excluded from the sample as they apply different 
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accounting practices The study covers the period between 2005 and 2013 because: (a) 
banking reform began in 2005; (b) implementation of CG best practice began in 2011; 
and (c) the 2011 revolution triggered further radical change (e.g. the introduction of 
SSBs).  
Data was hand-collected from annual reports and archival documents such as 
memoranda and Articles of Association. These gave information on the legal and 
formal structure of the banks, the ownership structure and details about the banks’ 
origins. The main source of secondary data on the sector was publications by the CBL. 
Other documents included government publications highlighting the legal role and 
responsibilities of the board of directors, the Companies' Law  (2010) and  financial 
and banking legislation.  
5.4.4. Data Collection via Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was distributed to a purposive sample of the target population. It 
was designed to yield insights into the nature and characteristics of the BODs in the 
sample companies and how these companies are governed in practice, and to elicit the 
general attitudes of a range of internal stakeholders towards current corporate 
governance practice. 
A questionnaire may be defined as a set of questions that have been designed to elicit 
reliable responses from a particular group of participants (Collis and Hussey, 2013; 
Sekaran and Bougie, 2010). It is a useful method for studying the views and practices 
of the respondents (Hussain and Mallin, 2002; Mingers, 2001). Questionnaires can be 
administered by mail, telephone, online or in person, and can be completed by either 
the researcher or the respondent. Each of these options has its own advantages and 
disadvantages (Collis and Hussey, 2013; Sekaran and Bougie, 2010), but the self-
administered questionnaire was considered the most appropriate in this case. In the 
self-administered questionnaire, the researcher presents the questionnaire to the 
respondents and explains the purpose of the investigation, and the respondents are then 
left alone to complete it (Oppenheim, 2000; Sekaran and Bougie, 2010). 
The main advantage of administering a questionnaire in person is that the completed 
response can be collected within a short period of time. Any sensitive or complex 
questions can be clarified on the spot, ensuring a higher response rate. It is often more 
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time- and cost-effective, and it minimises researcher bias (Oppenheim, 2000; Bryman 
and Bell, 2015; Collis and Hussey, 2013; Sekaran and Bougie, 2010). Finally, it gives 
the researcher the opportunity to introduce the research topic personally and to 
motivate the participants not just to complete the questionnaire, but to answer the 
questions honestly (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010). An additional consideration in this 
case was the fact that Libya’s postal service is not very reliable; administering the 
questionnaire by post would have reduced the response rate and taken more time. It 
was similarly impractical to conduct the questionnaire by email or telephone because 
of the difficulty of finding up to date contact details for the target respondents. As the 
questionnaire was designed to collect comprehensive data, it was quite long. Had it 
been administered by post, email or telephone, it may well have been ignored by the 
recipients and achieved a very low response rate. 
Collis and Hussey (2013) identify several important issues that researchers need to 
consider when designing and distributing their research instrument. These include 
sample/population size, question design (i.e. type, wording and presentation), how to 
pilot the questionnaire, the covering letter, distribution method, methods of data 
analysis and how to test reliability and validity. These issues are discussed in the 
following sections.  
5.4.4.1. Questionnaire Design 
Numerous authors have pointed out that the questionnaire is one of the most widely 
used data collection techniques in studies adopting a survey strategy (Saunders et al., 
2012; Sekaran and Bougie, 2010). They argue that a good questionnaire is designed in 
such a way as to collect the precise data required to answer the research questions and 
meet the research objectives. Unlike other data collection methods, the researcher has 
only one opportunity to collect data; they will not be able to go back to the respondents 
and collect additional information using another questionnaire. In this study, a 
theoretical framework was built based on the research objectives. The development of 
the questionnaire was also influenced by the reviewed literature; several questions 
were adopted from Hussain and Mallin (2002), Solomon (2010) and Stiles and Taylor 
(2001). The OECD’s corporate governance assessment instrument (2004) was also 
used in this section of the research. Finally, a small number of questions were 
specifically related to the legal and economic environments and Shari'ah law.  
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Significant effort and time were dedicated to the construction of the questionnaire and 
the piloting of drafts (see 5.4.4.3). A detailed and careful evaluation of each part of the 
questionnaire was conducted; this process was also guided by the recommendations of 
authors such as Oppenheim (2000), Bryman and Bell (2015), Collis and Hussey (2013), 
Saunders et al. (2012) and Sekaran and Bougie (2010). A number of steps were taken 
to ensure optimum clarity and user-friendliness in the questionnaire. Firstly, the 
purpose of the questionnaire was explained to all respondents. Clear instructions were 
given for each question, all of which were expressed in simple and direct language. To 
give respondents additional support, the questionnaire was accompanied by a brief 
glossary of some of the more specific terms. Questions were kept as short as possible 
without distorting their content and meaning, with questions on a similar theme being 
grouped together. Respondents were led from general to more specific questions and 
from relatively easy to more difficult questions. Embarrassing questions were avoided. 
Finally, the questionnaire was designed to look neat and attractive: the final draft 
consisted of A4 pages ( 6 Pages) , printed on both sides and stapled to form a booklet. 
This required less paper and made it appear shorter and more professional. The full 
text of the questionnaire (in English) is provided in Appendix B. 
5.4.4.2. Types of Questions 
The questionnaire was divided into three sections. The questions in Section One were 
designed to obtain general information about the banks in the sample. Those in Section 
Two were designed to investigate the respondents’ perceptions of corporate 
governance in the Libyan business environment. These questions were important 
because they were expected to provide the basic data needed for analysing and testing 
relationships with other variables in the study. The respondents were presented with 
six definitions of corporate governance (Solomon, 2010), each expressing a different 
interpretation of CG, and asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed 
with each definition by scoring each one between 1 (strongly disagree) and 5 (strongly 
agree).  
Section Two was also designed to seek the respondents’ opinions and perceptions 
regarding the board’s service role, strategic role and control/monitoring role in the 
Libyan context. In terms of their strategic role, boards of directors fall into two 
categories: (1) The board creates the bank’s objectives, strategies and a board policy, 
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while top management prepares the overall strategy; and (2) the board is involved in 
the development and implementation of strategy.  Respondents were asked to indicate 
on a five-point Likert scale whether they agreed (or disagreed) with these statements 
as a description of  the role played by their board.  
The service role of the board of directors has three main aspects: networking with the 
external environment, building the firm’s reputation and counselling executives. 
Respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point Likert scale the extent to which 
they agreed that their board performs its service role by (1) enhancing company 
reputation, (2) establishing contacts with the external environment and (3) giving 
advice to executives. 
The control/monitoring role has three main aspects: output control, strategic control 
and behavioural control. The respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point Likert 
scale the extent to which they agreed that their board engages in (1) output control 
(monitoring company performance), (2) strategic control (monitoring the execution of 
approved strategy) and (3) monitoring managers. 
The remaining questions in Section Two attempted to elicit more detail about the 
factors that participants saw as preventing boards from performing their roles 
effectively, and the role of CG mechanisms in enhancing board efficiency. This section 
was important in helping the researcher to explore current approaches to corporate 
governance in Libya and to draw out respondents’ opinions regarding its future 
development.  
Table 5-6: Factors investigated in Section Two of the questionnaire: 
 
Factor How it was measured Scale Question 
The main key factors 
influence the role and 
responsibilities of the 
board 
Participants were asked to identify the 
degree to which performance is 
impeded for 8 factors 
Likert 
5-point 
 
2.4 
Factors that might 
enhance the effectiveness 
of boards and corporate 
governance in Libyan 
banks 
Participants were asked to identify the 
degree to which board effectiveness 
and corporate governance in Li byan 
banks would be enhanced (11 
statements). 
Likert 
5-point 
 
2.5 
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Section Three of the questionnaire was addressed solely to CEOs, the questionnaire 
attempted to elicit more details on the practices, roles and responsibilities of boards of 
directors in public, private and foreign banks operating in Libya. The section looked 
at corporate governance mechanisms,( composition, diversity, structure, and process) 
how these mechanisms might diverge from international best practice (Hussain, and 
Mallin, 2002). 
Table 5-7: Corporate governance mechanisms measured in the questionnaire 
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5.4.4.3. Pilot Study Questionnaires 
A pilot study was carried out in order to identify any potential problems with the design 
of the questionnaire and to check the internal consistency and reliability of the 
questions (Saunders et al., 2012). An initial draft of the questionnaire was put together 
based on the literature. This draft was reviewed by the supervisory team and then 
piloted among the PhD students at Nottingham Business School. The second stage of 
the pilot study involved passing the questionnaire to three LBS board members and 
four academics in Libyan universities (all of whom held PhDs in accounting from UK 
universities). Their comments on the reliability of the questions were collected, and 
the wording and scaling of certain questions were modified accordingly. In the third 
stage of the pilot study, the modified version of the questionnaire was translated from 
English into Arabic and then reviewed by the same academics to check for any bias or 
grammatical/semantic mistakes. Their comments were incorporated into the final 
version of the questionnaire.  
5.4.4.4. Research Population and Sample for the Questionnaire 
As explained in section 5.4.3, Libya’s commercial banking sector comprises seventeen 
operating banks, sixteen of which took part in the study. Six are state- or local 
government-owned, six are privately owned banks and four are subsidiaries of foreign-
held firms. The remaining bank was excluded from the research because it had been 
frozen by the Libyan government.  
The aims of the questionnaire were to gain an insight into the nature and characteristics 
of boards in the LBS and how banks are governed, and to elicit the attitudes of different 
groups towards current practice. Since the research questions focus on the real 
operation of boards in the sector and the impact of internal CG mechanisms, it was 
necessary to survey not just board members and executive committee members, but 
also the various internal stakeholders and outsider groups that have an impact on the 
BOD’s role. The difficulties of gaining access to boards were another reason why it 
was decided that the sampling frame should be as large as possible. The frame was 
therefore selected according to the following criteria: 
1. Most existing studies focus on the perceptions of chairmen and CEOs 
(Machold et al., 2011; Hassien and Mallin, 2002). Inclusion of all board 
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members facilitated the investigation of the roles of both non-executive and 
executive directors. These are a key focus in both academic and prescriptive 
literatures. 
2. Internal stakeholders from a range of managerial roles are called upon as board 
informants. Directors with major resource allocation and policy-making power 
were targeted, such as financial managers and internal auditors. Which 
significantly impact boards of directors role. 
3. Board secretaries were included because, as Stiles and Taylor (2001) argue, 
they may be rather more objective than directors when answering 
questionnaires. The board secretary is responsible for administration; their 
duties include convening board and company meetings at the direction of the 
board, taking minutes of meetings, writing up the company's statutory books 
and filing returns with the registrar of companies. 
4. The questionnaire was also distributed to research and development staff, as 
some of them accounting lecturers in some of Libya’s business schools. These 
academics influence accounting, corporate governance and disclosure practice 
in the country. 
5. The samples were chosen from both Libyan-owned (public and private) and 
joint Libyan/foreign-owned banks to allow comparison of corporate 
governance systems and structures. 
Based on previous research experience in Libya, it was predicted that approximately 
50% to 70% of the questionnaires would be returned. To maximise the chances of 
obtaining a sufficient number of responses from each group, 410 questionnaires were 
therefore sent out to: 
1. Board members (depending on the size of the board) 112 questionnaires. 
2. CEOs or Executive manager / financial deparment (senior manager, finance 
director, management accountant) (head office level) 80 questionnaires. 
3. Internal auditors (director / head office level) 80 questionnaires. 
4. Executive manager members ( sitting) on sub-committee(s) 88 questionnaires. 
5. Board secretaries 16 questionnaires. 
6. Research and development staff member 34 questionnaires. 
A total of 227 questionnaires were answered, giving a response rate of 55% (see, Table 
5.8). 
Table 5-8: Responses to the questionnaire survey from each group 
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5.4.4.5. Statistical Analysis of Questionnaire Data 
The best way to evaluate the reliability of questionnaire responses with a minimum 
acceptable value of 0.70 is Cronbach's Alpha test (Field, 2013; Santos, 1999). The 
items in the current data presented on the Likert scale showed an acceptable reliability 
of 82.2%. The other items in the questionnaire did not require a reliability test because 
they were drawn as formative measures. These measures indicate that the items 
adopted from the questionnaire had significant correlation. 
After the questionnaire responses had been coded according to respondent type and 
bank sector, the data was transferred to the SPSS computer package for analysis. There 
are many techniques for analysing experimental data; descriptive statistics and non- 
parametric tests were deemed the most suitable techniques for answering the research 
questions in this case. 
Descriptive statistics changes raw data into finished information (Sekaran and Bougie, 
2010). This information is presented in the form of frequencies, percentages, overall 
mean scores, standard deviations and rank orders. Weisberg et al. (1996) comment on 
the particular usefulness of percentages and frequency distribution as a way of 
presenting information. The overall mean value of each question attached from the 
three user groups was used in the ranking of the respondents’ mean to the research 
questions. 
The first moment is the mean, which is usually computed as: 
𝑥 =
1
𝑛
 . ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Where: 
X = the mean; N = the total number of respondents in the sample; i = 1,2,3,4, ....n. 
The second moment is the standard deviation. This is usually computed as: 
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Where:  
S = the standard deviation; X = the mean; N = the total number of respondents in the 
sample; and Xi =1 ý2, 3, 4, ....N. 
The aim was to compute an indicator that would allow measurement of the 
unpredictability of an individual response within a particular distribution. Standard 
deviation measures the spread around the mean of the sample population. Sekaran and 
Bougie (2010) describe standard deviation as an indicator that allows the researcher to 
measure the variability within an individual or group’s answers and how much they 
differ from the mean. This statistical method is used to make abstract thought from 
sample statistics to the population parameters. In this study, it was used to compare 
respondents’ opinions and perceptions of CG and the roles and responsibilities of 
BODs in public, private and foreign banks operating in Libya.  
Non-parametric tests were then conducted to analyse the differences between 
independent samples. Newbold et al. (2007) advise that non-parametric testing is more 
suitable in a questionnaire survey, where the data is mainly nominal and ordinal. Leach 
(1979) argues that in non-parametric testing; relatively few assumptions are made 
about the nature of the population distribution. As computations are based upon 
frequency distributions and/or rank order rather than means, neither interval-level data 
nor assumptions about the shape of the underlying distribution are required.  
Siegel and Castellan (1988) identify a number of advantages of non-parametric testing. 
They argue that non-parametric methods are applicable to all types of data in any 
analysis, large or small, and that they are suitable for treating samples made up of 
observations from different populations. They can be used to analyse data that is 
normally ranked, producing numerical scores that have the strength of ranks. 
Depending on the parametric procedures selected, non-parametric methods may be 
almost or even equally (see Bradley, 1968) as powerful as classical procedures when 
the assumptions of the latter are met. They may be quite a bit more powerful when the 
assumptions of classical procedures are not met. As they make fewer stringent 
assumptions than classical procedures, they are easier to apply. Finally, non-parametric 
methods are cheap to use.  
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The non-parametric tests employed in this study were the Kruskal-Wallis One-Way 
Analysis of Variance test and the Mann-Whitney test. The Kruskal-Wallis test was used 
to test the differences among participants from private, public and foreign banks – 
specifically in terms of their perceptions of CG. The Kruskal-Wallis test is another 
version of the parametric ANOVA test for calculating the difference in the population 
mean. It tests the null hypothesis that independent groups or samples are the same 
against the alternative hypothesis that one or more of the groups differ from the others. 
Gall et al., (2007) define the Kruskal-Wallis test as:  
“a statistical technique used to compare categorical data. It also 
gives a comparison of the distribution of individual variables from 
two or more different groups and produces a measure of relationship, 
called the contingency coefficient, which is similar to the correlation 
coefficient.” (p. 405) 
In line with Curwin and Slater’s recommendation (2007), this study was conducted at 
the 5% level of significance and 95% level of confidence for the various statistical 
tests. A statistically significant result on the Kruskal-Wallis test indicates a difference 
between groups, while an insignificant result indicates that they are the same.  
The Kruskal-Wallis value is computed using the following formula: 
 
Where:  
H = Kruskal-Wallis value                 Rj = sum of the ranks of the jth group 
nj = sample size of the jth group or sample 
N = combined sample sizes of all groups or samples 
R = average of the ranks in the jth samples or groups. 
 k = the number of groups 
A mean value was computed for each item on the questionnaire, reflecting the 
respondent’s behaviour in regard to that item. A five-point scale, with 1 representing 
the lowest point and 5 representing the highest point, accompanied each question. 
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Respondents’ mean responses to each of the questions were ranked. These rankings 
represent the capability of response in terms of level of value or 
agreement/disagreement. This rank order is vital because it signals the relative level of 
importance attributed by the respondents to each item. 
The Mann-Whitney test, which is a non-parametric test similar to the (parametric) t-
test, is used to test the difference between two independent groups on a continuous 
measure. The test turns the scores for the continuous variable into ranks (Chan et al., 
2009) and measures whether the ranks for the two groups differ significantly. The 
Mann-Whitney test is also used to test the difference between two paired samples. The 
underlying assumption of this test is that the data (in the one sample situation) or the 
difference-scores (in the two sample situation) is continuous ordinal data from a 
symmetric population. Leach (1979) adds that each subject's data is independent of the 
data from other subjects.  
Where there is no significant difference between the means of the two groups, the 
Mann-Whitney value is computed for the second group, using the following formula: 
U = 𝑆 −     
𝑛1(𝑛1 − 1)
2
 
Where: 
S = the sum of the ranks assigned to the sample under study 
N1 = the total number of respondents in sample1  
In this study, the MW test was used to verify which pairs of group averages were 
significantly different from each other. If the two groups were the same size, the Mann-
Whitney value was computed for the second of the two groups.   
5.4.4.6. Respondents’ Demographic Details 
The survey questionnaire began by gathering information about the respondents’ 
personal backgrounds; they were asked about their place of work, last educational 
qualification, degree subject, current position and relevant work experience. Apart 
from yielding useful data, these questions were helpful in introducing respondents to 
the format of the questionnaire. Table 5.9 illustrates that 44.5% of respondents worked 
in the state-owned banking sector, 31.3% in the private sector and 24.2% in the Libyan 
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foreign sector. The vast majority of respondents (84.6%) had top management 
responsibilities. 57.3% held a bachelor’s degree, while 33.4% had a PhD or other post-
graduate qualification. 
Table 5-9: General information about the respondents 
Source: design by researcher 
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Table 5.10 indicates that 41.4% of the respondents were board members, 17.2% 
worked in the financial department (as senior managers), 16.3% were internal auditors 
(these were directors), 9.7% were members of one or more sub-committees, 7% were 
board secretaries and 8.4% worked in research and development (serving the board in 
an advisory capacity). More than half (59%) of the participants had between 5 and 10 
years’ experience,  31.3% had between 11 and 15 years’ experience and 7.0% had more 
than 15 years’ experience. 2.6% had less than five years’ experience in their current 
position. 
 Table 5-10: Respondents’ position and years of experience 
 
It may be concluded from the above information that the respondents were generally 
knowledgeable and relatively highly experienced. Most respondents had a background 
in banking, finance or accounting, making them well placed to provide relevant 
information regarding current corporate governance practice in Libya and the BOD’s 
role (see Appendix A Table 5). 
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5.4.5. Data Collection via Semi-Structured Interviews  
The questionnaire results mainly addressed the first research question, while the 
second, third and fourth research questions were addressed principally through the 
interviews. The questionnaire results were used to frame the interview questions, 
which also drew on findings from previous studies. The interviews, which were 
conducted between September 2012 and January 2013, were used to confirm the 
results from the questionnaire survey, to gain further understanding of the findings and 
to obtain more specific information about the roles and responsibilities of BODs and 
CG practice in the Libyan banking sector, including any differences between private 
and public banks.  
Liew (2007) and Solomon et al. (2002) show that interviews are an effective data 
collection method when studying corporate governance systems. The interviewees, 
who included board chairmen, CEOs and non-executive directors, were chosen 
purposefully for the significant impact they have on the practice and development of 
corporate governance in the banking sector. The primary objective of the interviews 
was to gain further insight into the directors’ perceptions regarding the BOD’s role. 
These perspectives were used to develop an understanding of how these directors 
conceived of their role on the board. 
5.4.5.1. Face-to-Face Interview Method 
Opdenakker (2006) states that interviews may be conducted face-to-face (FtF), over 
the telephone, or via MSN messenger or email. He adds that face-to-face interviews 
are the most common, but that telephone interviews are also popular. Each of the four 
options has its own advantages and disadvantages, depending on the degree to which 
it is a synchronous or asynchronous form of communication (see Table 5.11).  
Table 5-11: The four interview techniques by degree of synchronous 
asynchronous communication 
Source: adapted from Opdenakker (2006) 
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As seen in Table 5.11, FtF interviews facilitate communication that is synchronous in 
both time and place. Email interviews offer asynchronous communication in time and 
place, while MSN messenger and telephone interviews are synchronous in time but 
asynchronous in terms of place. Although it can be more expensive and time-
consuming than other types of interview, the face-to-face interview technique was 
employed here because it offers more advantages than the other techniques. As 
Opdenakker (2006) highlights, it is unique in enabling communication that is 
synchronous in both time and place. There is no significant time delay between 
question and answer; in other words, the interviewer and interviewee can directly react 
to what the other says or does. The interviewer has the chance to create the right 
ambience, and the interviewee’s answers are more likely to be spontaneous. Ending an 
FtF interview is also easier than ending other forms of interview as there are likely to 
be enough clues in the interaction between interviewer and interviewee to indicate 
when the interview is drawing to a natural conclusion.  
The fact that FtF interviews can be recorded (with the permission of the interviewee) 
makes it easier for the researcher to compile an accurate report, but it is still important 
to take notes during the interview: (1) to check that all the questions have been 
answered, (2) in case the recorder malfunctions and (3) in case of “interviewer 
malfunction”. In the event, the researcher in this study had to rely entirely on note 
taking as none of the interviewees were willing to be recorded. 
5.4.5.2.  Semi-Structured Interviews 
Three types of interview have been identified in social research (Saunders et al., 2012): 
the structured interview, the semi-structured interview and the unstructured interview. 
Researchers choosing to conduct structured interviews employ a predetermined, 
standardised or identical set of questions. Those choosing semi-structured interviews 
may also go in with a list of questions (see Appendix C), but these are only used as a 
starting point. One advantage of the semi-structured interview is that it offers the 
flexibility to explore areas of interest as they arise. Unstructured interviews are used 
to explore in depth a general area of interest. The goal is to put the interviewee at ease 
so that they feel able to express themselves freely. 
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The face-to-face semi-structured interview was chosen as the main data collection tool 
for this study because it had the capacity to provide important insights into BODs, 
including how their role and practices have developed over time, from the perspective 
of well-informed respondents (Yin, 2013). The semi-structured format provided a 
framework for the interview (rather than allowing respondents to talk in general ways 
about the research problem), while still giving interviewees the space to provide 
additional explanations where they felt it necessary (Deegan and Blomquist, 2006).  
5.4.5.3. Instrument Development  
The design of the instrument reflected the aims and objectives of the research and drew 
on previous qualitative studies, such as those by O’Neal and Thomas (1995), Solomon 
(2010), Stiles and Taylor (2001), Hill (1995) and Okpara (2011). The OECD’s 
corporate governance assessment instrument was also used in this section of the 
research. A small number of questions were drawn from the Libyan legal and economic 
environments, as well as from Shari’ah law. The guidelines given by Saunders et al. 
(2012) were closely followed when formulating the questions. These authors 
recommend three types of questions for use in semi-structured interviews: open 
questions that elicit definition and description of a situation or event; probing questions 
to explore significant responses to the research topic; and specific and closed questions 
to obtain specific information, or to confirm a fact or opinion. 
The interview schedule included questions about: the corporate governance concept; 
board roles and responsibilities; factors that affect the board’s roles and responsibilities 
in the Libyan banking sector, and how these might diverge from international best 
practice; factors that prevent boards from carrying out their roles and responsibilities 
effectively; and factors that could enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of Libyan 
boards. The original interview questions, which were drafted in English, were a 
mixture of open-ended and closed questions. To enhance validity and reliability, the 
researcher’s supervisors, who have the relevant expertise, reviewed the questions, and 
their comments were taken into consideration. Since Libya’s official language is 
Arabic, it was necessary to translate the instrument. This was done by the researcher 
and a bilingual Arabic/English colleague. The interviews were conducted in Arabic to 
optimise the chances of gathering full and detailed responses. For the purpose of the 
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analysis, the interviews in Arabic were translated into English and then back into 
Arabic in order to minimise any misunderstandings arising from inaccurate translation.  
All the interviews were conducted by the researcher. Interviewees were first contacted 
and an appointment arranged. The time and place of the interviews were chosen by the 
interviewees, be it the workplace or elsewhere. Prior to the actual interview, each 
participant was given a description of the research purpose at a confirmation meeting. 
This helped ensure they understood the questions and would feel more relaxed and 
comfortable (and thus would be more likely to give honest answers). The respondents 
were also allowed to make comments about the questions before their interview. This 
provision may have also promoted the validity of the data by enabling the interviewees 
to think about the information being requested beforehand. 
An attempt was made at the beginning of each interview to establish a good 
relationship with the interviewee by discussing a matter unrelated to the research. This 
is a Libyan tradition and was a necessary preamble. After thanking the interviewee for 
participating in the study, the nature of the research was again outlined. It was stressed 
that it was the interviewee’s opinions that were being sought, that there were no “right” 
or “wrong” answers to the questions, and that no prior technical knowledge of any 
kind was either assumed or required. The informed consent form was introduced and 
it was explained that that was a university requirement aimed at ensuring the researcher 
behaves ethically vis-à-vis their interviewees. The opportunity was also taken at this 
point to describe the broad objective of the research, to specify the interviewee’s right 
to refuse to answer any question, and to describe the procedures to ensure anonymity. 
The participant was made aware that they would have the opportunity to 
retrospectively verify the accuracy of the interview transcript and amend it. The 
participant was then asked to sign the consent form. 
Typically, the data collection process began with general questions about the 
interviewee’s profession/background and the name of the bank that they were 
associated with. The researcher used the interview guidelines during the interviews 
(see Appendix C). The interviewees were allowed to speak without interruption and 
were given sufficient time to develop their arguments and provide useful information. 
The average time of the interviews was one and a half to two hours, and all were 
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conducted on a one-to-one basis. Detailed notes were taken in the interviews, with the 
permission of the interviewees. Note taking was necessary as none of the interviewees 
wanted to be tape-recorded. All of the interviewees subsequently confirmed they were 
satisfied with the notes that had been taken. Four requested a copy of the interview 
transcript. All participants signed the Ethical Approval consent form, giving 
permission for the collected data to be used and published in this thesis. A promise of 
anonymity was given to all interviewees. After each interview, the researcher thanked 
the respondent. All interviews were transcribed immediately afterwards in Arabic and 
then translated into English. 
5.4.5.4.  Pilot Interviews 
According to Gill and Johnson (2010), conducting a pilot study in advance of the main 
study allows any potential problems in the form of the interview to be identified and 
corrected. Yin (2009) also highlights that a pilot study helps the researcher to refine 
their data collection plans in terms of content and the procedures to be followed. 
Accordingly, two sets of pilot interviews were conducted – one group in the UK and 
one in Libya. The process allowed the researcher to detect any ambiguity or 
redundancy in the questions and to assess their validity and reliability as data collection 
tools (Saunders et al., 2012). 
The interview questions were first discussed with the supervisory team at NTU. This 
draft was then piloted among PhD students at Nottingham Business School, 
Nottingham Trent University, to elicit their comments and feedback on the wording 
and structure of the questions. A final draft was prepared using this feedback and the 
preliminary results from the analysis of the questionnaire. In the second stage of the 
pilot process, another set of interviews was conducted in Libya to assess whether the 
interview questions were appropriate for use with the target sample. To avoid any bias 
and ensure accuracy, the questions were translated from English into Arabic with 
professional help. Three individuals were interviewed in two different banks during 
July and August 2012: these were a regional manager, a board secretary and a non-
executive director. All interviews took place in the respondent’s workplace and lasted 
approximately one hour. Most of the interviewees expressed a belief in the importance 
of the study and proposed the names of other potential interviewees. One 
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recommendation to emerge from the pilot study was that the researcher should use his 
personal contacts to identify key personnel for interviews. 
The rationale behind the pilot study was both to produce a more valid and reliable 
instrument and to practise the qualitative interview and data analysis process. It was 
essential to ensure that the interview questions were clear and made sense to the 
respondents, but it was an equally valuable opportunity to test the validity of the 
research questions. The pilot study was also important in terms of measuring the time 
needed for interviews; it was useful, when collecting the main study data, to be able to 
anticipate their likely length. In practical terms, the pilot study provided an opportunity 
to practise the analysis of data using NVivo software. Finally, the initial outcomes of 
the pilot study analysis enabled the target group of directors to enhance their own 
understanding of the subject. 
5.4.5.5.  Research Population and Sample for the Interviews 
According to Kumar (2005), in qualitative research, sampling is less significant as the 
main aim of this type of enquiry is to explore or describe the diversity in a situation, 
phenomenon or issue. As discussed earlier, the researcher was ultimately able to meet 
with representatives from sixteen of Libya’s seventeen commercial banks, but finding 
individuals who were available and willing to be interviewed was extremely 
challenging (see section 5.4.1). Therefore, it was decided that the sampling frame 
should be as large as possible within certain constraints. The interviewees were chosen 
using the snowball method of sampling. Non-probability sampling techniques may be 
justified where the research process is: “one of ‘discovery’ rather than the testing of 
hypotheses” (Denscombe, 2007), as was the case here. 
Following Kamel and Elbanna (2010), the interview sample was selected according to 
a number of criteria. Firstly, interviewees had to have participated in the questionnaire 
survey. They also had to have the relevant knowledge and experience; that is, they had 
to be on the main board of one of the banks and have some experience in the field of 
corporate governance. They had to be able to spare an hour for the in-depth interview 
and be available for possible follow up conversations. Finally, since it was important 
for them to be as neutral as possible (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010), care was taken to 
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find individuals who understood and agreed with the purpose of the research and who 
would respond as honestly and objectively as possible.  
Libyan banking law (2005) requires each bank to have: a managing director (CEO) 
(regardless of whether or not he serves on the board), a chairman of the board, from 
two to four executive directors, and from two to four non-executive directors. Care 
was taken to ensure that one of the interviewees from each bank was an executive 
member of the board and another was an independent member of the board. It was 
initially intended to conduct approximately 34 semi-structured in-depth interviews, but 
in the end, the researcher was only able to conduct 24 interviews, after emphasising 
that the study would respect the confidentiality and anonymity of the data collected 
from the interviewees. Table 5.12 shows the number of interviews that were conducted 
and the interviewees’ roles, qualifications and levels of experience. 
Table 5-12: Interviewees’ roles, qualifications and experience 
 
Bank 
sector 
Code Interviewee's role in 
board and bank 
Qualification Years of 
experience 
Public C1 
C2 
C5 
C6 
C14 
C15 
C16 
C19 
C20 
C23 
Chairman 
CEO 
Chairman 
Executive 
Non-executive 
Non-executive  
Chairman and CEO 
Chairman 
Chairman 
Non-executive 
Degree in Accounting               
MSc in Accounting 
PhD in Accounting 
MSc in Banking 
PhD in Accounting 
PhD in Banking 
Degree in Accounting   
PhD in Business   
PhD in Accounting 
Degree in Accounting                          
25
15 
17 
21 
25 
26 
24 
13 
10 
14
 
Private C7 
C9 
C11 
C12 
C17 
C18 
C21 
C22 
Chairman and CEO 
Non-executive 
CEO 
Chairman and CEO 
CEO 
Executive 
Chairman 
Non-executive 
Degree in Accounting   
Degree in Law 
Degree in Accounting  
MSc in Accounting    
MSc in Accounting    
Degree in Management   
PhD in Management   
Degree in Law 
12 
7    
11 
10 
9 
12 
10 
7 
 
Libyan 
and 
Foreign   
C3 
C4 
C8 
C10 
C13 
C24 
CEO 
Non-executive 
Chairman and CEO 
CEO 
Chairman 
Non-executive 
Degree in Management 
Degree in Law 
Degree in Law 
Degree in Accounting 
PhD in Accounting 
Degree in Management   
9  
10  
23   
20   
18 
11  
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All interviews were conducted by researcher. Following the same procedure for the 
entire sample mitigated the effect of any bias resulting from the snowball sampling. 
Board chairmen were asked to nominate potential interviewees. In a few cases, the 
chairmen consulted with top managers to nominate directors for interview. Since this 
might have reduced the credibility of the collected data (interviewees were likely to 
express similar views), the chairmen and top managers were urged to nominate 
directors according to their position within the organisation (i.e. CEOs/managing 
directors and executive directors). The researcher was also able to convince chairmen 
to nominate a number of non-executives who had established reputations in the sector. 
Finally, some directors were approached directly by the researcher. 
5.4.5.6.  Analysis of Interview Data 
Data analysis is essentially the examination, categorisation, tabulation and 
interpretation of evidence to support, reject or amend a theory and/or to generate new 
theory. There is no standardised approach to the analysis of qualitative data (Saunders 
et al., 2012). According to Taylor and Bogdan (1998), every researcher develops their 
own way of analysing this kind of data. Miles et al. (2013) identify three stages in 
qualitative data analysis. Data reduction is the process of selecting, focusing, 
simplifying, abstracting and transforming the data obtained in order to focus on 
emergent constructs. This is followed by data display, which is the organisation of the 
compressed data so as to make visible the themes that run through it. The third stage 
is conclusion drawing and verification: these involve the researcher interpreting the 
data, extracting meaning, identifying patterns and themes and using strategy to develop 
theory. 
Kumar (2005) argues that the analysis of qualitative data involves identifying the main 
themes, assigning codes to these themes, classifying responses under the main themes 
and integrating the themes and responses into the text of the report.  This can be done 
manually (e.g. by cutting text and putting it into different folders, or by implementing 
a card index system) or with software such as Ethnograph, ATLAS, NVivo or X Sight. 
The large amount of textual data derived from the transcribed interviews was managed 
using version 10 of NVivo by Qualitative Solutions and Research. This is a popular 
package for qualitative data analysis (see Figure 5.2). Computer Assisted Qualitative 
Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) has a number of advantages over manual analysis 
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(Silverman, 2013). Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008) observe that software programs 
make it easier for the researcher to carry out several activities concurrently, from 
making notes in the field, to writing up or transcribing notes, developing interview 
materials, editing or coding data, attaching key words and tags to segments of text for 
storage, implementing search and retrieve commands, data linking and report writing. 
Computer programs are faster than manual analysis and can handle complicated 
statistical procedures, print reports, display the analysed data and present it graphically. 
Kumar (2005), pointing out the labour they save, recommends that researchers use one 
of these programs wherever possible, as the research will benefit. 
Figure 5-2: The default main screen in NVivo 
 
A major advantage of the NVivo software used in this study is its ability to allow data 
to be allocated into categories, giving a more streamlined structure for discovering 
emergent themes (Rowe, 2007). The package is similar to a word processing package 
to use, making it easier for the researcher to code straight onto the screen (Anderson-
Gough, 2004). Bazeley and Jackson (2013) highlight five principal ways in which 
NVivo supports the analysis of qualitative data: 
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 It helps them to manage ideas – to organise and quickly access conceptual and 
theoretical knowledge. 
 It enables the researcher to manage data – to organise and keep track of the 
many, messy records that go into making a qualitative project. 
 It enables them to query the data. The researcher can ask simple or complex 
questions of the data, and NVivo retrieves the answer from the relevant 
database. 
 It enables the researcher to model the data in graphic form – to show the cases, 
ideas or concepts being built from the data and the relationships between them, 
and to present those ideas and conclusions in visual displays using models and 
matrices. 
 It enables the researcher to report on the data. 
 
Primary analysis of the collected data was undertaken before NVivo was applied. This 
primary analysis was a four-step process. Each interview was transcribed (in Arabic) 
into Microsoft Word 2010 document format, leaving out only those portions where the 
interviewee or interviewer digressed from the research focus completely. O’Dwyer et 
al. (2004) recommend that researchers transcribe interviews as this enables them to 
analyse the material in depth as they go and to get a feel for the data. The second step 
was to conduct a microanalysis of each interview, with a view to uncovering any 
hidden meanings within the words, phrases, sentences and finally paragraphs that 
might impact researcher understanding of the data. Miles et al. (2013) advise that prior 
to sifting and sorting data, the researcher must familiarise themselves with its diversity 
and gain an overview of the gathered material. The third step was to translate each 
interview from Arabic into English and back to Arabic, making every effort to retain 
the original meaning. The final step was to transfer and store the interview transcripts 
on the NVivo 10 software.  
The study borrowed a number of codes and categories for the analysis from the 
literature.  Thus, boards were categorised as: rubber stamp, legal fraction, gate keeping, 
high-level, counsel or monitoring body (Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Zahra and Pearce, 
1989; Solomon, 2010). Strauss and Corbin (2008, p.79) show that concepts from the 
relevant literature “have some advantages insofar as they are loaded with analytic 
meaning and may already be considerably well developed in their own right”. However, 
borrowing should be done carefully as borrowed concepts often bring with them 
commonly held meanings and associations.  
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The interview transcripts were examined, sentence by sentence, to identify emerging 
themes and patterns. The Key Word in Context method was used at an early stage to 
identify and code categories such as “review strategy”, “executive committee’s role”, 
“role of foreign partners”, “Shari’ah committee’s role” and “board chairman’s role”. 
These categories were analysed in the same order (with the same meaning) to develop 
categories in which they presented the same phenomena, thus enabling themes and 
patterns to emerge. The secondary analysis used NVivo version 10 to develop a system 
of codes to categorise the detailed data and facilitate its retrieval, as Kumar (2005) 
recommends (see Figure 5.3). A provisional node list was created using initial 
quotation and node data. The provisional nodes identified the themes and organised 
them into a set of lists. As the analysis progressed, nodes were reclassified, existing 
nodes were modified and new ones added. The final nodes were then grouped and 
arranged in order, to present the research data in the form of matrices, models and 
reports. 
Figure 5-3: The sets of nodes coordinated in NVivo 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the research philosophy and methodology that were applied to 
answer the research questions. It explains why a pragmatic paradigm was chosen as 
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the most appropriate approach to examine the actual and perceived roles and 
responsibilities of boards of directors in the LBS and to identify the factors that 
facilitate and hinder board efficiency. It argues that this philosophical standpoint 
recognises the significance of individual interpretation while emphasising that there 
exists an external reality that can be understood. As such, it allows a deeper 
understanding of the social processes that shape the BODs’ roles, and of how these 
roles and processes are perceived by the individuals involved. 
 A mixed-method approach was employed, with data being collected from archival 
sources, questionnaires and interviews, in the belief that the various data sources would 
be mutually enriching. The chapter discusses the qualitative and quantitative 
approaches that were employed in the study, explaining that the main instrument for 
data collection was the face-to-face, semi-structured interviews. It describes the pilot 
studies that were carried out before the actual fieldwork and how these contributed to 
the research design. It also discusses the challenges the researcher faced in gaining 
access to both interviewees and documents, how these challenges were overcome and 
how they affected the research. Finally, it presents the analytical methods that were 
used to code, classify, analyse and present the qualitative and quantitative data. 
Descriptive statistical techniques and tests were used to analyse the data collected from 
the questionnaires. NVivo software was utilised to convert the qualitative data 
collected from the interview questions into numerical data, providing a structured 
approach to the organisation, coding and presentation of the emerging themes. The 
results of these analyses are presented in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 6: The Role and Responsibility of the Board of 
Directors in the Libyan Banking Sector 
6.1. Introduction  
This chapter presents and discusses this study’s findings, focusing specifically on the 
first two research questions (see section 1.3). The first of these questions addresses the 
extent to which current practice among boards in the LBS conforms to international 
CG regulations, while the second investigates how the respondents perceived their 
roles and responsibilities as contributing to efficient corporate governance.  
As discussed in Chapter Four, theorists identify three main roles for the board of 
directors: the strategic role, the service role and the monitoring role (Andrews, 1980; 
Kemp, 2006; Kakabadse et al., 2010). The researcher first sought to understand to what 
extent directors’ perceptions were in line with international boardroom norms 
concerning these roles. To this end, a series of statements describing the board’s 
strategic, service and control roles were extracted from the literature and the survey 
respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point Likert scale whether they agreed or 
disagreed with each statement. These statements were: the board is involved in 
developing bank strategy, the board creates the bank’s objectives, strategies and a 
board policy, while top management prepares the overall strategy, the board controls 
the performance of the bank, the board monitors managers, the board monitors the 
execution of approved strategy, the board enhances company reputation, the board 
establishes contacts with the external environment, and the board provides advice and 
counsel to executives. Overall, the data shows that the directors considered their 
strategic and control roles as their main function, with the service role being seen as 
less important. This is reflected in the top three ranked statements (see Table 6.1): the 
board is involved in developing bank strategy (B), the board monitors the execution of 
approved strategy (E) and the board controls the performance of the bank (C). The 
following sections offer a summary of the main findings from this survey question. 
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Chapter 7:  Corporate Governance and Factors that Facilitate 
or Hinder Libyan Boards’ Effectiveness 
7.1. Introduction  
The previous chapter discussed the three primary roles (the service role, the control 
role and the strategic role) played by BODs in Libyan banks. These roles, and the 
board’s ability to perform them efficiently, are influenced by a number of factors, 
including operational issues (Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009) and external factors. In 
addition to discussing these factors in more detail, this chapter considers how corporate 
governance mechanisms could be made more effective in Libya, thereby addressing 
the first, third and fourth research questions (see 1.3). 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8.1. Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to collate and explain the key findings of the study 
and how they meet the aims and objectives of the research. It is organised into six 
sections. The first section illustrates how the research aims and objectives have been 
achieved. The second section discusses the extent to which international CG principles 
are reflected in Libya’s CG guidelines and practice in the banking sector. Section three 
summarises the key findings of the research project and explains the model of board 
roles. Section four summarises the study’s contribution to existing knowledge and its 
implications for practice and policy. Finally, the last section discusses the limitations 
of the study, giving also some suggestions for further research.  
The final framework (Figure 8-1) covers the three main board roles (service, strategic 
and monitoring), presenting the direct and indirect relationships between 
actors/elements that affect board formation and activities. However, the framework 
does not include all the actors and elements that were included in the original version 
(Chapter 4). For instance, some of the board sub-committees are omitted as they are 
not found in the Libyan environment. On the other hand, the final model shows the 
significant role that is played by the Shari’ah committee. To be able to summarise the 
main results of the research, the findings are presented one after the other, in relation 
to each of the objectives and through this model.   
8.2. Conclusions Relating to the Research Aims and Questions 
The financial crisis of 2009 has enhanced corporate governance in developed countries 
by forcing firms to improve directors’ roles and board effectiveness; however, as stated 
previously, it is unclear whether the same has happened in developing countries as CG 
is still under-researched in these countries. This study seeks to address this gap by 
examining the actual and perceived roles and responsibilities of boards in the LBS and 
identifying the factors that facilitate/hinder board efficiency. Libya provides a 
particularly interesting setting for this study as corporate governance and boards of 
directors in the banking sector are highly influenced by Shari’ah law. The aims of the 
study were to understand if boards in the LBS conform to boardroom norms in terms 
of their strategic, service and control roles, and to develop a conceptual model that will 
give a better understanding of how these roles work in an Islamic and developing 
country where banks are expected to consider not just shareholders’ interests but also 
those of other stakeholders. Poor performance of these roles leads to internal division, 
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dissatisfied shareholders, disgruntled customers and lacklustre organisational 
performance, all of which were witnessed first hand by the researcher during his time 
as a senior manager in the sector.  
The research employed a pragmatic paradigm and mixed methods, including a survey, 
and semi-structured interviews. This mixed-method approach has allowed a better 
understanding of individual perceptions and the social processes that shape the roles 
of boards. The literature is reviewed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, while Chapter 5 describes 
the methodology and methods employed to carry out the research. Chapters 6 and 7 
report the findings from the questionnaire, interviews and secondary data. Figure 8-2 
illustrates how the research aims and objectives were addressed through the adopted 
methods and where they are discussed in the thesis, while Figure 8-1 presents the 
finished model.  
Figure 8-1: Model of board roles and the main factors affecting these roles in the 
LBS 
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Figure 8-2: Summary of how the study addresses the research aim and objectives 
 
 
8.3.   The Libyan Context and the Influence of CG Principles on Practice 
in the Libyan Banking Sector 
The first objective of this study was to explore the actual/current practices, roles and 
responsibilities of boards of directors in the LBS. Although Libya’s legal system 
already accommodates some of the international CG principles regarding the role of 
the board of directors, many of the study participants saw CG as a new concept for 
Libya – one that requires more attention in terms of education and integration. 
Nevertheless, the questionnaire answers showed that Libyan banks have already 
incorporated a number of key international CG principles into their own practice. At 
the moment, CG regulations vary from bank to bank, but this is nevertheless an 
encouraging development.  
The respondents generally agreed that CG is a useful mechanism for protecting 
shareholders' and stakeholders' rights and determining the responsibilities of the board. 
Most of the large and foreign banks were applying the CG system, deriving many 
benefits from it and advising others to apply it. The audit committee was seen as a 
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particularly valuable CG mechanism because of its role in improving disclosure and 
transparency, and particularly the quality of financial reporting, helping shareholders 
and boards to make informed decisions and evaluate the bank's performance over time. 
The study found significant positive returns for the banks that had adopted the two 
main recommendations of the Cadbury Committee : that boards should contain at least 
three non-executive directors, two of whom should be independent of management; 
and that the positions of chairman and CEO should not be held by the same individual. 
Respondents generally ranked relevant business skills and experience, and 
professional qualifications, as the first, and second, most important qualifications for 
non-executive directors. However, many had significant concerns about board size, 
composition, diversity and structure in the LBS. 
8.4. Main Findings  
This study aimed to test theories and to develop a general framework that might be 
used to understand how board members perceive their roles, and the internal and 
external factors that impact board roles and performance. Drawing on the work done 
by other researchers in developed and developing economies (see Figure 4-1), a final 
framework was developed that is more applicable to an emerging market such as the 
LBS. This conceptual framework (Figure 8-1) was then tested empirically. The 
researcher has since delivered a number of lectures in the presence of board members 
to confirm the framework’s applicability to the LBS. The reaction of the board 
members has been positive, with most agreeing that it reflects reality in terms of board 
roles.   
8.4.1. Main Role and Responsibilities of the BOD  
The final model (Figure 8-1) covers the three main board roles: strategic, control and 
monitoring and service.  
The Strategic Role  
The analysis of the interview and questionnaire data showed that the main role of the 
board is to develop and determine the strategic context. As discussed in Chapter 6, 
boards in the LBS play a significant role in determining bank strategy, either by being 
involved in strategy formulation itself, or by reviewing the strategy prepared by top 
management. 
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The respondents saw the strategic role as the board’s main function (and most 
respondents enjoyed this role more than the board’s other roles). The empirical data 
(see chapter 6, 6.2) showed that the vast majority of boards in the LBS play a 
significant role in the formulation of bank strategy.  Those that help set up key firm 
objectives and are directly involved in the formulation of core strategy may be said to 
play a greater strategic role than top management; in other words, in this context, they 
are more than merely partners. Thus, the findings identify a new category of board 
involvement in strategy formulation. Only 12.5% of respondents (all from the private 
sector) saw the board’s role as being merely to review the strategic plans presented to 
it by top management and to verify that they conform to the relevant laws and 
regulations. The interviews confirmed that the board’s strategic role differs between 
state banks and other banks. In public banks, the CBL plays a key role in developing 
and implementing bank strategy. The process is less restricted in foreign banks, where 
strategies can be developed and improved at executive management level. In private 
banks, the ownership structure may make this more difficult. 
The research confirms that board members see their role as being to add value to the 
organisation by ensuring that managers’ strategic proposals are viable. However, most 
of the respondents felt that boards do not always carry out due diligence in this regard 
because they are thinking primarily about shareholders’ interests. It was also apparent 
that in practice, directors’ influence over the strategic direction of the bank is limited 
by managers screening the information that comes to the board, making it difficult for 
them to comprehensively discuss issues of strategic importance.  
The Control and Monitoring Role 
There was some disagreement among participants on the extent to which the board 
performs a monitoring/control role. The empirical data (see chapter 6,  6.3) shows that 
boards in the LBS play this role in three ways; by monitoring the execution of strategy, 
by monitoring the top management of the bank and by controlling the performance of 
the bank. While respondents from all three sectors agreed that the board monitors the 
execution of approved strategy (although the foreign banks were the most supportive 
of this role), only about 50% of the respondents felt the board’s role was to monitor 
top management. Respondents from the public sector did not consider monitoring the 
top management team as their primary role. Boards of directors generally play little 
part in selecting the CEO and executive management in these banks, and they tend to 
have little power because of the influence of major owners such as the CBL. 
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Consequently, some of the participants from the public sector saw their role as being 
to assist rather than to observe top management; they felt that their supervisory role 
should be limited to the review of the annual balance sheet and the recruitment of 
independent board members. This result suggests that top management are primarily 
monitored by large shareholders rather than by non-executive directors, but, in any 
case, since large shareholders are also classified as non-executive directors, it is 
unclear how independent NEDs actually are in practice. This is a distinctive feature of 
the Libyan market; concentrated ownership plays a critical role in corporate 
management, with large shareholders regulating the board and controlling the selection 
of its members. Nor was there a clear consensus in terms of who possesses the power 
to control bank performance. Eleven of the interviewees felt that control is shared 
between top management and the board; five argued that banking regulations put 
power in the hands of the board, while another eight believed that, in practice, control 
is in the hands of the CEO.   
The Service Role 
It was clear from the survey results that understanding of, and support for, the board’s 
service role was lower than for the other two roles (see chapter 6,  6.4). Zahra and 
Pearce (1989) define the board’s service role as "enhancing company reputation, 
establishing contacts with the external environment, and giving advice and counsel to 
executives" (p.292). Maintaining relationships with investors and shareholders was 
seen as central to enhancing the bank’s reputation and consequently its 
competitiveness; it demonstrates accountability and signals an effective and vigilant 
board, which is seen as crucial for enhancing business performance. Participants from 
all sectors felt that their boards were more interested in building a good network with 
shareholders than with other external stakeholders, although they saw internal and 
external networks as complementary; as they saw it, good relationships with the 
external environment enable the bank to achieve its objectives, which benefits the 
shareholders.  
As far as consultation and advice to management are concerned, the results are in line 
with those obtained by Dahya et al. (2002). It became evident in the interviews that 
the public banks were more committed to the advice and consultation role than their 
private and foreign counterparts. There are several possible reasons for this low level 
of engagement in the private and foreign banks, including a lack of legal power and 
clearly defined legal responsibilities, lack of independence, lack of technical expertise, 
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perceived low status, information shortage and lack of incentives. However, the main 
cause seemed to be a lack of harmony between non-executive directors, executives and 
executive management. Non-executive directors support the board’s service role by 
extending the bank’s external networks and providing data to help it achieve its 
objectives, but the lack of understanding and openness between executive and non-
executive members on some boards reduces their ability to counsel the board 
effectively. If the CEO sees NEDs as primarily serving a control function, they may 
be dismissive of the NEDs’ suggestions and advice, or even reluctant to give them the 
information they need to be useful counsellors. Researchers have asserted the 
importance of positive interaction between board members and CEO, and this was 
borne out in the current study; in a number of the banks, the lack of unity affected the 
flow of data and information to the board, forcing some board members to rely on 
unofficial channels instead. Weak relationships within the board and with management 
not only damage board performance but do little to strengthen the competitiveness of 
these banks. 
8.4.2. Factors Facilitating/Hindering BODs’ Performance of their Roles 
and Responsibilities in the LBS 
These three roles, and the board’s ability to perform them efficiently, are influenced 
by a number of factors, including operational issues (Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009) 
and external factors. The model produced in this study (see Figure 8.1) shows the direct 
and indirect relationships between actors/elements that affect board roles and activities 
in the LBS. These relationships vary from strong to minimal in terms of the influence 
they have. The arrows show that while some relationships are uni-directional, with one 
element influencing the other, other pairings are mutually influential.  
The model shows that the influence of board committees varies from one bank to 
another, although all three sectors agreed on the key roles played by the auditing, 
executive and Shari’ah committees and the importance of their relationships with the 
board of directors. The auditing committee has a direct effect on the board’s 
monitoring role, with the influence of the ownership structure and shareholders being 
only slightly less strong. But while some respondents saw the audit committee as an 
effective mechanism, others were dissatisfied with the performance of their audit 
committee to the point that they felt it made the board as a whole less effective in its 
monitoring and control role (see chapter 7, 7.3.2.2.2). The executive committee was 
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perceived as having a direct relationship with the board’s strategic role and with the 
ownership structure and CEO. It was seen as important for setting policies and helping 
the board implement decisions. 
The model shows that the Shari’ah committee has a strong, direct influence on 
executive management and supports the board’s three roles by giving guidance and 
preparing control reports. It facilitates the application of governance principles. 
Islamic banks work in the same way as commercial ones but provide products and 
services which conform to Islamic rules. Suleiman (2000) argues that these banks 
should develop a distinct institutional culture aimed at fostering spiritual awareness 
while maintaining growth. The Shari’ah committee makes a crucial contribution to this, 
serving as an additional control factor and ensuring adherence to the Muslim 
community’s expectations (Lewis and Algaoud, 2001). An independent body selected 
by the board of directors, it issues opinions on matters referred to it by senior 
management, who nominate its members from among directors and executive 
managers. The committee is involved in setting the bank’s strategies and monitoring 
and controlling its activities, issuing fatwa to address problems, and lobbying for bank 
transactions that adhere to Islamic rules. It also sends periodic reports to the board of 
directors (see chapter 7, 7.3.2.2.3). 
Most boards in the sample do not have a nomination committee to review applications 
or submit recommendations to the administration. Banks find this difficult to 
implement because the process is so dominated by large shareholders, owners and even 
the CBL. This was seen as having a negative impact on board performance as it is 
difficult to foster a team spirit in these circumstances. 
The model shows that non-executive directors play an important part in the BODs’ 
strategic and service role, but that they have less impact on the control role. At the 
same time, however, the independence of NEDs was seen as particularly crucial 
because of its importance in raising investor confidence in the integrity of the board 
(Pass, 2004) (see chapter 7,  7.3.3.2). The model shows the crucial role played by 
executive management in supporting board roles.  
Leadership structure directly affects the role of the board of directors. The power and 
authority of the chairman differs from bank to bank, depending on size and ownership 
structure. The results confirm that the roles of chairman and CEO are separated in most 
public and foreign banks, but that this is not always the case in the private banks.  
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Board size, diversity and meetings have a less direct effect. Board size impacts board 
performance indirectly via its influence on board cohesion and decision making (see 
chapter 7, 7.3.3.1). If the board has more than seven members, some individuals are 
less able to contribute during discussions, the likelihood of cognitive conflict increases 
and decision making becomes more difficult. This adversely affects the board’s ability 
to perform its three key roles effectively. Meetings were seen as crucial for providing 
information to the board and ensuring that everyone has the opportunity to participate 
in decision making.  
Diversity in terms of educational background, qualifications and gender has an indirect 
impact on board performance through its effect on board processes and decision 
making. The argument is that graduates with specialist skills are more likely to be able 
to contribute usefully to strategic planning. As far as gender diversity is concerned, 
interviewees argued that women are less likely to engage in corrupt behaviour and can 
play an active role in the oversight and control of executive management.  
As far as external factors are concerned, the model indicates that ownership structure 
has a strong, direct effect on board roles in all three sectors; foreign partners (in joint 
banks), major shareholders in all banks, family owners in private banks, and the CBL 
in public banks all affect the board’s strategising, service and control roles. Ownership 
structure is in turn affected by executive management, board committees and the board. 
The CBL has a direct and strong effect on the board in public banks as it is able to 
interfere in the appointment of the CEO. Stakeholders other than shareholders also 
play a significant monitoring role.  
The model also shows the importance of religious culture in reinforcing corporate 
governance principles and strengthening the board’s role. Religion is recognised as 
having an impact on the practice of corporate governance and boards’ roles because it 
requires the rights of shareholders and stakeholders to be protected. It can be argued 
that religion helps institutions to perfect their governance, since, as Rizk (2008) argue, 
it contributes to the formation of moral behaviour. In Libyan society, it is informing 
corporate governance principles and making them more acceptable, which may 
enhance transparency, honesty and directors’ independence. The general perception is 
that corporate governance principles are applied more conscientiously in banks 
following Shari’ah law than in banks who do not (see chapter 7, 7.4.3). 
   Shalba 2016                                                   249 
 
The model shows that most banks in Libya do not have formal policies in place to 
enforce disclosure and transparency, and that this has a significant impact on board 
performance (see chapter 7, 7.4.2).  
8.5. Contribution of the Study 
The research makes several contributions to our knowledge about boards of directors 
and to the development of corporate governance literature and theory, particularly in 
relation to CG in banks and the LBS.  
1. The  main contribution , which is one of the first studies in the Libyan banks sector 
provides a framework that explains corporate governance and the role of boards of 
directors in the Libyan banking sector. This framework focuses on the board of 
directors as a central instrument of governance, rather than on corporate governance 
in general. Scholars argue that as the structure of corporate governance is influenced 
by different factors in different countries, one single framework cannot be applied to 
all contexts (Khanchel El Mehdi, 2007; Hussain and Mallin, 2002; Okike, 2007). Thus, 
it is the contention of this research that existing (western-originated) frameworks 
cannot fully explain corporate governance in Libya. And, indeed, whilst the results 
show some commonalities between Libya and other countries, they also suggest some 
significant differences, thereby underlining that researchers need to recognise the 
importance of national context as a contingency variable in corporate governance 
research (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
Whilst board composition and firm performance have been examined exhaustively in 
western countries (Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009), less CG research has been 
conducted in African countries such as Libya (Mangena et al., 2012), although, as the 
literature indicates, many of these countries are attempting to improve their corporate 
governance (De Andres and Vallelado, 2008). Against this background, this 
investigation of Libya’s CG systems is especially timely and relevant; as Larbsh (2010) 
observes: “The role and responsibilities of the Board of Directors and the obstacles to 
disclosure and transparency in Libya might be a fertile field of future research” 
(p.247).  
The research contributes to CG literature by exploring whether boards in the banking 
sector play an active role or are little more than legal figureheads dominated by major 
shareholders (particularly families) and/or managers. The developed framework 
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addresses a gap in the literature by explaining the role of boards of directors in an 
emerging country – this theoretical framework has then been empirically tested. The 
results show that in emerging countries such as Libya, board structural attributes, 
composition and diversity are not as critical in ensuring board effectiveness as board 
cohesiveness, board decision making and board operations. Members of the board 
have to work together to enable governance and they have to be supported with 
efficient administrative back up. The conceptual framework and study findings may 
incentivise researchers to seek practical insights into shareholder activities from 
various angles. The findings may also be useful to shareholders, managers, policy 
makers and the wider community. 
2. Although directors’ impact on board effectiveness has been highlighted in the 
literature, their roles are often ill-defined (Petrovic, 2008); in fact, there is no general 
consensus on what these roles are (Johnson et al., 1996; Roberts et al., 2005). Scholars 
disagree on the number of roles played by the board (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Zahra 
and Pearce, 1989) and on precisely what these roles involve (Huse, 2007; Minichilli et 
al., 2012; Petrovic, 2008; Stiles and Taylor, 2002). Previous studies have generally 
theoretically measured a single board role (Zhang, 2010). Surveys have been employed 
as the main data collection instrument (Payne et al., 2009) to study board roles, their 
antecedents and board performance. Minichilli et al. (2009) and Zhang (2010) explain 
that researchers have used multi-item perception measures and often relied on a single 
respondent per board. This may be why there is often a significant gap between what 
directors do in practice and what the business literature proposes they should do (see 
Brennan, 2006; Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Machold and Farquhar, 2013). 
According to Cornforth and Brown (2013) and Halton (2013), accessing information 
on the boardroom activities of directors is an extremely challenging task in practice. 
The confidentiality of internal board activities and information as well as the 
reluctance of directors to cooperate with studies of this nature mean that there are only 
a few studies that draw on directors’ own accounts of the role and responsibilities of 
the board (Stiles and Taylor, 2001; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew, 1992; 
Pye, 2000). Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that such an investigation has 
been undertaken in a developing economy, until now. 
This study addresses this gap. This study of directors’ perceptions in sixteen Libyan 
bank boards provides new insights into how these boards perform in practice. It 
highlights that boards in the Libyan banking sector perform two aggregated board 
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roles: strategic and control. The greatest emphasis is placed on the strategic role, while 
there is  least support for the board’s service role. The findings show that the majority 
of interviewees saw the board’s role as being to determine key objectives, to fully 
engage with strategy making and to monitor the execution of approved strategy. The 
finding supports Stiles (2001) and Schmidt and Bauer (2006), who argue that the board 
works with management to develop strategic direction. According to this view, the 
board is an active participative entity (Wood, 1983) that shares leadership with top 
management (Herman, 1981; Molz, 1985; Zahra, 1990; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; 
Golden and Zajac, 2001; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Huse, 2007; Pugliese and 
Wenstøp, 2007). Vance (1983) describes active boards as “collegial boards”. However, 
as these boards set up key firm objectives and are directly involved in formulating core 
strategy, they can in fact be said to have a greater input than top management. In other 
words, in this context, they are more than simply partners. Thus, the findings identify 
a new category of board involvement in strategy formulation. 
The investigation of the directors’ perceptions revealed that the effects of internal and 
external factors such as board size, composition, diversity and structure are issues of 
significant concern for boards in the LBS. Ownership structure was also identified as 
having a strong, direct effect on board roles in all three sectors.  
This study contributes methodologically to the domain of board research and adds to 
the small but growing body of scholarly works that use qualitative methods to collect 
primary data (Pettigrew, 1992; Pye, 2000; Stiles and Taylor, 2001). Rather than relying 
solely on data from surveys, this study also draws on documentary sources and 
interviews to investigate board processes and behaviours and to establish a holistic 
picture of what boards do. 
3. The Shari’ah-based governance model brings an additional set of expectations to 
existing CG frameworks, including transparency, trust, ethical behaviour, credibility 
and faith (Nathan and Ribieri, 2007). More Libyan banks are implementing Shari’ah 
governance and introducing Shari'ah supervisory boards into their systems to ensure 
that all activities and transactions are in harmony with Shari'ah precepts. Grassa (2015) 
points out that the authority given to SSBs varies from one country to another and that 
little attention has been given to the impact of these supervisory boards on board 
performance. Not only does this study focus on a context that is significantly different 
from the west, but it enriches the corporate governance literature by investigating what 
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SSBs add to the board of directors. The findings highlight that Islamic law has a major 
effect on corporate governance practice and BOD decisions, as these decisions must 
take into account the wish of traders and clients that transactions be conducted 
according to Islamic principles. The Shari’ah committee has influence over executive 
management and supports the board’s three roles by giving guidance and preparing 
control reports, thus facilitating the application of governance principles. Most Islamic 
bank managers in the sample explained that Islamic banks work in the same way as 
commercial ones, but provide products and services which conform to Islamic rules. 
4. Comparing CG practice with codes or best practice recommendations is the most 
common research approach in both developed and developing countries (Akkermans 
et al., 2007; Mallin, 2007). Studies have empirically proved that disclosure of 
compliance levels not only has a positive impact on performance (Mallin and Ow-
Yong, 2012) but also ensures that firms remain aware of codes (Akkermans et al., 
2007). Identifying levels of non-compliance allows countries to track the gap between 
standars of CG and reality and to take corrective action (e.g Parsa et al., 2007). An 
awareness of the overall standard of corporate governance is particularly important for 
the LBS if it is to achieve its development goals and attract foreign investment. Thus, 
the findings of this study could potentially contribute to the economy of Libya in two 
ways. Firstly, they indicate that CG in Libya has improved significantly since Larbsh 
conducted his study in 2010; Libya’s legal system already accommodates some of the 
international CG principles regarding the BODs’ role, and Libyan banks have 
incorporated a number of key international CG principles into their own practice. At 
the moment, CG regulations vary from bank to bank, but this is nevertheless an 
improvement on previous practice. This sign of improvement in the governance 
standard may be expected to raise the confidence of both domestic and foreign 
investors in the LBS. Secondly, the findings may give the LBS the information it needs 
to take corrective action to improve its governance standard even further. This is 
especially important, given that Libya's economic backwardness has been blamed on 
the lack of good governance in Libyan banks.  
5. The findings contribute to ‘Governance Literature and Theory’ by identitifying the 
discrepancies between CG theory, as described in the literature, and its practice in the 
context of the Libyan banking system. Prior studies have documented the strong and 
consistent links between corporate governance and the role of the BOD under agency, 
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stakeholder, resource dependency, stewardship and institutional theories (as identified 
in chapter 3), but the theories are not without contradictions (Daily et al., 2003; 
Christopher, 2010; Zahra and Pearce,1989; Johnson et al., 1996) 
Corporate governance is a complex phenomenon which can be influenced by many 
factors, including religion, culture and ownership structure (Mallin, 2007). This is 
especially true in Libya, where the legal and banking system are shaped by Islamic 
teachings and rules. Furthermore, the various theories that have been applied to 
examine corporate governance all have limitations. The complexity of the 
phenomenon and the limitations of existing theory rendered it necessary to adopt a 
combination of theories for this research. Hence, agency theory was employed 
alongside stakeholder theory and institutional theory, as discussed in chapter 3. This 
combination of theoretical perspectives has allowed a better understanding of board 
roles and the factors that can impact board performance in the LBS.   
The need for corporate governance and the role of the BOD have been explained by 
reference to agency theory: adequate monitoring and control mechanisms need to be 
established to protect shareholders from managerial opportunism – the so-called 
agency cost being the most important implication. Accordingly, normative 
recommendations include appointing a board that has a majority of outside directors, 
independent directors and separate chairman and CEO. However, institutional theory 
views these mechanisms as practices that are imposed by legislators to improve 
organisational effectiveness, or that are adopted in imitation of other organisations – 
in other words, they originate externally rather than internally.  
The findings support agency theory’s assumptions that the role of the board is to 
maximise shareholder wealth and that the ownership structure can help mitigate the 
agency problem and reduce agency costs (Denis and McConnell, 2003). The view of 
some respondents in public and private banks was that, as major shareholders have a 
strong motive to monitor and control the executive body, concentrated ownership 
(whether this is family ownership, individuals, institutions or the state) helps protect 
and promote the interests of shareholders. It encourages managers to take decisions 
that will maximise shareholder wealth, limits their power and strengthens the board’s 
control role. Thus, the findings indicate that ownership is an important factor 
determining the quality of governance and board performance in Libyan banks. 
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Conversely, none of the other internal corporate governance variables examined in this 
research, apart from board size and board meetings, were found to have any significant 
effect on the BODs’ role. The findings do not support agency theory assumptions that 
the presence of independent directors enhances the ability of the board to monitor and 
control the executive management (Young, 2008), or that audit committees and NEDs 
mitigate agency problems and reduce agency costs by aligning the interests of 
controlling owners with those of the company (Choi et al., 2007; Christopher, 2010; 
Johnson et al., 1996; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). In fact, the participants 
suggested that NEDs are largely ineffective, despite the fact that they may make up as 
much as two-thirds of the board in Libyan banks. Indeed, the interviews revealed 
concerns at the incidence of nepotism and lack of independence. This finding is best 
explained by reference to institutional theory, which views these mechanisms as 
externally imposed (Cohen et al., 2007 and Scott, 2008). This suggests that 
institutional theory may be more appropriate than agency theory as a way of 
understanding internal CG mechanisms in developing countries such as Libya. In 
terms of the BODs’ role, institutional theory and agency theory are complementary.The 
Islamic banking system is not consistent with the hypotheses of agency theory either. 
Governance in Islam is characterised by distinctive features which distinguish it from 
other systems of governance: while the Anglo-Saxon model is based on the agent 
principle (Frank and Meyer, 1997) and prioritises the protection of shareholders’ 
interests, and the European or stakeholder model is a two-level system comprising a 
supervising committee and an independent board of executive members, the Islamic 
model operates on the principle that the company is accountable before Allah. Roles 
are performed according to the Shari’ah principles, and shareholders are seen as having 
a duty to work towards social justice, the ultimate goal of governance in Islamic 
banking (Choudury and Hoque, 2004).   
The growth of Islamic banking stems from a rising popular distrust of traditional 
banks, which are believed to put shareholders’ profits ahead of society’s interests. 
Shari’ah committees ensure that Islamic banks serve the interests of all stakeholders – 
this is especially important given that the state’s legal and regulatory framework (and 
Islamic banking regulation) is not yet robust enough to protect shareholders’ rights and 
alert them to their role (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006 and Hasan, 2009). Shari’ah 
committees aim to maximise well-being and justice for all members of the community; 
in other words, this becomes one of the aims of governance. Thus, the Islamic model 
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is consistent with the principle of stakeholder theory (stakeholder-oriented), in that it 
sees companies as being created to offer value for others. As such, they should be 
managed to cater for the needs of all stakeholders, including customers, managers, 
suppliers, local communities and shareholders. Letza et al. (2004) confirm that 
companies are involved in many aspects of social life and have the potential to improve 
the well-being of many people. It is important, therefore, that they are aware of their 
obligations to work towards equality and social justice. In both Islam and the west, CG 
plays a significant role in helping organisations achieve their set objectives and aims; 
primarily, these lie in the maximisation and protection of stakeholders’ interests, but 
in the Islamic bank system, they must also adhere to the objectives of Islamic law.  
The major theoretical contribution of this study is to the ongoing debate over which is 
the appropriate model of governance for developing countries such as Libya.  As 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 7, critics have argued that the shareholder perspective is 
inappropriate and that the stakeholder perspective is the best alternative for developing 
and Islamic countries. The few existing studies on Libya also recommend the country 
explores the possibility of adopting the stakeholder approach (Larbsh, 2010).  
However, it is not clear whether the stakeholder model would be the optimal solution, 
especially when countries like Libya suffer from widespread corruption, nepotism and 
lack of independence ( see chapter 2). The findings of this study are useful in that they 
suggest that neither perspective is enough on its own for developing countries such as 
Libya, and that it may be more appropriate to combine features from different models. 
In this respect, the study is a response to researchers including Letza et al. (2008), who 
have argued for researchers to go beyond the traditional static concept of governance 
and understand it in new ways.  In view of this, the empirical findings of this research 
have responded to the views of Letza et al. (2008) and  Hasan ( 2008, 2010), and in 
particular have outline three theories, stakeholder theory, agency theory and 
institutional theory, that provides a sensible explanation of the practices of corporate 
governance and the Board of Director roles in Libya. In chapter 3 it was shown that, 
institutional theory complements agency theory. Therefore, this study also provides 
theoretical validity by proposing that institutional theory is more appropriate than 
agency theory in describing the practices of corporate governance and board roles in 
public and private banks in developing countries such as Libya. However, stakeholder 
oriented theory strongly influences institutional theory in Libyan context because the 
influence of culture and religion has a major part to play in the Shari’ah Committees. 
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Although, shareholder perspective is the least important concept, it still retains some 
significance which was also supported by responses received from interview and 
survey participants, who believed the concept of CG in Libya to be predominantly 
stakeholder-oriented, with relatively little emphasis being placed on protecting 
shareholders’ interests. 
8.6 Practical Implications 
The literature, especially that produced in recent years, provides a good theoretical 
framework for understanding the board’s role; to complement this, the following 
paragraphs discuss some of the practical implications of this study’s findings. 
1. Board members are not selected on the basis of their abilities or expertise but 
through personal contacts and favouritism. This means that roles are not 
allocated appropriately and the board does not develop. It is crucial to address 
board appointment and decision-making procedures if board performance in 
the LBS is to improve. In particular, the politicisation of board appointments 
and the intrusion of personal relationships into corporate appointments in 
public banks must be discouraged or eliminated through appropriate legislation 
by the CBL. Policy should be geared towards improving the structural design 
of boards of directors. 
2. The board’s structure determines how it works. The results confirm that board 
composition has some impact on board performance through its effect on board 
processes. This implies that, rather than focusing on increasing the number of 
non-executive directors, boards should seek to find the best balance between 
internal and external parties and should delineate these roles more clearly. 
3. There is a lack of standards or legislation governing the way boards and their 
mechanisms function. Therefore Libyan banks should benefit from CG 
principles that comply with application mechanisms. The most important 
mechanism is internal and external networking between directors and 
stakeholders. 
4. There was almost universal agreement among the participants on the impact of 
ownership on board performance. Currently, governance in public and foreign 
banks serves the interests of major shareholders, with decisions aimed at 
increasing their wealth. The study found less correlation between ownership 
structure and board roles in private banks, which may indicate a lack of 
awareness and vision among investors, or that many are only interested in 
short-term investment. Conferences and seminars are needed to raise 
awareness of the board’s role among investors. This would help protect their 
rights and create a more stable investment environment. 
5. External factors that affect the role of boards need to be developed in Libya. 
Establishing accounting principles and standards would enhance disclosure and 
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transparency. There is also room for further regulation to determine the roles 
and responsibilities of boards and to protect shareholders’ rights. 
6. Gender diversity on LBS boards is very poor compared to developed countries, 
with boards invariably being controlled by men. This reflects the culture-based 
inequality in Libyan society. The representation and participation of women on 
these boards should be addressed in regulations, which should define the skills, 
qualifications and experience required. 
7. Executive and Shari’ah committees are effective control mechanisms, but 
auditing committees may be less so because their members lack independence. 
The lack of accounting and auditing standards also does little to promote 
independence. 
8. Self-regulation will become increasingly important for boards in the LBS as 
firms strive to attract investment capital. Directors and boards must understand 
the importance of complying with local and international corporate governance 
standards, but appreciate that wholesale application of corporate governance 
standards and practices as designed for developed countries may not work in 
the LBS, given its unique political and socio-cultural circumstances. It is 
important that they make efforts to understand differences in boardroom 
culture, working methods and board organisation, and attempt to configure 
new standards and practices specific to the LBS context. 
9. Board involvement in strategy formulation is crucial. The board should attempt 
to guide the actions of lower-level management to reflect its strategic intention 
and resolve any problems that arise during the implementation of strategic 
plans. 
10. Boards must monitor important changes in their bank. This should not be 
limited to monitoring significant events. Effective directors go beyond this, 
developing contacts with a range of internal and external constituencies 
(Bower and Weinberg, 1988). The maintenance of such contacts is an essential 
requirement for directors. 
11. Boards have a major role to play in reviewing strategic plans. Directors must 
be able to participate in discussions. This requires that they be given adequate 
information and time to review plans before they come before the board. 
12. The study revealed varying attitudes towards the board’s role in monitoring top 
management. Each board must specify the extent to which it intends to monitor 
top management and which variables it will monitor. 
By addressing these issues and providing training courses and workshops to better 
prepare directors, the LBS can improve governance in the sector. 
8.7. Implications for Policy Makers 
Corporate governance is a main concern of regulators, academics and practitioners in 
most countries worldwide. This study highlights some aspects that are in need of 
attention from Libyan policy makers. 
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1. Boards in all three sectors exhibited governance features seen in international 
companies, but a number of aspects were missing. There were also issues 
related to autonomy and corporate responsibilities, which limit a board’s ability 
to carry out its roles effectively. Training is needed to make directors more 
aware of their responsibilities and to give them the skills they need to protect 
shareholders’ interests. 
2. Corporate governance in the LBS promotes the interests of shareholders, who 
influence the appointment process and decision making. Considering the rights 
of shareholders and giving them some level of control are key factors in CG in 
Libya. 
3. At policy level, efforts have focused on changing investment regulations to 
ensure that the environment is conducive to foreign investment. The study 
shows that joint-owned banks are seeking the aid of their foreign partners to 
implement international standards of corporate governance. The involvement 
of foreign partners has had a significant effect on the development of board 
roles and corporate governance in the LBS. On the other hand, foreign partners 
have not done much to address internal corporate governance weaknesses in 
Libyan banks. Unless internal governance systems, such as boards of directors, 
are strengthened, their ability to attract investment capital will be limited, 
weakening their performance and their capacity to drive economic growth. The 
findings of the study confirm that corporate governance in developing and 
emerging countries like Libya is going through a transitional period. 
4. The Commercial Law (2010) and the Banking Law (2005, 2012) are too broad 
and do not address specific areas of CG weakness in banks. Bank governance 
structures will only improve with robust legislation regulating the activities and 
structure of banks, and when regulators have the power and the will to penalise 
offenders. 
5. Both public and private sectors face challenges in terms of improving board 
performance. Any programmes or activities to introduce and improve 
corporate governance practices in the LBS should involve public-private sector 
collaboration. For example, industry associations like the Chamber of 
Commerce and other professional bodies in the private sector could partner 
public institutions such as the Libyan Stock Market Authority and the 
government. Public-private sector collaborations might be employed to create 
development opportunities for bank directors. Training programmes should 
consider the importance of board cohesion and unimpeded information flow, 
and how directors can employ their knowledge and skills to foster board 
relationships. 
6. The introduction of Shari’ah committees has created a two-tier model similar 
to the European stakeholder model.  Beyond this, the study participants felt 
that religious adherence generally encourages compliance with the rules of 
corporate governance as long as they are consistent with the principles of 
Islamic Shari’ah. 
7. Banks in Libya are generally reluctant to disclose the information needed to 
improve corporate governance systems and ensure accountability. The full and 
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timely disclosure of information on all aspects of the firm must be mandatory 
if Libya is to attract foreign investment. 
8.8. Limitations and Future Research 
The lack of good governance in Libya is not restricted to the banking sector; it is a 
major problem across the financial sector, in public and private firms alike. An in-
depth analysis of the governance in these firms and how it affects their performance is 
beyond the scope of this research, but such an analysis is certainly warranted, since 
they play a significant role in creating an environment that is conducive to business 
growth. To this end, the theoretical model could be extended to explore its relevance 
to non-commercial banks and other organisational forms such as not-for-profits 
orqanisations. 
Although the focus of this thesis is on the role of boards of directors, there are other 
equally important mechanisms of corporate governance. Again, they are beyond the 
scope of this thesis. The decision to adopt a cross-sectional approach was dictated by 
resources and time limitations, but future research might employ time-series data to 
capture the dynamics of, and causal relationships between, board attributes, board 
process and board performance. Research that relates measures of board performance 
to firm performance would further enhance understanding of how boards contribute to 
firm performance in Libyan banks. The study might also be repeated at some future 
point to enable longitudinal research. This would allow the results of the study to be 
compared with future studies and help increase the understanding of board 
effectiveness. 
This research relies heavily on the self-reporting of respondents, but the accuracy of 
self-reporting depends on a number of factors, including the respondent’s reasons for 
participating. Measures were taken to address these concerns – efforts were made to 
establish a rapport with the respondents and they were assured of full confidentiality 
and anonymity in both the questionnaire surveys and the interviews – but future 
researchers may be able to employ other research techniques that allow them greater 
access to the internal activities of the board. For example, it would have been useful 
to observe board meetings, but the current climate of fear and mistrust made this 
impossible. 
Libya has much in common with other Islamic countries, but there are obvious 
differences in terms of economic capabilities, cultural practices and political and legal 
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systems. These differences may have important implications for governance in Libya, 
but time and resource constraints rendered empirical investigation of other countries 
impractical. Future research that considers these differences would be useful in 
illuminating how they influence corporate governance practices. Replicating the study 
using data from other countries would enable the investigation of board processes and 
board effectiveness both within-country and between-countries and help in developing 
a universal framework for investigating corporate governance (Minichilli et al., 2012). 
Finally, the researcher focused only on a certain set of board characteristics and their 
impact on board roles, but other characteristics such as age and ethnicity could have 
been considered. Further research could also be undertaken to examine the effect of 
board committees, NED compensation and degree of independence on board 
effectiveness in Libya’s financial companies. 
In conclusion, given the importance of the banking sector to Libya’s economy and the 
absence of descriptive empirical data, this thesis makes an important contribution to 
knowledge in this field. The researcher strongly believes that the theoretical 
framework and the findings of this thesis will stimulate practitioners and scholars of 
strategy, organisational behaviour and corporate governance to examine boards and 
their activities from many perspectives, particularly from the process side. The 
findings of this study have important implications for all stakeholders, directors, 
managers, regulators and shareholders.  
 
 
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   261 
 
References 
Abdelsalam, O.H. and El-Masry, A., 2008. The impact of board independence and 
ownership structure on the timeliness of corporate internet reporting of Irish-listed 
companies. Managerial Finance, 34(12), 907-918.  
Abdelsalam, O.H. and Weetman, P., 2003. Introducing International Accounting 
Standards to an emerging capital market: relative familiarity and language effect in 
Egypt. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 12(1), 63-84.  
Abdul Rahman, R.A. and Ali, F.H.M., 2006. Board, audit committee, culture and 
earnings management: Malaysian evidence. Managerial Auditing Journal, 21(7), 783-
804.  
Abidin, Z.Z., Kamal, N.M., and Jusoff, K., 2009. Board structure and corporate 
performance in Malaysia. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 1(1), 150-
164. 
Abu-Tapanjeh, A.M., 2009. Corporate governance from the Islamic perspective: a 
comparative analysis with OECD principles. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 
20(5), 556-567.  
Adams, R., 2008. Communication in the boardroom: a research report. Stockholm: 
Swedish Institute for Financial Research. 
Adams, R., Hermalin, B.E., and Weisbach, M.S., 2008. The role of boards of directors 
in corporate governance: a conceptual framework and survey. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 48(1), 58-107. 
Adams, R.B. and Ferreira, D., 2009. Women in the boardroom and their impact on 
governance and performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 94(2), 291-309.  
Adams, R.B. and Mehran, H., 2012. Bank board structure and performance: evidence 
for large bank holding companies. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 21(2), 243-
267.  
AFDB Economic Brief, 2011. Libya: post-war challenges. Retrieved. Available at: 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Brocure%20A
nglais%20Lybie_North%20Africa%20Quaterly%20Analytical.pdf [last accessed 
12/12/2013].   
Agnaia, A.A., 1997. Management training and development within its environment: 
the case of Libyan industrial companies. Journal of European Industrial Training, 21 
(3), 117-123.  
Aguilera, R.V., 2005. Corporate governance and director accountability: an 
institutional comparative perspective. British Journal of Management, 16, S39-S53.  
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   262 
 
Aguilera, R., Filatotchev, I., Gospel, H., and Jackson, K., 2008. Contingencies, 
complementarities, and costs in corporate governance models. Organization Science, 
19(3), 475-492.  
Ahmad, N.S. and Gao, S.S., 2004. Changes, problems and challenges of accounting 
education in Libya. Accounting Education, 13(3), 365-390.  
Aintablian, S. and Al Boustany, W., 2008. Corporate goverance, ownership structure 
and bank performance: evidence from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). 
In: ASAC, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada .Available at:  
http://ojs.acadiau.ca/index.php/ASAC/article/viewFile/683/592 [last accessed 
15/11/2013]. 
Akkermans, D., Ees, H.V., Hermes. 2007. Corporate Governance in the Netherlands: 
an overview of the application of the Tabaksblat Code in 2004. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 15(6), 1106-1118. 
Al-Akra, M., Eddie, I.A., and Ali, M.J., 2010. The influence of the introduction of 
accounting disclosure regulation on mandatory disclosure compliance: evidence from 
Jordan. The British Accounting Review, 42(3), 170-186. 
Al-Faruqi, I.R., 1995. Al-Tawhid: its implications for thought and life. Herndon, 
Virginia: International Institute of Islamic Thought.  
Al-Ghiryany, W., 2004. The effect of the external auditor on management. PhD thesis, 
Garyounis University.  
Alhajam, A.S., 2013. Exploring and analysing the demand and supply conditions for 
the institutionalisation of Islamic banking and finance in Libya. PhD thesis, Durham 
University. 
Al-Omari, A., 2010. The institutional framework of financial reporting in Jordan. 
European Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Sciences, 22, 32-50.  
Al-Tekhtash, S., 2004. Factors affecting reporting of financial statements of public 
companies in Libya. PhD thesis, Garyounis University.  
Altunisik, M.B., 1995. External vs.internal debate revisited: the political economy of 
economic reform policies in Libya (1987-1993). PhD thesis, Boston University.  
Al-Twaijry, A.A., Brierley, J.A., and Gwilliam, D.R., 2003. The development of 
internal audit in Saudi Arabia: an institutional theory perspective. Critical Perspectives 
on Accounting, 14(5), 507-531.  
Alzoreiky, J., 2010. The position of Islamic financial services under Banking Law 
No. (1) (2005). In: Second Islamic Financial Services Conference, Tripoli: Higher 
Center for Financial and Administrative Occupations, and the Academy of Graduate 
Studies between  27 and 28 April, 2010. Available at: 
http://iefpedia.com/arab/%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%84%
D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   263 
 
%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%8
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%A7%
D9%84-18440 [last accessed 13/10/2014]. 
Anchor, J. and Dehayyat, J.A., 2010. Organisational characteristics and strategic 
planning in an emerging economy: the case of Jordan. Working paper, University of 
Huddersfield. 
Anderson, R.C. and Bizjak, J.M., 2003. An empirical examination of the role of the 
CEO and the compensation committee in structuring executive pay. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 27(7), 1323-1348.  
Anderson-Gough, F., 2004. Using computer assisted qualitative data analysis 
software: respecting voices within data management and analysis. In: C. Humphrey, 
and B. Lee (eds.). The real life guide to accounting research: a behind-the-scenes view 
of using qualitative research methods. Elsevier, Oxford (2008), pp. 373-90.  
Andrews, K.R., 1980. Directors' responsibility for corporate strategy. Harvard 
Business Review, 58(6): 30-42.  
Ayuso, S. and Argandoña, A., 2009. Responsible corporate governance: towards a 
stakeholder board of directors? Working paper, University of Navarra.  
Bach, S.B. and Smith, A.D., 2007. Are powerful CEOs beneficial to post-IPO survival 
in high technology industries?: An empirical investigation. The Journal of High 
Technology Management Research, 18(1), 31-42.  
Baker, R.C. and Owsen, D.M., 2002. Increasing the role of auditing in corporate 
governance. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 13(5), 783-795.  
Banaga, A., Tomkins, C.R., and Ray, G.H., 1994. External audit and corporate 
governance in Islamic banks: a joint practitioner-academic research study. Aldershot: 
Avebury. 
Banks, E., 2004. Corporate governance, financial responsibility, controls and ethics. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Baralexis, S., 2004. Creative accounting in small advancing countries: the Greek case. 
Managerial Auditing Journal, 19(3), 440-461.  
Baranchuk, N. and Dybvig, P.H., 2009. Consensus in diverse corporate boards. Review 
of Financial Studies, 22(2), 715-747.  
Barney, J., 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of 
Management, 17(1), 99-120.  
Bavly, D., 1999. Corporate governance and accountability: what role for the 
regulator, director, and auditor?. Quorum Books: Westport, Connecticut. London. 
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   264 
 
Baysinger, B.D. and Butler, H.N., 1985. Corporate governance and the board of 
directors: performance effects of changes in board composition. Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization, 1(1), 101-124.  
Bazeley, P. and Jackson, K., 2013. Qualitative data analysis with NVivo. Los Angeles: 
Sage. 
BBC, 2014. Libya country profile - overview. Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13754897 [last accessed 3/12/2014]. 
Beitul-Mal, M., 1990. The importance of accounting information and economic 
development. PhD thesis, Garyounis University. 
Belal, A.R., Abdelsalam, O., and Nizamee, S.S., 2014. Ethical reporting in Islami Bank 
Bangladesh Limited (1983-2010). Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 129 No. 4, pp. 1-
16..  
Benatar, S.R., 2002. Reflections and recommendations on research ethics in 
developing countries. Social Science and Medicine, 54(7), 1131-1141.  
Bengdara, F., 2007. The development and restructure of Libyan commercial banks. 
Available in Arabic ed. Tripoli: Central Bank of Libya. 
Berger, P.L., 2011. The sacred canopy: elements of a sociological theory of religion. 
New York: Open Road Media.  
Berglöf, E. and Claessens, S., 2006. Enforcement and good corporate governance in 
developing countries and transition economies. The World Bank Research Observer, 
21(1), 123-150.  
Berle, A.A. and Means, G.C., 1932. The Modern Corporation and private property. 
New York: MacMillan. 
Bhagat, S. and Black, B., 1999. The uncertain relationship between board composition 
and firm performance. The Business Lawyer, 54(3), 921-963.  
Bhagat, S. and Black, B., 2002. Non-correlation between board independence and 
long-term firm performance. Journal of Corporation Law, 27(2), 231-274. 
Bhatti, M. and Bhatti, M.I., 2010. Toward understanding Islamic corporate governance 
issues in Islamic finance. Asian Politics and Policy, 2(1), 25-38.  
Bilimoria, D. and Wheeler, J.V., 2000. Women corporate directors: current research 
and future directions. In R. J. Burke & M. C. Mattis (Eds), Women in Management: 
Current Research Issues, 2. London: Sage, 138-163.  
Black, B.S. and Khanna, V.S., 2007. Can corporate governance reforms increase firm 
market values? Event study evidence from India. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 
4(4), 749-796.  
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   265 
 
Blair, M.M., 1995. Ownership and control: rethinking corporate governance for the 
twenty-first century. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.  
Bosch, R., 1995. Corporate practices and conduct. London: Woodslane.  
Bower, J.L. and Doz, Y., 1979. Strategy formulation: a social and political process. In: 
D.E. Schendel, and C.W. Hofer (eds.). Strategic management: A new view od 
Business Policy. Boston, Mas: Little Brown and Co. pp.152.166 
Bower, J.L. and Weinberg, M.W., 1988. Statecraft, strategy and corporate leadership. 
California Management Review, 30(3), 9-56.  
Boyd, B.K., 1995. CEO duality and firm performance: a contingency model. Strategic 
Management Journal, 16(4), 301-312.   
Boytsun, A., Deloof, M., and Matthyssens, P., 2011. Social norms, social cohesion, 
and corporate governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 19(1), 
41-60. 
Bradley, J.V., 1968. Distribution-free statistical tests. London: Prentice Hall. 
Braiotta Jr, L. and Zhou, J., 2006. An exploratory study of the effects of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, the SEC and United States stock exchange(s) rules on audit committee 
alignment. Managerial Auditing Journal, 21(2), 166-190. 
Bremer, J. and Elias, N., 2007. Corporate governance in developing economies: the 
case of Egypt. International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics, 3(4), 430-
445.  
Brennan, N., 2006. Boards of directors and firm performance: is there an expectations 
gap? Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14(6), 577-593. 
Brennan, N.M. and Solomon, J., 2008. Corporate governance, accountability and 
mechanisms of accountability: an overview. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 
Journal, 21(7), 885-906. 
Brick, I.E. and Chidambaran, N., 2010. Board meetings, committee structure, and firm 
value. Journal of Corporate Finance, 16(4), 533-553. 
Bryman, A. and Bell, E., 2011. Business research methods 3rded. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Bryman, A. and Bell, E., 2015. Business research methods 4thed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Burrell, G. and Morgan, G., 1994. Sociological paradigms and organisational 
analysis: elements of the sociology of corporate life. London: Heinemann. 
Busnaina, I.A.A., 2011. The effect of marketing programmes on buying behaviours of 
Libyan consumers. PhD thesis, Nottingham Trent University. 
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   266 
 
Cadbury, A., 1992. Report of the committee on financial aspects of corporate 
governance. London: Gee.  
Cadbury, A., 1993. Thoughts on corporate governance. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 1(1), 5-10.  
Cadbury, A., 2000. The corporate governance agenda. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 8(1), 7-15.  
Cadbury, A., 2002. Corporate governance and chairmanship: a personal view. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Caprio, G., Laeven, L., and Levine, R., 2007. Governance and banks’ valuations. 
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 16(4), 584-617.  
Carruthers, B.G., 1995. Accounting, ambiguity, and the new institutionalism. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 20(4), 313-328. CASE. 2001. Fact Book. 
Carpenter, M.A. and Westphal, J.D., 2001. The strategic context of external network 
ties: examining the impact of director appointments on board involvement in strategic 
decision-making. Academy of Management Journal, 44(4), 639-660. 
Carter, C.B. and Lorsch, J.W., 2004. Back to the drawing board: designing corporate 
boards for a complex world. Boston: Harvard Business Press. 
Carter, D.A., Simkins, B.J., and Simpson, W.G., 2003. Corporate governance, board 
diversity, and firm value. Financial Review, 38(1), 33-53.  
Carver, J. and Oliver, C., 2002. Corporate boards that create value: governing 
company performance from the boardroom. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.  
Carver, J., 2000. The Opportunity for Re‐inventing Corporate Governance in Joint 
Venture Companies. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 8(1), 75-80.  
Cascio, W.F., 2004. Board governance: a social systems perspective. The Academy of 
Management Executive, 18(1), 97-100.  
Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), 2003. Corporate governance in 
Morroco, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan – countries of the MENA region. Washington,  
CIPE. Available at:   http://www.cipe.org/ [last accessed 11/10/2010]. 
Central Bank of Libya, 2005. Annual report: fiscal year 2005. Tripoli: Central Bank 
of Libya. 
Central Bank of Libya, 2006. Annual report: fiscal year 2006. Tripoli: Central Bank 
of Libya. 
Central Bank of Libya, 2009. Annual report: fiscal year 2009. Tripoli: Central Bank 
of Libya. 
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   267 
 
Central Bank of Libya, 2010. The fifty-fourth report of the Central Bank of Libya. 
Tripoli: Central Bank of Libya.  
Central Bank of Libya, 2012. The seventy-one report of the Central Bank of Libya. 
Tripoli: Central Bank of Libya.  
Cernat, L., 2004. The emerging European corporate governance model: Anglo-Saxon, 
continental, or still the century of diversity? Journal of European Public Policy, 11(1), 
147-166.  
Chaganti, R.S., Mahajan, V., and Sharma, S., 1985. Corporate board size, composition 
and corporate failures in retailing industry. Journal of Management Studies, 22(4), 
400-417.  
Chahine, S. and Safieddine, A., 2008. Corporate governance and the external 
monitoring of banks in Lebanon. Corporate Governance, 8(3), 258-270.  
Chami, R., Al-Darwish, A., Cevik, S., Charap, J., George, S., Gracia, B., Gray, S., and 
Pattanayak, S., 2012. Libya beyond the revolution: challenges and opportunities. 
Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. Available at: 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dp/2012/1201mcd.pdf [last accessed 
12/5/2013]. 
Chan, E.H., Qian, Q.K., and Lam, P.T., 2009. The market for green building in 
developed Asian cities – the perspectives of building designers. Energy Policy, 37(8), 
3061-3070. 
Chan, K.C., Seow, G.S., and Tam, K., 2009. Ranking accounting journals using 
dissertation citation analysis: a research note. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
34(6), 875-885. 
Chancharat, N., Krishnamurti, C., and Tian, G., 2012. Board structure and survival of 
new economy IPO firms. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 20(2), 
144-163.  
Chapra, M.U., 1992. Islam and the economic challenge. Leicester: Islamic Foundation.  
Chapra, M.U., 2007. Challenges facing the Islamic financial industry. In: M.K. Hassan, 
and M.K. Lewis (eds.). Handbook of Islamic banking. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar,  Cheltenham (2007), pp. 325–360. 
Charkham, J., 1994. Keeping good company: a study of corporate governance in five 
countries. Oxford: Clarendon.  
Cheng, S., 2008. Board size and the variability of corporate performance. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 87(1), 157-176.  
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   268 
 
Child, J., Yan, Y., and Lu, Y., 1997. Ownership and control in Sino-foreign joint 
ventures. In: P.W. Beamish, and J.P. Killing (eds.). Corporative strategies: Asian 
Pacific perspectives. San Francisco: New Lexington Press, 181-225. 
Choi, J.J., Park, S.W., and Yoo, S.S., 2007. The value of outside directors: evidence 
from corporate governance reform in Korea. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 42(4), 941-962.  
Choudhury, M.A. and Hoque, M.Z., 2004. An advanced exposition of Islamic 
economics and finance. New York: Edwin Mellen Press.  
Choudhury, M.A. and Hoque, M.Z., 2006. Corporate governance in Islamic 
perspective. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 
6(2), 116-128.  
Christopher, J., 2010. Corporate governance a multi-theoretical approach to 
recognizing the wider influencing forces impacting on organizations. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, 21(8), 683-695.  
Claessens, S., Fan, J.P.H., Djankov, S., and Lang, L.H.P., 1999. On expropriation of 
minority shareholders: evidence from East Asia,  Policy Research paper 2088World 
Bank, Washington DC. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=202390 [last accessed 
April 2012].   
Clarke, T., 1993. Corporate governance: the state of the art. Managerial Auditing 
Journal, 8(3), 3-7.  
Clarke, T., 2004. Introduction: theories of governance – reconceptualising corporate 
governance theory after the Enron experience. In: T. Clarke (ed.). Theories of 
corporate governance. London: Routledge, 1-31. 
Clarkson, M.B.E., 1995. A stakeholder framework for analyzing and evaluating 
corporate social performance. Academy of Management Review, 20(1), 92-117.  
Cochran, P.L., Wartick, S.L., and Financial Executives Research Foundation, 1988. 
Corporate governance: a review of the literature. New Jersey: Financial Executives 
Research Foundation. 
Cohen, J., Gaynor, L.M., Krishnamoorthy, G., and Wright, A.M., 2007. Auditor 
communications with the audit committee and the board of directors: policy 
recommendations and opportunities for future research. Accounting Horizons, 21(2), 
165-187. 
Collier, P.M., 2008. Stakeholder accountability: a field study of the implementation of 
a governance improvement plan. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 
21(7), 933-954. 
Collier, P. and Zaman, M., 2005. Convergence in European corporate governance: the 
audit committee concept. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13(6), 
753-768.  
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   269 
 
Collis, J. and Hussey, R., 2013. Business research: a practical guide for 
undergraduate and postgraduate students. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Combined Code, 2006. Combined Code, principles of corporate governance. London: 
The London Stock Exchange Limited.  
Conger, J.A. and Lawler E.E., 2001. Building a high‐performing board: how to choose 
the right members. Business Strategy Review, 12(3), 11-19   
Conger, J.A., Lawler, E.E., and Finegold, D., 2002. Corporate boards: new strategies 
for adding value at the top. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Conyon, M.J. and Mallin, C., 1997. Women in the boardroom: evidence from large 
UK companies. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 5(3), 112-117. 
Conyon, M.J. and Peck, S.I., 1998. Board control, remuneration committees, and top 
management compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 41(2), 146-157. 
Coombes, P. and Wong, S., 2004. Chairman and CEO – one job or two? McKinsey 
Quarterly, A New Era in Governance, 2, 43-47.  
Core, J.E., Holthausen, R.W., and Larcker, D.F., 1999. Corporate governance, chief 
executive compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 
51(3), 371-406. 
Cornforth, C. and Brown, W.A., 2013. Nonprofit governance: Innovative perspectives 
and approaches. Routledge.  
Creswell, J.W., 2013. Research design: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods 
approaches. Thousand Oaks: Sage.  
Curwin, J. and Slater, R., 2007. Quantitative methods: a short course. London: 
Cengage Learning. 
Dahya, J., Karbhari, Y., and Xiao, J.Z., 2002. The supervisory board in Chinese listed 
companies: problems, causes, consequences and remedies. Asia Pacific Business 
Review, 9(2), 118-137.  
Dahya, J. and McConnell, J.J., 2007. Board composition, corporate performance, and 
the Cadbury Committee recommendation. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 42(3), 535-564.  
Daily, C.M. and Dalton, D.R., 1992. The relationship between governance structure 
and corporate performance in entrepreneurial firms. Journal of Business Venturing, 
7(5), 375-386.  
Daily, C.M. and Dalton, D.R., 1994. Bankruptcy and corporate governance: the impact 
of board composition and structure. Academy of Management Journal, 37(6), 1603-
1617.  
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   270 
 
Dalton, D.R., Daily, C.M., Johnson, J.L., and Ellstrand, A.E., 1999. Number of 
directors and financial performance: a meta-analysis. Academy of Management 
Journal, 42(6), 674-686.  
D'Aunno, T., Sutton, R.I. and Price, R.H., 1991. Isomorphism and external support in 
conflicting institutional environments: A study of drug abuse treatment units. Academy 
of Management Journal, 34(3), 636-661.  
Davies, M. and Schlitzer, B., 2008. The impracticality of an international “one size fits 
all” corporate governance code of best practice. Managerial Auditing Journal, 23(6), 
532-544.  
De Andres, P., Azofra, V., and Lopez, F., 2005. Corporate boards in OECD countries: 
size, composition, functioning and effectiveness. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 13(2), 197-210.  
De Andres, P. and Vallelado, E., 2008. Corporate governance in banking: the role of 
the board of directors. Journal of Banking and Finance, 32(12), 2570-2580.  
Deakin, S. and Konzelmann, S.J., 2003. After Enron: an age of enlightenment? 
Organization, 10(3), 583-587.  
Deegan, C. and Blomquist, C., 2006. Stakeholder influence on corporate reporting: an 
exploration of the interaction between WWF-Australia and the Australian minerals 
industry. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 31(4), 343-372.  
Dehaene, A., De Vuyst, V., and Ooghe, H., 2001. Corporate performance and board 
structure in Belgian companies. Long Range Planning, 34(3), 383-398.  
DeLorenzo, Y. T. 2002. Shari[ah Supervision of Islamic Mutual Funds. 4th Annual 
Forum of Harvard University Islamic Forum, held from 30 Sept-1 October 2002.  
Demb, A. and Neubauer, F., 1992. The corporate board: confronting the paradoxes. 
Long Range Planning, 25(3), 9-20.  
Denis, D.K. and McConnell, J.J., 2003. International corporate governance. Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38(1), 1-36.  
Descombe M. 2007. The Good Research Guide for Small Scale Social Research 
Project. Philadelphia: Open University Press. 
Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S., 1994. Handbook of qualitative research. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage. 
Deutsch, Y., 2005. The impact of board composition on firms’ critical decisions: a 
meta-analytic review. Journal of Management, 31(3), 424-444.  
Dey, A., Engel, E., and Liu, X., 2011. CEO and board chair roles: to split or not to 
split? Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(5), 1595-1618.  
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   271 
 
DiMaggio, P.J. and Powell, W.W., 1983. The iron cage revisited – institutional 
isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. Advances in Strategic 
Management, 17, 143-166. (Reprinted from The American Sociological Association, 
48, 147-160, 1983.) 
Donaldson, L., 1990. The ethereal hand: organizational economics and management 
theory. Academy of Management Review, 15(3), 369-381.  
Donaldson, L. and Davis, J.H., 1991. Stewardship theory or agency theory: CEO 
governance and shareholder returns. Australian Journal of Management, 16(1), 49-64.  
Donaldson, T. and Preston, L.E., 1995. The stakeholder theory of the corporation: 
concepts, evidence, and implications. Academy of Management Review, 20(1), 65-91.  
Duchin, R., Matsusaka, J.G., and Ozbas, O., 2010. When are outside directors 
effective? Journal of Financial Economics, 96(2), 195-214.  
Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R., and Jackson, P., 2012. Management research: an 
introduction. London: Sage.  
Ehtawsh, S.D., 2012. Opinion: reform of the Libyan banking market. The Tripoli Post. 
17/02/2012. Available at: http://www.tripolipost.com/articledetail.asp?c=2&i=7904 
[last accessed 10/5/2012]. 
Eisenhardt, K.M., 1985. Control: organizational and economic approaches. 
Management Science, 31(2), 134-149. 
Eisenhardt, K.M., 1989. Agency theory: an assessment and review. Academy of 
Management Review, 14(1), 57-74.  
Elloumi, F. and Gueyie, J.P., 2001. Financial distress and corporate governance: an 
empirical analysis. Corporate Governance, 1(1), 15-23.  
Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2012. Country analysis briefs: Libya. 
Washington, DC. Available at: 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/cabs/Libya/pdf.pdf. www.eia.gov [last 
accessed 10/9/2014]. 
Eriksson, P. and Kovalainen, A., 2008. Qualitative methods in business research. 
London: Sage. 
Ezat, A. and El-Masry, A., 2008. The impact of corporate governance on the timeliness 
of corporate internet reporting by Egyptian listed companies. Managerial Finance, 
34(12), 848-867.  
Ezzamel, M. and Watson, R., 1997. Wearing two hats: the conflicting control and 
management roles of non-executive directors. In: K. Keasey, S. Thompson, and M. 
Wright (eds.). Corporate governance: economic and financial issues. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 54-79. 
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   272 
 
Faleye, O., 2007. Does one hat fit all? The case of corporate leadership structure. 
Journal of Management and Governance, 11(3), 239-259.  
Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., and Hoitash, U., 2009. Killing the goose that lays the golden 
egg? The costs of overburdened independent directors, Working Paper. Northeastern 
University. Available at: 
http://www.efmaefm.org/0EFMAMEETINGS/EFMA%20ANNUAL%20MEETING
S/2009-Milan/papers/250.pdf [last accessed 10/5/2014]. 
Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., and Hoitash, U., 2011. The costs of intense board monitoring. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. 
Falgi, K.I., 2009. Corporate governance in Saudi Arabia: a stakeholder perspective. 
PhD thesis, University of Dundee. 
Fama, E.F., 1980. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. The Journal of 
Political Economy, , 88 (2),288-307.  
Fama, E.F. and Jensen, M.C., 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of 
Law and Economics, 26(2), 301-325. 
Faraj, S. and El-Firjani, E., 2014. Challenges facing IASs/IFRS implementation by 
Libyan listed companies. Universal Journal of Accounting and Finance, 2(3), 57-63. 
Farook, S., 2007. On corporate social responsibility of Islamic financial institutions. 
Islamic Economic Studies, 15(1), 31-46.  
Farooque, O.A., Zijl, T.V., Dunstan, K., 2007a. Ownership structure and corporate 
performance: Evidence from Bangladesh. Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & 
Economics, 14 (2), 127-149.  
Farooque, O.A., Zijl, T.V., Dunstan, K., 2007b. Corporate governance in Bangladesh: 
link between ownership and financial performance. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 15 (6), 1453-1468.  
Feldmann, D.A. and Schwarzkopf, D.L., 2003. The effect of institutional ownership 
on board and audit committee composition. Review of Accounting and Finance, 2(4), 
87-109.  
Ferlie, E., Ashburner, L. and Fitzgerald, L., 1994. The Non-executive Director and the 
Board–Some Evidence from the NHS. Unpublished Paper. Centre for Corporate 
Strategy and Change, University of Warwick, .  
Fethi, M.D. and Pasiouras, F., 2010. Assessing bank efficiency and performance with 
operational research and artificial intelligence techniques: a survey. European Journal 
of Operational Research, 204(2), 189-198.  
Field, A., 2013. Discovering statistics using IBM SPSS statistics. London: Sage.  
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   273 
 
Filatotchev, I., 2008. Developing an organizational theory of corporate governance: 
comments on Henry L. Tosi Jr. (2008) “Quo Vadis? Suggestions for future corporate 
governance research.” Journal of Management and Governance, 12(2), 171-178.  
Filatotchev, I. and Boyd, B.K., 2009. Taking stock of corporate governance research 
while looking to the future. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(3), 
257-265.  
Filatotchev, I., Isachenkova, N., and Mickiewicz, T., 2007. Ownership structure and 
investment finance in transition economies: a survey of evidence from large firms in 
Hungary and Poland. Economics of Transition, 15(3), 433-460.  
FRC, 2003. The Combined Code on corporate governance. London: Financial 
Reporting Council. Available at: 
http://www.frc.org.uk/documents/pdf/combinedcodefinal.pdf [last accessed 
14/10/2010]. 
Finkelstein, S. and Hambrick, D.C., 1996. Strategic leadership: top executives and 
their effects on organizations (Hornbooks). Minneapolis/St. Paul: West Pub. Co.  
Finkelstein, S. and Mooney, A.C., 2003. Not the usual suspects: how to use board 
process to make boards better. The Academy of Management Executive, 17(2), 101-
113.  
Fisher, C.M., 2007. Researching and writing a dissertation: a guidebook for business 
students. London: Prentice Hall.  
Fisher, C.M. and Lovell, A., 2008. Business ethics and values: individual, corporate 
and international perspectives. London: Prentice Hall.  
Forbes, D.P. and Milliken, F.J., 1999. Cognition and corporate governance: 
understanding boards of directors as strategic decision-making groups. Academy of 
Management Review, 24(3), 489-505.  
Freeman, R.E. and Evan, W.M., 1991. Corporate governance: a stakeholder 
interpretation. Journal of Behavioral Economics, 19(4), 337-359.  
Freeman, R.E., Wicks, A.C., and Parmar, B., 2004. Stakeholder theory and “the 
corporate objective revisited”. Organization Science, 15(3), 364-369.  
Fried, V.H., Bruton, G.D., and Hisrich, R.D., 1998. Strategy and the board of directors 
in venture capital-backed firms. Journal of Business Venturing, 13(6), 493-503. 
Gabrielsson, J. and Huse, M., 2005. Outside directors in SME boards: a call for 
theoretical reflections. Corporate Board: Role, Duties and Composition, 1(1), 28-37. 
Gall, M.D., Borg, W.R., and Gall, J.P., 2007. Educational research: an introduction. 
Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   274 
 
Garratt, B., 2003. Thin on top: why corporate governance matters and how to measure 
and improve board performance. London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing.  
Garratt, B., 2010. The fish rots from the head: the crisis in our boardrooms: developing 
the crucial skills of the competent director. London: Profile Books.  
Garrett, G., 1998. Partisan politics in the global economy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Geller, G., 2009. Corporate governance of banking institutions: a descriptive study of 
boards of directors in Latin America. Unpublished working paper. Available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1494338 [last accessed 
8/12/2014].  
Ghosh, S., 2006. Do board characteristics affect corporate performance? Firm-level 
evidence for India. Applied Economics Letters, 13(7), 435-443.  
Gibson, M.S., 2003. Is corporate governance ineffective in emerging markets? Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38(1), 231-250. 
Gilbert, N., 2001. Researching social life (2nd). London: Sage. 
Gill, J. and Johnson, P., 2010. Research methods for managers. London: Sage. 
Gillan, S.L., 2006. Recent developments in corporate governance: an overview. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(3), 381-402.  
Gilpin, R., 2001. Global political economy: understanding the international economic 
order. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Goergen, M., Manjon, M.C., and Renneboog, L., 2008. Recent developments in 
German corporate governance. International Review of Law and Economics, 28(3), 
175-193.  
Golden, B.R. and Zajac, E.J., 2001. When will boards influence strategy? Inclination 
× power = strategic change. Strategic Management Journal, 22(12), 1087-1111.  
Gooden, S., 2001. ‘Participation of stakeholders in the corporate governance of Islamic 
financial institutions.’ New Horizon,. 114(2),: 12-15.  
Goodstein, J., Gautam, K., and Boeker, W., 1994. The effects of board size and 
diversity on strategic change. Strategic Management Journal, 15(3), 241-250.  
Government Commission of Germany, 2010. German Corporate Governance Code, 
2010. (as amended on May 26, 2010). Available at: 
http://www.bayer.com/en/german-corporate-governance-code-2010.pdfx [last 
accessed 10/11/2013]. 
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   275 
 
Goyal, V., 2012. Corporate board structures. London: QFinance. Available at: 
http://www.financepractitioner.com/contentFiles/QF02/g1xtn5q6/12/4/corporate-
board-structures.pdf [last accessed 14/6/2014]. 
Grais, W., & Pellegrini, M. (2006). Corporate governance in institutions offering 
Islamic financial services. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4054, 
November 2006  
Grassa, R., 2013. Shariah supervisory system in Islamic financial institutions: New 
issues and challenges: a comparative analysis between Southeast Asia models and 
GCC models. Humanomics, 29 (4), 333-348.  
Grassa, R., 2015. Shari’ahh supervisory systems in Islamic finance institutions across 
the OIC member countries: an investigation of regulatory frameworks. Journal of 
Financial Regulation and Compliance, 23(2), 135-160.  
Gray, S.J., 1988. Towards a theory of cultural influence on the development of 
accounting systems internationally. Abacus, 24(1), 1-15.  
Greenbury, R., 1995. Directors' remuneration: report of a study group chaired by Sir 
Richard Greenbury. London: Gee Publishing.  
Gumhouria Bank, 2012. Annual Report 2012. Tripoli: Gumhouria Bank.  
Habbash, M., 2010. The effectiveness of corporate governance and external audit on 
constraining earnings management practice in the UK. PhD thesis, Durham 
University. 
Halton, M., 2013. Board behaviours: Bringing challenge in the bank boardroom. 
International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, 10(4), 422-441.  
Hamadu, M., 2010. Commercial companies in Libyan business law. Gharyan, Libya: 
University of the Western Mountain.  
Hampel Committee, 1998. Final report of the Committee on corporate governance. 
London: Gee. 
Haniffa, R.M. and Cooke, T.E., 2002. Culture, corporate governance and disclosure in 
Malaysian corporations. Abacus, 38(3), 317-349.  
Haniffa, R. and Hudaib, M., 2006. Corporate governance structure and performance 
of Malaysian listed companies. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 33(7‐8), 
1034-1062.  
Hart, O., 1995. Corporate governance: some theory and implications. The Economic 
Journal, 105(430), 678-689. 
Hasan, Z., 2008. Corporate governance of Islamic financial institutions. Paper 
presented at the Conference on Malaysian Study of Islam,University of Wales, 
Lamperter, United Kingdom, 28-29 June, 2008. 
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   276 
 
Hasan, Z., 2009. Corporate governance: Western and Islamic perspectives. 
International Review of Business Research Papers, 5(1), 277-293. 
Hassan, Z., 2010. Regulatory framework of Shari’ah governance system in Malaysia, 
GCC Countries and the UK. Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies, , 3(2), 82-115.  
Hasan, Z., 2011. Sharīʿah governance in Islamic financial institutions in Malaysia, 
GCC countries and the UK. PhD thesis, Durham University. 
Hendry, K. and Kiel, G.C., 2004. The role of the board in firm strategy: integrating 
agency and organisational control perspectives. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 12(4), 500-520.  
Henke Jr, J.W., 1986. Involving the board of directors in strategic planning. Journal 
of Business Strategy, 7(2), 87-95.  
Henry, D., 2010. Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance 
compliance: a private contracting perspective. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 18(1), 
24-46. 
Hermalin, B.E. and Weisbach, M.S., 2003. Boards of directors as an endogenously 
determined institution: a survey of the economic literature (digest summary). 
Economic Policy Review, 9(1), 17-26.   
Herman, E.S., 1981. Corporate control, corporate power. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Higgs, D., 2003. Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors. 
London: Department of Trade and Industry Publications.  
Hill, S., 1995. The social organization of boards of directors. British Journal of 
Sociology, 46(2), 245-278. 
Hillman, A.J. and Dalziel, T., 2003. Boards of directors and firm performance: 
integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives. The Academy of 
Management Review, 28(3), 383-396. 
Hillman, A.J., Nicholson, G., and Shropshire, C., 2008. Directors' multiple identities, 
identification, and board monitoring and resource provision. Organization Science, 
19(3), 441-456. 
Hofstede, G., 2001. Culture's consequences: comparing values, behaviors, institutions 
and organizations across nations. Thousand Oaks: Sage.  
Holmstrom, B., 2005. Pay without Performance and the Managerial Power 
Hypothesis: A Comment”. Journal of Corporation Law, 30, 703-713.  
Hopt, K.J. and Leyens, P.C., 2004. Board models in Europe – recent developments of 
internal corporate governance structures in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, 
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   277 
 
and Italy. Working paper. The Hague: Van der Heijden Institute of the University of 
Nijmegen. 
Hughes, J.A. and Sharrock, W.W., 1997. The philosophy of social research. London: 
Longman.  
Hung, H., 1998. A typology of the theories of the roles of governing boards. Corporate 
Governance, 6(2), 101-111.  
Huse, M., 2005. Accountability and creating accountability: a framework for exploring 
behavioural perspectives of corporate governance. British Journal of Management, 16, 
S65-S79.  
Huse, M., 2007. Boards, governance and value creation: the human side of corporate 
governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hussain, S.H. and Mallin, C., 2002. Corporate governance in Bahrain. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 10(3), 197-210.  
Hussain, S.H. and Mallin, C., 2003. The dynamics of corporate governance in Bahrain: 
structure, responsibilities and operation of corporate boards. Corporate Governance: 
An International Review, 11(3), 249-261.  
Hussey, J. and Hussey, R., 1997. Business research: a practical guide for 
undergraduate and postgraduate students. London: Macmillan. 
Huyghebaert, N. and Wang, L., 2011. Expropriation of minority investors in Chinese 
listed firms: the role of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 20(3), 308–332. 
Ingley, C.B. and Van der Walt, N.T., 2001. The strategic board: the changing role of 
directors in developing and maintaining corporate capability. Corporate Governance: 
An International Review, 9(3), 174-185.  
Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), 2009. The role of internal auditing in resourcing 
the internal audit activity. Position paper. Florida, USA Available at: 
https://na.theiia.org/standardsguidance/Public%20Documents/PP%20The%20Role%
20of%20Internal%20Auditing%20in%20Resourcing%20the%20Internal%20Audit%
20Activity.pdf [last accessed 17/5/2014].   
International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Hawkamah Institute for Corporate 
Governance, 2008. Corporate governance survey of listed companies and banks 
across the Middle East and North Africa countries. Survey ed. NW, Washington. 
Available at: 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site
/corporate+governance/publications/guidelines_reviews+and+case+studies/a+corpor
ate+governance+survey+of+listed+companies+and+banks+across+the+middle+east
+and+north+africa [last accessed 1/5/2014].International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2008. 
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   278 
 
International Monetary Fund country report No. 08/302, 2008. Tripoli: International 
Monetary Fund Publications. 
International Monetary Fund, 2013. Article IV consultation concluding 
statement: preliminary conclusions of the IMF Mission 1 (LCB). International 
Monetary Fund Publications.USA. 
Jaggi, B., Leung, S., and Gul, F., 2009. Family control, board independence and 
earnings management: evidence based on Hong Kong firms. Journal of Accounting 
and Public Policy, 28(4), 281-300. 
Jensen, M., 1993. Modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control 
systems. Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831-880. 
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H., 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, 
agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360. 
Jick, T.D., 1979. Mixing qualitative and quantitative methods: triangulation in action. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 24(4), 602-611.  
Jiraporn, P., Singh, M., and Lee, C.I., 2009. Ineffective corporate governance: director 
busyness and board committee memberships. Journal of Banking and Finance, 33(5), 
819-828.  
John, K. and Senbet, L.W., 1998. Corporate governance and board effectiveness. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 22(4), 371-403.  
Johnson, J.L., Daily, C.M., and Ellstrand, A.E., 1996. Boards of directors: a review 
and research agenda. Journal of Management, 22(3), 409-438.  
Johnson, S., Boone, P., Breach, A., and Friedman, E., 2000. Corporate governance in 
the Asian financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1-2), 141-186. 
Judge Jr, W.Q. and Zeithaml, C.P., 1992. Institutional and strategic choice 
perspectives on board involvement in the strategic decision process. Academy of 
Management Journal, 35(4), 766-794.  
Kakabadse, N.K., Yang, H., and Sanders, R., 2010. The effectiveness of non-executive 
directors in Chinese state-owned enterprises. Management Decision, 48(7), 1063-
1079.  
Kamel, H. and Elbanna, S., 2010. Assessing the perceptions of the quality of reported 
earnings in Egypt. Managerial Auditing Journal, 25(1), 32-52.  
Kang, H., Cheng, M., and Gray, S.J., 2007. Corporate governance and board 
composition: diversity and independence of Australian boards. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 15(2), 194-207.  
Keasey, K., Thompson, S., and Wright, M., 1997. Corporate governance: economic 
and financial issues. New York: Oxford University Press.  
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   279 
 
Kemp, S., 2006. In the driver's seat or rubber stamp?: The role of the board in providing 
strategic guidance in Australian boardrooms. Management Decision, 44(1), 56-73. 
Kemp, S., 2010. Driving strategy or just going through the motions: an empirical study 
of boardrooms in the UK. International Journal of Business Administration, 1(1), 2-
18. 
Khalifa, A.S., 2003. The multidimensional nature and purpose of business in Islam, 
accounting, commerce and finance. The Islamic Perspective Journal, 7(1/2), 1-25. 
Khanchel El Mehdi, I., 2007. Empirical evidence on corporate governance and 
corporate performance in Tunisia. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
15(6), 1429-1441.  
Kiel, G.C. and Nicholson, G.J., 2003. Board composition and corporate performance: 
how the Australian experience informs contrasting theories of corporate governance. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11(3), 189-205.  
King, T.D. and Wen, M. M., 2011. Shareholder governance, bondholder governance, 
and managerial risk-taking. Journal of Banking & Finance, 35(3), 512-531.  
Klein, A., 2002. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings 
management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(3), 375-400. 
Kosnik, R.D., 1987. Greenmail: a study of board performance in corporate 
governance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 32(2), 163-185. 
Kula, V., 2005. The impact of the roles, structure and process of boards on firm 
performance: evidence from Turkey. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 13(2), 265-276. 
Kumar, P. and Sivaramakrishnan, K., 2008. Who monitors the monitor? The effect of 
board independence on executive compensation and firm value. Review of Financial 
Studies, 21(3), 1371-1401.  
Kumar, R., 2005. Research methodology: a step-by-step guide for beginners. London: 
Sage.  
Laing, D. and Weir, C.M., 1999. Governance structures, size and corporate 
performance in UK firms. Management Decision, 37(5), 457-464. 
Langevoort, D.C., 2001. The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and 
the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, Georgetown Law 
Journal, 89, 797-832.  
Larbsh, M., 2010. An evaluation of corporate governance practice in Libya: 
stakeholders’ perspectives. PhD Thesis, Nottingham Trent University.  
Lauenstein, M., Tashakori, A., and Boulton, W., 1983. A look at the board's role in 
planning. Journal of Business Strategy, 3(3), 64-70. 
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   280 
 
Law., 2005. Banking Law No 1: Libyan Encyclopaedias of Financial Legislation. 
Tripoli: Central Bank of Libya. 
Law., 2010. Libyan Companies Law No 1. Libyan Encyclopaedias of Financial 
Legislation. Tripoli: Central Bank of Libya. 
Law., 2012. Libyan Banking Law No 46. Libyan Encyclopaedias of Financial 
Legislation. Tripoli: Central Bank of Libya. 
Leach, C., 1979. Introduction to statistics: a nonparametric approach for the social 
sciences. New York: Wiley. 
League of Arab States, 2005. Governance in the Arab States Program, news of 
governance. Arab 3: Quarterly Newsletter. (Reference in Arabic). 
Learmount, S., 2002. Theorizing corporate governance: New organizational 
alternatives. Working Paper 237, ESRC Centre for Business Research, Judge Institute 
for Management, University of Cambridge, Cambridge.  
Leblanc, R. and Schwartz, M.S., 2007. The black box of board process: gaining access 
to a difficult subject. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(5), 843-
851. 
Lee, A.S., 1991. Integrating positivist and interpretive approaches to organizational 
research. Organization Science, 2(4), 342-365.  
Letza, S., Kirkbride, J., Sun, X., 2008. Corporate governance theorising: limits, critics 
and alternatives. International Journal of Law and Management, 50 (1), 17-32.  
Letza, S., Sun, X., and Kirkbride, J., 2004. Shareholding versus stakeholding: a critical 
review of corporate governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
12(3), 242-262.  
Levrau, A. and Van den Berghe, L.A.A., 2007a. Corporate governance and board 
effectiveness: beyond formalism. ICFAI Journal of Corporate Governance, 6(4), 58-
85.  
Levrau, A. and Van den Berghe, L.A.A., 2007b. Identifying key determinants of 
effective boards of directors. Vlerick Leuven Gent Working Paper Series, Vlerick 
Leuven Gent Management School, 11(1), 58.  
Lewis, M.K., 2001. Islam and accounting. Accounting Forum, 25(2), 103-127.  
Lewis, M.K., 2005. Islamic corporate governance. Review of Islamic Economics, 9(1), 
5-29. 
Lewis, M.K., 2006. Accountability and Islam. Fourth International Conference on 
Accounting and Finance in Transition, Adelaide, April 10-12, 2006. Adelaide: 
University of South Australia.P,8.  
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   281 
 
Lewis, M.K. and Algaoud, L.M., 2001. Islamic banking. Northampton, MA: Edward 
Elgar. 
Li, J., 1994. Ownership structure and board composition: a multi‐country test of 
agency theory predictions. Managerial and Decision Economics, 15(4), 359-368.  
Libyan Stock Market, 2010. Board report 2010. Tripoli: LSM.  
Liew, P.K., 2007. Corporate governance reforms in Malaysia: the key leading players' 
perspectives. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15 (5), 724-740.  
Limpaphayom, P. and Connelly, J.T., 2004. Corporate governance in Thailand. 
Working Paper. Asian Development Bank Institute. Available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.965300 [last accessed 15/10/2011]. 
Lindegger, G. and Richter, L., 2000. HIV vaccine trials: critical issues in informed 
consent. South African Journal of Science, 96(6), 313-317.  
Lipton, M. and Lorsch, J.W., 1992. Modest proposal for improved corporate 
governance. Business Lawyer, 48(1), 59-77. 
Liu, G.S., 2005. Comparative corporate governance: the experience between China 
and the UK. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13(1), 1-4.  
Lorsch, J.W. and MacIver, E., 1989. Pawns or potentates: the reality of America's 
corporate boards. Boston: Harvard Business Press. 
Lorsch, J. and Young, J., 1990. Pawns or potentates: the reality of America's corporate 
boards. The Executive, 4(4), 85-87.  
Lye, J.M., 2011. An exploratory study of organizational learning from a performance 
measurement system: a grounded theory approach - Abstract. Journal of Accounting 
and Organizational Change, 7(1), 1-41.  
Maali, B., Casson, P., and Napier, C., 2006. Social reporting by Islamic banks. Abacus, 
42(2), 266-289. 
Maassen, G.F., 2002. An international comparison of corporate governance models. 
Amsterdam: Spencer Stuart.  
Mace, M.L., 1971. Directors: myth and reality. Boston: Harvard Business School 
Press. 
Mace, M.L., 1986. Directors: myth, and reality. Boston: Harvard Business School 
Press. 
Machold, S., Huse, M., Minichilli, A., and Nordqvist, M., 2011. Board leadership and 
strategy involvement in small firms: A team production approach. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 19 (4), 368-383.  
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   282 
 
Machold, S. and Farquhar, S., 2013. ‘Board task evolution: a longitudinal field study 
in the UK. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 21(2),  147–162 
Mallin, C., 2002. The relationship between corporate governance, transparency and 
financial disclosure. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 10(4), 253-255.  
Mallin, C., 2007. Corporate Governance. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Mallin, C. and Ow-Yong, K., 2012. Factors influencing corporate governance 
disclosures: evidence from Alternative Investment Market (AIM) companies in the 
UK. The European Journal of Finance, 18 (6), 515-533.  
Mangena, M. and Tauringana, V., 2006. Corporate boards, ownership structure and 
firm performance in an environment of economic and political instability: the case of 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange listed companies. Paper present in BAA National 
Conference, University of Portsmouth, April 11-13, 2006 . 
Mangena, M. and Tauringana, V., 2008. Corporate boards, ownership structure and 
firm performance in an environment of severe political and economic uncertainty. 
Paper Presented at the British Accounting Association Conference, April 2008, 
Blackpool, UK. 
Mangena, M., Tauringana, V., and Chamisa, E., 2012. Corporate boards, ownership 
structure and firm performance in an environment of severe political and economic 
crisis. British Journal of Management, 23(1), S23-S41.  
ManosA, R., Murinde, V. and Green, C.J., 2007. Leverage and business groups: 
Evidence from Indian firms. Journal of Economics and Business, 59 (5), 443-465.  
Mashat, A.A., 2005. Corporate social responsibility disclosure and accountability: the 
case of Libya. Manchester: Manchester Metropolitan University. 
May, K.A., 1994. Abstract knowing: the case for magic in method. In: J. Morse (ed.). 
Critical issues in qualitative research methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 10-21   
McCarthy, D.J. and Puffer, S.M., 2003. Corporate governance in Russia: a framework 
for analysis. Journal of World Business, 38(4), 397-415.  
McColgan, P., 2001. Agency theory and corporate governance: a review of the 
literature from a UK perspective. Department of Accounting and Finance Working 
Paper 6, 0203.  
McGee, R.W., 2008. Corporate governance in Asia: eight case studies. Working Paper 
School of Accounting, Florida International University, Available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1081954 [last accessed 10/11/2010]. 
McKnight, P.J. and Weir, C., 2009. Agency costs, corporate governance mechanisms 
and ownership structure in large UK publicly quoted companies: a panel data analysis. 
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 49(2), 139-158.  
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   283 
 
McNulty, T. and Pettigrew, A., 1996. The contribution, power and influence of part‐
time board members. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 4(3), 160-179.  
McNulty, T. and Pettigrew, A. M. 1998. Sources and uses of power in the boardroom. 
European Journal of Work & Organizational Psychology, 7(2), 197–214. 
McNulty, T. and Pettigrew, A., 1999. Strategists on the board. Organization Studies, 
20(1), 47-74. 
McNulty, T., Roberts, J., and Stiles, P., 2005. Undertaking governance reform and 
research: further reflections on the Higgs Review. British Journal of Management, 
16(1), S99-S107.  
Melis, A., 2000. Corporate governance in Italy. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 8(4), 347-355.  
Mertens, D.M., 2009. Research and evaluation in education and psychology: 
integrating diversity with quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage.  
Meyer, J.W. and Rowan, B., 1977. Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as 
myth and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, , 83, pp. 340-363 
Miles, M.B., Huberman, A.M., and Saldana, J., 2013. Qualitative data analysis: a 
methods sourcebook. Los Angeles: Sage. 
Miller-Millesen, J.L., 2003. Understanding the behavior of nonprofit boards of 
directors: A theory-based approach. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 32 (4), 
521-547.  
Milliken, F.J. and Martins, L.L., 1996. Searching for common threads: Understanding 
the multiple effects of diversity in organizational groups. Academy of Management 
Review, 21 (2), 402-433.  
Mingers, J., 2001. Combining IS research methods: towards a pluralist methodology. 
Information Systems Research, 12(3), 240-259.  
Minichilli, A. and Hansen, C., 2007. The board advisory tasks in small firms and the 
event of crises. Journal of Management and Governance, 11(1), 5-22. 
Minichilli, A., Zattoni, A., and Nielsen, S., and Huse, M. 2012. Board task 
performance: an exploration of micro‐and macro‐level determinants of board 
effectiveness. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 33(2), 193-215.  
Minichilli, A., Zattoni, A., and Zona, F., 2009. Making boards effective: an empirical 
examination of board task performance. British Journal of Management, 20(1), 55-74.  
Mintzberg, H., 1983. Power in and around organizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall.  
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   284 
 
Mizruchi, M.S., 1983. Who controls whom? An examination of the relation between 
management and boards of directors in large American corporations. Academy of 
Management Review, 8 (3), 426-435.  
Molz, R., 1985. The role of the board of directors: typologies of interaction. Journal 
of Business Strategy, 5(4), 86-93. 
Monks, R. and Minow, N., 1991. Power and accountability. New York: Harper 
Collins.  
Monks, R. and Minow, N., 2008. Corporate governance. Chichester: John Wiley and 
Sons. 
Mulili, B.M. and Wong, P., 2011. Corporate governance practices in developing 
countries: the case for Kenya. International Journal of Business Administration, 2(1), 
14-27. 
Mullineux, A., 2006. The corporate governance of banks. Journal of Financial 
Regulation and Compliance, 14(4), 375-382.  
Muneeza, A. and Hassan, R., 2014. Shari'ah corporate governance: the need for a 
special governance code. Corporate Governance, 14 (1), 120-129.  
Murphy, S.A. and McIntyre, M.L., 2007. Board of director performance: a group 
dynamics perspective. Corporate Governance, 7(2), 209-224.  
Murtuza, A., 2002. Islamic antecedents for financial accountability. International 
Journal of Islamic Financial Services, 4(1), 1-19.  
Mushaf Al-Madinah An-Nabawiyah. (1990). The Holy Qur-an: English translation of 
the meanings and the commentary. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia The Custodian of the 
Two Holy Mosques King Fahd Complex,Saudi Arabia. 
Mustafa, A., 2009. Evaluating the audit services in Libya. PhD thesis, Garyounis 
University. 
Musteen, M., Datta, D.K., and Kemmerer, B., 2010. Corporate reputation: do board 
characteristics matter? British Journal of Management, 21(2), 498-510.  
Muth, M. and Donaldson, L., 1998. Stewardship theory and board structure: a 
contingency approach. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 6 (1), 5-28.  
Muth, M. and Donaldson, L., 2002. Stewardship theory and board structure: a 
contingency approach. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 6(1), 5-28. 
Naser, K., Al-Hussaini, A., and Al-Kwari, D., 2006. Determinants of corporate social 
disclosure in developing countries: the case of Qatar. Advances in International 
Accounting, 19(1), 1-23.  
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   285 
 
Nathan, S. and Ribiere, V., 2007. From knowledge to wisdom: the case of corporate 
governance in Islamic banking. The Journal of Information and Knowledge 
Management Systems, Vine, 37 (4), 471-483.  
Nestor, S. and Thompson, J., 2000. Corporate governance patterns in OECD 
economies: is convergence underway? In: OECD (ed.). Corporate governance in Asia: 
a comparative perspective. Paris: OECD Publishing. elopment. Retrieved May 17, 
2004, from www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/10/1931460.pdf 
Newbold, P., Carlson, W.L., and Thorne, B., 2007. Statistics for business and 
economics. Operational Research Society, 56(11), 1347. 
Newman, I. and Benz, C.R., 1998. Qualitative-quantitative research methodology: 
exploring the interactive continuum. Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University 
Press.  
Nicholson, G.J. and Kiel, G.C., 2004a. A framework for diagnosing board 
effectiveness. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12(4), 442-460.  
Nicholson, G.J. and Kiel, G.C., 2004b. Breakthrough board performance: how to 
harness your board's intellectual capital. Corporate Governance: The International 
Journal of Business in Society, 4(1), 5-23.  
Nienhaus, V., 2006. Corporate governance in Islamic banks. Jeddah: IRTI. Available 
at: http://www.irtipms.org/PubText/216.pdf [last accessed December 2014]. 
Ocasio, W., 1994. Political dynamics and the circulation of power: CEO succession in 
US industrial corporations, 1960-1990. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(2), 285-
312. 
O’Dwyer, B., Unerman, J., and Hession, E., 2004. The emergence and future 
development of corporate social disclosure in Ireland: the perspectives of non-
governmental organisations. In: Fourth Asia Pacific Interdisciplinary Research in 
Accounting Conference, Singapore, July 2004. pp. 4-6.  
OECD, 1999. OECD principles of corporate governance. Paris: The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development.  
OECD, 2003. The PISA 2003 assessment framework: mathematics, reading, science 
and problem solving knowledge and skills. Paris: The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development. 
OECD, 2004. OECD principles of corporate governance. Paris: The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development. 
OECD, 2008. Using the OECD principles of corporate governance: a boardroom 
perspective. OECD 2008, Paris Cedex, France, Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/60/40823806.pdf [last accessed  12/11/2011]. 
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   286 
 
O'Hara, K., 2011. Transparent government, not transparent citizens: a report on 
privacy and transparency for the Cabinet Office.  
Okeahalam, C.C. and Akinboade, O.A., 2003. A review of corporate governance in 
Africa: literature, issues and challenges. Washington: Global Corporate Governance 
Forum. 
Okike, E.N.M., 2007. Corporate governance in Nigeria: the status quo. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 15(2), 173-193.  
Okpara, J.O., 2011. Corporate governance in a developing economy: barriers, issues, 
and implications for firms. Corporate Governance, 11(2), 184-199.  
Olson, J.F. and Adams, M.T., 2004. Composing a balanced and effective board to meet 
new governance mandates. The Business Lawyer, 59(2), 421-452.  
O'Neal, D. and Thomas, H., 1995. Director networks/director selection: the board's 
strategic role. European Management Journal, 13(1), 79-90.  
Ong, C. and Wan, D., 2008. Three conceptual models of board role performance. 
Corporate Governance: An International Journal of Business in Society, 8 (3), 317-
329.  
Opdenakker, R., 2006. Advantages and disadvantages of four interview techniques in 
qualitative research. Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung (Forum for Qualitative Social 
Research), 7(4), Art 11. 
Oppenheim, A.N., 2000. Questionnaire design, interviewing and attitude 
measurement. London: Continuum International Publishing Group.  
O'Reilly III, C.A., Williams, K.Y., and Barsade, S., 1997. Group demography and 
innovation: does diversity help? In: E. Mannix and M. Neale (eds.). Research on 
managing groups and teams. Standford: JAI, 183-207. 
O'Sullivan, N. and Wong, P., 1999. Board composition, ownership structure and 
hostile takeovers: some UK evidence. Accounting and Business Research, 29(2), 139-
155.  
Otman, W.A. and Karlberg, E., 2007. The Libyan legal system and key recent 
legislation. In: W. Otman and E. Karlberg (eds.). The Libyan economy. New York: 
Springer, p.p.654.    
Oxford Business Group, 2008. The report: Libya 2008. London. Available at: 
https://www.google.co.uk/webhp?sourceid=chromeinstant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF
8#q=Oxford+Business+Group%2C+2008.+The+Report%3A+Libya+2008.+illustrate
d+ed.+Contributor+Oxford+Business+Group+Staff+.ISBN+1902339118%2C+9781
902339115%3A+Oxford+Business+Group%2C+2008 [last accessed  10/4/2014]. 
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   287 
 
Pagano, M. and Roell, A., 1998. The choice of stock ownership structure: agency costs, 
monitoring, and the decision to go public. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(1), 
187-225.  
Pansiri, J., 2005. Pragmatism: a methodological approach to researching strategic 
alliances in tourism. Tourism and Hospitality Planning and Development, 2(3), 191-
206.  
Pansiri, J., 2009. Evolution of a doctoral thesis research topic and methodology: a 
personal experience. Tourism Management, 30(1), 83-89. 
Paredes, T.A., 2005. Corporate governance and economic development. Regulation, 
28 (1): 34-39. 
Parker, L.D., 2007. Financial and external reporting research: the broadening corporate 
governance challenge. Accounting and Business Research, 37(1), 39-54. 
Parsa, S., Chong, G. and Isimoya, E., 2007. Disclosure of governance information by 
small and medium-sized companies. Corporate Governance: The International 
Journal of Business in Society, 7 (5), 635-648.  
Pass, C., 2004. Corporate governance and the role of non-executive directors in large 
UK companies: an empirical study. Corporate Governance: The International Journal 
of Business in Society, 4(2), 52-63.  
Pathan, S. and Skully, M., 2010. Endogenously structured boards of directors in banks. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 34(7), 1590-1606.  
Patton Michael Quinn, , 2002. Qualitative research and evaluation methods. 3rd ed. 
London: Sage.: Thousand Oaks, Calif.  
Payne, G. T., Benson, G. S., and Finegold, D. L. 2009. Corporate board attributes, 
team effectiveness and financial performance. Journal of Management Studies, 46(4): 
704–731. 
Pearce, J.A. and Zahra, S.A., 1991. The relative power of CEOs and boards of 
directors: associations with corporate performance. Strategic Management Journal, 
12(2), 135-153. 
Pearce, J.A. and Zahra, S.A., 1992. Board composition from a strategic contingency 
perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 29(4), 411-438.  
Peck, E., 1995. The performance of an NHS Trust Board: actors' accounts, minutes 
and observation. British Journal of Management, 6(2), 135-156.  
Pedersen, T. and Thomsen, S., 1997. European patterns of corporate ownership: a 
twelve-country study. Journal of International Business Studies, 28(4), 759-778. 
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   288 
 
Pedro Sánchez Ballesta, J. and García-Meca, E., 2005. Audit qualifications and 
corporate governance in Spanish listed firms. Managerial Auditing Journal, 20(7), 
725-738.  
Peng, M.W., Tan, J., and Tong, T.W., 2004. Ownership types and strategic groups in 
an emerging economy. Journal of Management Studies, 41(7), 1105-1129.  
Pergola, T.M. and Joseph, G.W., 2011. Corporate governance and board equity 
ownership. Corporate Governance, 11(2), 200-213.  
Petra, S.T. and Dorata, N.T., 2008. Corporate governance and chief executive officer 
compensation. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in 
Society, 8(2), 141-152. 
Petrovic, J., 2008. Unlocking the role of a board director: a review of the literature. 
Management Decision, 46(9), 1373-1392.  
Pettigrew, A., 1992. On studying managerial elites. Strategic Management Journal, 
13(2), 163-182. 
Pfeffer, J., 1972. Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: the 
organization and its environment. Administrative Science Quarterly, 17(2), 218-228.  
Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G.R., 1978. The external control of organizations: a resource 
dependence perspective. Stanford: Stanford Business Books. 
Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G.R., 2003. The external control of organizations: a resource 
dependence perspective. Stanford: Stanford Business Books. 
Porter, M. and Yergin, D. (eds.), 2006. National economic strategy: an assessment of 
the competitiveness of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Tripoli: General Planning Council 
of Libya.  
Pratten, J.D. and Mashat, A.A., 2009. Corporate social disclosure in Libya. Social 
Responsibility Journal, 5(3), 311-327.  
Prowse, S., 1998. Corporate governance: emerging issues and lessons from East Asia. 
New Hampshire: World Bank Group. 
Przybyłowski, M., Aluchna, M., and Zamojska, A., 2011. Role of independent 
supervisory board members in Central and Eastern European countries. International 
Journal of Disclosure and Governance, 8(1), 77-98. 
Pugliese, A. and Wenstop, P.Z., 2007. Board members’ contribution to strategic 
decision-making in small firms. Journal of Management and Governance, 11(4), 383-
404.  
Pye, A. 2000. Changing scenes in, from and outside the boardroom: UK corporate 
governance in practice from 1989 to 1999. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 8(4), 335–346. 
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   289 
 
Pye, A., 2002. Corporate directing: governing, strategising and leading in action. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 10(3), 153-162.  
Renders, A. and Gaeremynck, A., 2012. Corporate Governance, Principal‐Principal 
Agency Conflicts, and Firm Value in European Listed Companies. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 20(2), 125-143.  
Renton, T. and Watkinson, J., 2001. The company director’s guide. London: The 
Institute of Directors and Kogan Page. 
Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), 2009. Corporate 
governance country assessment: Arab Republic of Egypt. New Hampshire: World 
Bank. 
Riege, A.M., 2003. Validity and reliability tests in case study research: a literature 
review with “hands-on” applications for each research phase. Qualitative Market 
Research: An International Journal, 6(2), 75-86.  
Rizk, R., 2008. Islam and corporate governance, in Aras, G. and Crowther, D. (eds.), 
Culture and Corporate Governance Research Series: Issues in Corporate Behaviour 
and Sustainability, Social Responsibility Network, Leicester, UK, pp. 204–214. 
Roberts, J., 2009. No one is perfect: the limits of transparency and an ethic for 
“intelligent” accountability. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34(8), 957-970.  
Roberts, J., McNulty, T., and Stiles, P., 2005. Beyond agency conceptions of the work 
of the non‐executive director: creating accountability in the boardroom. British 
Journal of Management, 16, S5-S26.  
Rodrigues, L.L. and Craig, R., 2007. Assessing international accounting 
harmonization using Hegelian dialectic, isomorphism and Foucault. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, 18(6), 739-757.  
Roe, M.J., 2003. Political determinants of corporate governance: political context, 
corporate impact. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Rose, C., 2007. Does female board representation influence firm performance? The 
Danish evidence. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(2), 404-413.  
Ross, M.L., 2001. Does oil hinder democracy? World Politics, 53(03), 325-361.  
Rowe, A.L., 2007. Corporate environmental reporting: informal institutional Chinese 
cultural norms. In: 5th Asia Pacific Interdisciplinary Research in Accounting 
Conference, Auckland, July 8, 2007, p.p 8-10. 
Rubach, M.J. and Sebora, T.C., 1998. Comparative corporate governance: competitive 
implications of an emerging convergence. Journal of World Business, 33(2), 167-184.  
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   290 
 
Ruigrok, W., Peck, S., and Keller, H., 2006. Board characteristics and involvement in 
strategic decision making: evidence from Swiss companies. Journal of Management 
Studies, 43(5), 1201-1226.  
Ruigrok, W., Peck, S., and Tacheva, S., 2007. Nationality and gender diversity on 
Swiss corporate boards. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(4), 546-
557.  
Ryen, A., 2004. Ethical issues, in Clive Seale, Jay Gubrium and Giampietro Gobo (eds) 
Qualitative Research Practice, London: SAGE, pp. 230–247.  
Saidi, N.A.H., 2004. Corporate governance in MENA countries: improving 
transparency and disclosure. The Second Middle East and North Africa Regional 
Corporate Governance Forum, Beirut, June 3-5, 2004., 5-130. 
Saidi, N. 2005. Corporate governance in the Arab countries: role of banking system 
in ensuring transparency and disclosure. paper presented at Forum on Corporate 
Governance in Banks and Financial Institutions in Line with International Standards 
and Practices, Muscat, Oman. 
Samaha, K., 2010. Do board independence and audit committees motivate disclosure 
on different corporate governance information categories in the annual reports in 
developing countries? International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, No 
57, 206-225.  
Samaha, K. and Dahawy, K., 2011. An empirical analysis of corporate governance 
structures and voluntary corporate disclosure in volatile capital markets: the Egyptian 
experience. International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance 
Evaluation, 7(1), 61-93.  
Santos, J.R.A., 1999. Cronbach’s alpha: a tool for assessing the reliability of scales. 
Journal of Extension, 37(2), 1-5. 
Saudagaran, S.M. and Diga, J.G., 1997. Financial reporting in emerging capital 
markets: characteristics and policy issues. Accounting Horizons, 11(2), 41-64.  
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002., 2002. In: 107th congress of the United States of 
America. HR, pp. 107-204.  
Saunders, M., Lewis, P., and Thornhill, A., 2009. Business research methods. London: 
Prentice Hall.  
Saunders, M., Lewis, P., and Thornhill, A., 2012. Research methods for business 
students. 6th ed. Harlow, Pearson Higher Ed.  
Schmidt, S.L. and Brauer, M., 2006. Strategic governance: how to assess board 
effectiveness in guiding strategy execution. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 14(1), 13-22. 
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   291 
 
Scott, J., 1997. Corporate business: comparative perspectives. URL: 
Privatewww.Essex.Ac.Uk/~ scottj/socscot3.Htm (Available: October, 31.2007),.  
Scott, W. (2008) Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications. 
Scott, W.R., 2013. Institutions and organizations. Los Angeles: Sage.  
Sekaran, U. and Bougie, R., 2010. Research methods for business. Chichester: John 
Wiley and Sons. 
Selway, M., 2000. Over the hump. Accountancy. 125(1280), 68-69.  
Shareia, B.F., 2014. The Libyan accounting profession. World Academy of Science, 
Engineering and Technology: International Scholarly and Scientific Research and 
Innovation, 8(12), 3495-3503.  
Shareia, B., Parasuraman, B., and Cantrick-Brooks, B., 2005. Qualitative case study 
research in Africa and Asia: challenges and prospects. Proceedings of the 3rd 
International Qualitative Research Convention, Johor Bahru, Malaysia, 21–23rd 
August, 2005,Malaysia, 1-13. 
Sheridan, T. and Kendall, N., 1992. Corporate governance: an action plan for 
profitability and business success. London: Pitman Pub.  
Sherwin, L., 2003. Building an effective board. Bank Accounting and Finance,16(5), 
22-29.  
Shivdasani, A. and Yermack, D., 1999. CEO involvement in the selection of new board 
members: an empirical analysis. The Journal of Finance, 54(5), 1829-1853.  
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. The Journal 
of Finance, 52(2), 737-783. 
Short, H. and Keasey, K., 1999. Managerial ownership and the performance of firms: 
evidence from the UK. Journal of Corporate Finance, 5(1), 79-101.  
Siegel, S. and Castellan Jr, N., 1988. Nonparametric statistics for the behavioral 
sciences. New York: McGraw-Hill.  
Silverman, D., 2013. Doing qualitative research: a practical handbook. Sage 
Publications Limited, London. 
Simons, R., 1994. How new top managers use control systems as levers of strategic 
renewal. Strategic Management Journal, 15(3), 169-189.  
Simpson, W.G. and Gleason, A.E., 1999. Board structure, ownership, and financial 
distress in banking firms. International Review of Economics and Finance, 8(3), 281-
292. 
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   292 
 
Singh, A., 2003. Corporate governance, corporate finance and stock markets in 
emerging countries. Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 3(1), 41-72.  
Smerdon R., 1998. A practical guide to corporate governance. London: Sweet and 
Maxwell.   
Smith, K.G., Smith, K.A., Olian, J.D., Sims, H.P., O'Bannon, D.P., and Scully, J.A., 
1994. Top management team demography and process: the role of social integration 
and communication. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(3), 412-438.  
Snow, C.C. and Thomas, J.B., 1994. Field research methods in strategic management: 
contributions to theory building and testing. Journal of Management Studies, 31(4), 
457-480.  
Sobh, R. and Perry, C., 2006. Research design and data analysis in realism research. 
European Journal of Marketing, 40(11/12), 1194-1209. 
Solomon, J., 2007. Corporate governance and accountability. 2nd ed. Chichester: 
John Wiley.  
Solomon, J., 2010. Corporate governance and accountability. Chichester: John Wiley. 
Solomon, J. and Solomon, A., 2004. Corporate governance and accountability. 
Chichester: John Wiley. 
Solomon, J., Solomon, A., and Park, C., 2002. A conceptual framework for corporate 
governance reform in South Korea. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
10(1), 29-46.  
Solomon, J.F., Lin, S.W., Norton, S.D., and Solomon, A., 2003. Corporate governance 
in Taiwan: empirical evidence from Taiwanese company directors. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 11(3), 235-248.  
Sonnenfeld, J.A., 2002. What makes great boards great. Harvard Business Review, 
80(9), 106-113.  
Spira, L.F., 2003. Audit committees: begging the question? Corporate Governance: 
An International Review, 11(3), 180-188.  
Stedham, Y. and Beekun, R.I., 2000. Boards of directors and the adoption of a CEO 
performance evaluation process: Agency—and institutional—Theory perspectives. 
Journal of Management Studies, 37(2), 277-296. 
Steger, T., 2004. Corporate governance of German SMEs – a review with special 
regards to the situation in East Germany. Working paper. Geneva: Economic 
Commission for Europe.   
Sternberg, E., 2004. Corporate governance: accountability in the market place. 
London: Institute of Economic Affairs 
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   293 
 
Stiles, P. and Taylor, B., 1996. The strategic role of the board. Corporate Governance: 
An International Review, 4(1), 3-10.  
Stiles, P. and Taylor B., 2001. Boards at work: how directors view their roles and 
responsibilities. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Stiles, P., 2001. The impact of the board on strategy: an empirical examination. 
Journal of Management Studies, 38(5), 627-650.  
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (2008). Basics of qualitative research. Grounded theory: 
techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage 
Suchman, M.C., 1995. Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. 
Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 571-610.  
Suleiman, N.M., 2000. Corporate governance in Islamic banks. Society and Economy 
in Central and Eastern Europe, 22(3), 98-116.   
Sundaram, A.K. and Inkpen, A.C., 2004. The corporate objective revisited. 
Organization Science, 15(3), 350-363.  
Sundaramurthy, C. and Lewis, M., 2003. Control and collaboration: paradoxes of 
governance. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 397-415.  
Taktak, S. and Triki, M., 2012. The effect of board and ownership structure on the 
efficiency of banks in Tunisia: the stochastic frontier approach. International Journal 
of Business and Management, 7(16), 139-150. 
Taylor, S. and Bogdan, R., 1998. Introduction to qualitative research method: the 
research for meanings. New York: Wiley and Sons.  
Teddlie, C. and Tashakkori, A., 2009. Foundations of mixed methods research: 
integrating quantitative and qualitative approaches in the social and behavioral 
sciences. Thousand Oaks: Sage.  
Thomsen, S., 2004. Corporate values and corporate governance. Corporate 
Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 4(4), 29-46.  
Tian, J.J. and Lau, C.M., 2001. Board composition, leadership structure and 
performance in Chinese shareholding companies. Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management, 18(2), 245-263. 
Tricker, B., 2009. Essentials for board directors: an A to Z guide. New York: 
Bloomberg Press.  
Tricker, R.I., 1994. International corporate governance text, readings and cases. New 
York: Prentice Hall. 
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   294 
 
Tricker, R.I., 1996. Pocket director, the essentials of corporate governance from A-Z 
Economist Books. London: Profile Books. 
Tüngler, G., 2000. The Anglo-American board of directors and the German 
supervisory board – marionettes in a puppet theatre of corporate governance or 
efficient controlling devices? Bond Law Review, 12(2), 230-236.  
Turley, S. and Zaman, M., 2007. Audit committee effectiveness: informal processes 
and behavioural effects. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 20(5), 765-
788.  
Turnbull, N. and Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, 1999. 
Internal control: guidance for directors on the Combined Code. London: Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. 
Turnbull, S., 1997. Corporate governance: its scope, concerns and theories. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 5(4), 180-205.  
Twati, J.M. and Gammack, J.G., 2006. The impact of organisational culture innovation 
on the adoption of IS/IT: the case of Libya. Journal of Enterprise Information 
Management, 19(2), 175-191. 
Unerman, J. and Bebbington, J., 2007. Sustainability accounting and accountability. 
Essex: Taylor and Francis. 
Union of Arab Banks (UAB), 2007. Survey results: corporate governance survey of 
the Arab banking sector. Unpublished working paper.  
Vafeas, N., 1999. Board meeting frequency and firm performance. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 53(1), 113-142.  
Vagliasindi, M., 2008. The effectiveness of boards of directors of state owned 
enterprises in developing countries. New Hampshire: World Bank Publications.  
Vance, S.C., 1983. Corporate leadership: boards, directors, and strategy. New York: 
McGraw-Hill.  
Van der Walt, N.T. and Ingley, C., 2003. Board dynamics and the influence of 
professional background, gender and ethnic diversity of directors. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 11(3), 218-234. 
Varoudakis, A., El Daher, S., Benhassine, N., Robalino, D., Forneris, X., Messali, P., 
Mclinden, G., Ferencz, G., Brenton, P., Streifel, S., Malouche, M., Mougas, S., Farhan, 
N., Abdoun, R., Sederlof, H., and Sewell, D., 2006. Socialist people’s Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya country economic report. New Hampshire: World Bank.  
Vogel, F.E. and Hayes, S.L., 1998. Islamic law and finance: religion, risk, and return. 
Leiden: Brill.  
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   295 
 
Wang, J. and Dewhirst, H.D., 1992. Boards of directors and stakeholder orientation. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 11(2), 115-123.  
Wei, G., 2007. Ownership structure, corporate governance and company performance 
in China. Asia Pacific Business Review, 13(4), 519-545.  
Wei, Y., 2003. Comparative corporate governance: a Chinese perspective. The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International.  
Weimer, J. and Pape, J., 1999. A taxonomy of systems of corporate governance. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 7(2), 152-166.  
Weir, C. and Laing, D., 2001. Governance structures, director independence and 
corporate performance in the UK. European Business Review, 13(2), 86-95.  
Weir, C., Laing, D., and McKnight, P.J., 2002. Internal and external governance 
mechanisms: their impact on the performance of large UK public companies. Journal 
of Business Finance and Accounting, 29(5‐6), 579-611. 
Weisberg, H., Krosnick, J.A., and Bowen, B.D., 1996. An introduction to survey 
research, polling, and data analysis. London: Sage.  
Werder, A., Talaulicar, T., and Kolat, G.L., 2005. Compliance with the German 
corporate governance code: an empirical analysis of the compliance statements by 
German listed companies. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13(2), 
178-187. 
Westphal, J.D. and Zajac, E.J., 1997. Defections from the inner circle: social exchange, 
reciprocity, and the diffusion of board independence in US corporations. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(1), 161-183.  
Westphal, J.D., 1998. Board games: How CEOs adapt to increases in structural board 
independence from management. Administrative Science Quarterly,43 , 511-537.  
Wheelen, T.L., Hunger, J.D., Hoffman, A.N., and Bamford C.E., 2014. Strategic 
management and business policy: globalization, innovation, and sustainability. New 
Jersey: Pearson Education. 
Wood, M.M., 1983. From the boardroom: what role for college trustees? Harvard 
Business Review, 61(3), 52-62.  
Xie, B., Davidson III, W.N., and DaDalt, P.J., 2003. Earnings management and 
corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 9(3), 295-316.  
Yin, R.K., 2009. Case study research: design and methods. Beverley Hills: Sage.  
Yin, R.K., 2013. Case study research: design and methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage.  
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   296 
 
Young, M.N., Peng, M.W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G.D., and Jiang, Y., 2008. Corporate 
governance in emerging economies: a review of the principal-principal perspective. 
Journal of Management Studies, 45(1), 196-220.  
Yunis, H., 2007. Corporate governance for banks. In: S. Archer and R.A.A. Karim 
(eds.). Islamic finance: the regulatory challenge. New York: Wiley and Sons.  
Zahra, S.A., 1990. Increasing the board's involvement in strategy. Long Range 
Planning, 23(6), 109-117. 
Zahra, S.A. and Pearce, J.A., 1989. Boards of directors and corporate financial 
performance: a review and integrative model. Journal of Management, 15(2), 291-334.  
Zahra, S.A., Ireland, R.D., Gutierrez, I., and Hitt, M.A., 2000. Introduction to special 
topic forum privatization and entrepreneurial transformation: emerging issues and a 
future research agenda. Academy of Management Review, 25(3), 509-524. 
Zhang, P. 2010. Board information and strategic tasks performance. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 18(4) 473–487. 
Zona, F. and Zattoni, A., 2007. Beyond the black box of demography: board processes 
and task effectiveness within Italian firms. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 15(5), 852-864.  
Zucker, L.G., 1987. Institutional theories of organization. Annual Review of Sociology, 
13(1987), 443-464.  
 
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   297 
 
 Appendix A: Tables 
Table 1: Evolution of corporate governance in the UK 
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Table 2: The OECD principles (2004) framework 
 
Table 3: Years of experience 
 
Less than 5 years 5 – 10 years 11-15 years More than 15 years Total 
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
Board 
Members
0 0 47 50.0 37 39.4 10 10.6 94
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Table 4: Highest qualification 
 
Table 5: Degree subject 
 
 
Table 6: Formal statement of roles and responsibilities  
 
 
Table 7: CEO as board member 
 
 
 
Bank 
sector
Bachelor’s degree Master PhD Total
Freq % Freq % Freq %
Public 18 47.37 14 36.84 6 15.79 38
Private 20 64.52 11 35.48 0 0 31
Foreign 9 36.00 12 48.00 4 16.00 25
Overall 47 50.00 37 39.36 10 10.64 94
Bank 
sector
Banking Accounting Economics Business Law Finance Total 
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
Public 2 6.5 15 48.4 0 0 8 25.8 1 3.2 12 18.4 38
Private 20 6.5 11 35.4 0 0 31
Foreign 4 16.0 6 24.0 0 0 8 32.0 1 4.0 6 24.0 25
Overall 26 32 0 16 2 18 94
Does your bank have formal statements describing the roles, responsibilities and powers of the chairman, CEO, 
executive and non-executive directors?
Sector Chairman CEO Executive directors I-non-executive 
directors
yes no yes no yes no yes no
Public 33.3%  (2) 4 33.3% (2) 4 16.7% (1) 5 16.7% (1) 5
Private 50% (3) 3 50% (3) 3 0.0% (0) 6 0.0% (0) 6
Foreign 75% (3) 1 75% (3) 1 50% (2) 2 25% (1) 3
Overall 50% (8) 8 50% (8) 8 18.8% (3) 13 12.5% (2) 14
Is the CEO a board member?
Sector
Yes No No answer Total
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
Public 3 50.0 3 50.0 - - 6 37.5
Private 5 83.3 1 16.7 - - 6 37.5
Foreign 3 75.0 1 25.0 - - 4 25
Overall 11 68.75 5 31.25 - - 16 100
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Table 8: Status of chairman 
 
 
Table 9: Split between chairman and CEO roles 
 
Table 10: Executive committee 
 
 
 
Table 11: Audit committee 
 
Is the chairman of your bank board seen as a i-non-executive?
Sector Yes No No answer Total
Public 66.7% (4) 33.3% (2) - 6
Private 50% (3) 50% (3) - 6
Foreign 75% (3) 25% (1) - 4
Overall 63% (10) 37% (6) - 16
Are the roles of chairman and CEO split in the bank?
Sector Yes No No answer Total
Public 66.7% (4) 33.3% (2) - 6
Private 50%  (3) 33.3% (2) 16.667% (1) 6
Foreign 75% (3) 25% (1) - 4
Overall 62.5% (10) 31.25% (5) 6.25% (1) 16
Sector Yes No Total Average 
number of 
members
Average 
number of 
executives
Average number 
of NEDs
Public 83.3% (5) 1 6 4.4 1.4 3
Private 33.3% (2) 4 6 4.5 1.5 3
Foreign 100% (4) 0 4 3.75 1.5 2.25
Overall 68.8% (11) 5 16 4.22 1.43 2.75
Sector Yes No Total Average
number of
members
Average
number of
executives
Average number of
NEDs
Public 66.7% (4) 2 6 5 2 3
Private 33.3% (2) 4 6 3.25 2 1.25
Foreign 100% (4) 0 4 3 1 2
Overall 75% (10) 6 16 3.75 1.66 2.084
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Table 12: Nominations committee  
 
Table 13: Remuneration committee 
 
Table 14: Corporate governance committee 
 
Table 15: Shari’ah committee 
 
Sector Yes No Total Average number of 
members
Average 
number of 
executives
Average 
number of 
NEDs
Public 33.3% (2) 4 6 4 2 2
Private 16.7% (1) 5 6 3 1 2
Foreign 50% (2) 2 4 3 2 2.50
Overall 31.3% (5) 11 16 3.33 1.66 2.17
Sector Yes No Total Average
number of
members
Average
number of
executives
Average number of
NEDs
Public 33.3% (2) 4 6 4.5 2 2.5
Private 0% (0) 6 6 0 0 0
Foreign 50% (2) 2 4 4 2 2
Overall 25% (4) 12 16 4.25 2 2.25
Sector Yes No Total Average 
number of 
members
Average 
number of 
executives
Average number of 
NEDs
Public 50% (3) 3 6 3.33 0 3.33
Private 16.7% (1) 5 6 4 2 2
Foreign 75% (3) 1 4 4.33 1.66 2.66
Overall 43.8% (7) 9 16 3.87 1.22 2.65
Sector Yes No Total Average number of 
members
Average 
number of 
executives
Average number 
of NEDs
Public 50% (3) 3 6 4.66 0 4.66
Private 33.3% (2) 4 6 3 0 3
Foreign 100% (4) 0 4 3.33 0 3.33
Overall 56.3% (9) 7 16 3.66 0 3.66
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   302 
 
Table 16: Board size and representation of executive and non-executive directors  
 
Table 17: Frequency of board meetings 
 
 
Table 18: Number of directors at board meetings 
 
Table 19: Selection of independent directors 
 
 
 
Sector Average number of  directors Average number  of executive 
directors
Average number of NEDs 
Public 8.6 2.3 6.3
Private 6.4 3 3.4
Foreign 7 1.5 5.5
Overall 7.33 2.27 (31%) 5.06 (69%)
How many times per year does your board meet?
Board meetings per year Fewer than 4 4 – 8 More than 8 Total 
Public
0 83.3% 16.7% 6
Private
33.3% 16.7% 50% 6
Foreign
0 50% 50% 4
Overall
12.5% 50% 37.5% 16
Sector 50%-59% 60%-69% 70%-79% 80%-89% 90%-100% Total
Public
16.7% 16.7% 33.3% 0 33.3% 6
Private
0 16.7% 0 66.7% 16.7% 6
Foreign
0 75% 0 25% 0 4
Overall
6.25% 31.3% 12.5% 31.3% 18.78% 16
Sector BOD CEO Shareholders Mixture Total  
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
Public 0 0 0 5 83.3 1 16.6 6
Private 2 33.3 0 2 33.3 2 33.3 6
Foreign 1 16.7 0 3 50 0 0 4
Overall 3 18.75 0 0 10 62.5 3 18.75 16
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Table 20: Nomination of board members  
 
 
Table 21: Selection/appointment of CEO 
 
 
 
Table 22:  Summary of findings for the strategic role 
 
Sector BOD CEO Shareholders Mixture Total
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
Public 1 16.7 3 50 1 16.7 1 16.7 6
Private 1 16.7 3 50 2 33.3 0 6
Foreign 1 25 1 25 2 50 0 4
Overall 3 18.75 7 43.75 5 31.25 1 6.25 16
Sector BOD Nomination 
committee
Shareholders Mixture Total
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
Public 1 16.7 0 0.0 4 66.7 1 16.7 6
Private 4 66.7 0 0 2 33.3 0 0.0 6
Foreign 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 75.0 1 25.0 4
Overall 5 31.25 0 0 9 56.25 2 12.5 16
   
 
  Shalba 2016                                                   304 
 
Table 23: Summary of findings for the control and monitoring role 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The control and 
monitoring role
Empirical finding
1 Monitoring the execution 
of approved strategy 
Received the highest mean score (4.09). Ranked the board’s most important 
way of controlling and evaluating bank performance and reviewing this 
performance against the plan. 
The monitoring role is carried out through the mechanism of board meetings, 
during which managers present financial and non-financial reports detailing 
how the bank’s strategic objectives are being implemented, to be reviewed by 
the board. After briefly reviewing past performance, the board  mainly focuses 
on future prospects. 21 out of 24 interviewees agreed on the importance of this 
role.
2 Monitoring the top 
management and CEO
.
There was less support for this role. 55% (13/24) of interviewees agreed on 
the importance of this role (3 public, 5 private and 5 foreign).
A. The board’s role in this case is to assist rather than observe top 
management.
B. The board controls top management by selecting the CEO, stressing the 
importance of appointing independent members and evaluating management 
performance. 
3 Controlling the 
performance of the bank 
There was no clear consensus in terms of who possesses the power to control 
bank performance. 
A. 11 interviewees said this function is shared with the top management.
B. B. 8 said the CEO has full authority to control the work of the bank.
C. C. 5 said the board controls the work of the bank through board 
committees such as the auditing committee, the compliance committee 
and the Shari’ahh committee.
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Table 24: Summary of findings for the service role 
 
 
The service role Empirical finding
1 Establishing
contacts with the
external
environment
There was no general agreement among respondents regarding
the significance of the board’s service role. Both survey
respondents and interviewees showed less support for the
service role than for the other two roles.
A. 3 interviewees said the board is responsible for creating a 
good rapport with shareholders and for communicating 
with them regularly.
B. 8 interviewees said the board is responsible for 
establishing contacts with the external environment.
2 Providing
consultation and
advice
9 interviewees said the board’s role is to provide consultation
and advice (2 from private banks, 6 from public banks and
1from a foreign bank).
3 Enhancing
company reputation
The interviewees were divided on whether the board’s role is to
enhance company reputation There is less focus on this kind of
communication in public banks, where the state is the only
shareholder.
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Appendix B: Questionnaire 
 
Information sheet 
  
On behalf of myself and my supervisory team, Dr. Donald Harradine and Dr. Petra 
Molthan-Hill, I am writing to ask for your assistance in completing this questionnaire 
as a requisite for obtaining a PhD degree in Accountancy at Nottingham Trent 
University (NTU), UK. The attached questionnaire is part of a research project entitled: 
Investigating the roles and responsibilities of the board of directors in the Libyan 
banking sector. The main aims of the research are to examine the practices, roles and 
responsibilities of boards of directors in the Libyan banking sector and to identify the 
internal and external obstacles that directors see as affecting their ability to perform 
these roles and responsibilities effectively. 
The questionnaire, which is designed to investigate the strategic, institutional, control 
and monitoring roles and functions of boards, should take approximately 15-25 
minutes to complete. I would be grateful if you could answer all of the questions and 
write any further relevant comments on the last page of the questionnaire. No personal 
information is required.  
The research is being conducted in accordance with the ethical framework set out by 
Nottingham Trent University and will abide by any non-disclosure requirement from 
the companies involved. In the interests of confidentiality, all collected data will be 
anonymised and kept in a safe and secure place. 
I would be grateful if you could complete and return the questionnaire to me in person 
as soon as you can. Your cooperation in completing this survey is greatly appreciated. 
Thank you very much in advance for your assistance. 
Yours faithfully 
Abdalla Shalba 
PhD researcher at Nottingham Trent University  
 Email: Abdalla.Shalba@ntu.ac.uk   Tel/Libya: +218912130560 /UK +447429921037 
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Investigating the roles and responsibilities of the board of directors in the Libyan 
banking sector 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM8 
(To be completed after Participant Information Sheet has been read) 
 
 
The purpose and details of this study have been explained to me.  I understand that 
this study is designed to further scientific knowledge and that all procedures have 
been approved by Nottingham Trent University. 
 
I have read and understood the information sheet and this consent form. 
 
I have had an opportunity to ask questions about my participation. 
 
I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in the study. 
 
I understand that I have the right to withdraw from this study at any stage for any 
reason, and that I will not be required to explain my reasons for withdrawing. 
 
I understand that all the information I provide will be treated in strict confidence and 
will be kept anonymous and confidential to the researchers unless (under the statutory 
obligations of the agencies with which the researchers are working) it is judged that 
confidentiality will have to be breached for the safety of the participant or others.  
 
 
I agree to participate in this study. 
 
Your name 
 
Your signature 
 
Date           
 
Name of investigator         _______________________________________________ 
 
Signature of investigator 
 
Date 
                                                 
8  Completion of this informed consent form is not compulsory for participation in the 
questionnaire survey. 
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Questionnaire 
Section One: Personal and general information  
1. 1. Bank sector…………...................................................................……… ……… 
 
1.2. What is your position? Please tick one. 
 
1.3. Highest educational qualification obtained. Please tick one. 
If other please specify --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 1.4. Major of last degree 
 
1.4.1. Please state length of experience working in this field (including previous 
jobs). 
 
1.5.  Are you:                         Female                   or               Male         
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Section Two: General perceptions of corporate governance and the role of the 
B.O.D 
 
2.1. The concept of corporate governance 
 
The following is a list of possible definitions of corporate governance. In relation to 
the Libyan business environment, please indicate whether you agree/disagree with 
the following statements by circling the appropriate number on the 5-point scale: 
 
 
2.2. Does your board have a clear mission statement regarding its roles and 
responsibilities?                                                                               Yes         No         
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2.3. Researchers have identified the following archetypal board roles. Which role(s) 
(if any) does your board primarily adopt? Please indicate whether you agree/disagree 
with the following statements by circling the appropriate number:   
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2.4. Please indicate whether you agree/disagree that the following key factors 
influence or effectiveness the role and responsibilities of the board:   
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2.5. In the accounting literature, a large number of studies have found that corporate 
governance mechanisms enhance the effectiveness of the board of directors. Please 
indicate whether you agree/disagree that the following actions can enhance the 
effectiveness of the board in Libyan board rooms: 
 
 
Section Three: For CEOs only 
3.1. Is the CEO a board member?.................................................... .Yes   No 
3.2. How many board members does the bank have?      Female               Male                          
3.3. What is the number of executive directors?                                                                         
3.4. What is the number of i-non-executive directors?                                                                
3.5. Are the roles of chairman and CEO split in the bank?                     Yes    No                                     
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3.6. Is the chairman of your bank considered a i-non-executive?            Yes   No  
3.7. Does your bank have formal statements describing the roles, responsibilities and 
powers of:                                                                                                    Yes       No                                                                                                                                                            
A. The Chairman                                                                                        
B.  The Managing Director/CEO                                                                        
C. The executive  directors                                                                                             
D. The i-non-executive directors                                                                                                                                              
3.8.  How many times per year does your board meet? Please select one. 
   
If more than 8, please state how many………………………………...…………. 
 
3.9. On average, how many directors attend the board meetings? Please select one. 
 
3.10.  Please indicate whether your bank has any of the following sub-committees. If 
yes, please indicate the composition of the sub-committee: 
 
If other (e.g. crisis, strategy, Shari’ah, investment, etc.) please specify:…………… 
3.11. How are independent directors selected?              Please tick one. 
 
3.12. Who nominates board members?                                  Please tick one. 
 
3.13. Who selects/appoints the CEO?                                              Please tick one. 
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In conclusion, please write below any other comments that could assist in this 
research. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
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Appendix C: Semi-structured interview questions 
Semi-structured interview questions 
 
1. What do you understand by the term corporate governance? 
 
2. How do you monitor bank performance? 
 
3. Given your view of what an ideal board should be and do, in what ways 
should the board’s role be expanded or reduced? Would a detailed written 
charter of board responsibilities be useful? 
 
4. What does the board do (what is the job of the board)? 
 
5.  Which of the following do your board of director do effectively? 
 
 
 
6. Do you agree that Libyan board members understand and are committed to 
their roles and responsibilities? If yes, could you provide an example of a 
decision you were involved in where they showed commitment? 
 
7. What kind of information do you generally receive as a director and how 
could it be improved in terms of presentation, timeliness, level of detail, 
content or focus?  
 
8. How do executive and i-non-executive directors contribute to the board; 
how do the services they offer differ? 
 
9. How do you find being an executive board member and a manager at the 
same time? 
 
10. Does the size of your board reflect the complexity of the bank?  
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11. How important are audit committees, remuneration committees, nomination 
committees, executive committees and CG committees in Libyan banks? 
How are these sub-committees composed in your bank?  
12. How are these committees formed/established? Do they have clear written 
mandates? 
13. How could board meetings be improved in terms of frequency, duration, 
content and interest level? 
14.  Who sets the meeting agenda? How? 
15. What do you see as the role of the board committees in preventing 
wrongdoing and errors? 
16. Is there a clear division of responsibility between what the board can do, and 
what managers and employees can do? How is this responsibility divided? 
17.  How does the board, especially the chair, interact with management and the 
CEO? Are the roles of chairman and chief executive split in your bank? 
18. How are the members of the board of directors nominated and selected? Who 
is responsible for selection? 
19.  To what extent do corporate strategies influence the selection process? What 
factors determine the selection of the board chairman? 
20. How do you think the ownership structure affects the board? What role 
does it play in preventing wrongdoing and errors? 
21. How do board members perceive their relationship with the shareholders? 
        A. What role do major shareholders play in setting up the bank's strategy? 
        B. What role do foreign partners play in setting up the bank's strategy? 
22.  How do you think Libya’s cultural, religious and legal systems affect 
board performance and corporate governance? 
23. What role does the Shari'ah supervisory committee  play in setting and 
enforcing  roles? 
24. How do you think introducing Islamic banking into the banking system will 
affect the performance of boards?  
25.  Do most directors in your bank see the need for transparency and 
disclosure? And, Do you feel there is sufficient transparency and disclosure 
in BOD? 
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26. What are the internal and external factors or deficiencies that stop you 
carrying out your roles and responsibilities effectively? Are there any 
subjects that you cannot discuss in meetings? 
27. What do you think a board of directors needs to be effective? 
28.  What other factors do you think affect directors’ roles and responsibilities?  
29. How do you think board diversity such as the F/M balance and background 
experience affect the board’s performance of its roles?  
 
30. Do you have a clear list of the roles and responsibilities of the management, 
committees and the board as a whole?  May I have a copy of it, please?  
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Investigating the roles and responsibilities of the board of directors in the Libyan 
banking sector 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM9 
(To be completed after Participant Information Sheet has been read) 
 
 
The purpose and details of this study have been explained to me.  I understand that 
this study is designed to further scientific knowledge and that all procedures have 
been approved by Nottingham Trent University. 
 
I have read and understood the information sheet and this consent form. 
 
I have had an opportunity to ask questions about my participation. 
 
I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in the study. 
 
I understand that I have the right to withdraw from this study at any stage for any 
reason, and that I will not be required to explain my reasons for withdrawing. 
 
I understand that all the information I provide will be treated in strict confidence and 
will be kept anonymous and confidential to the researchers unless (under the statutory 
obligations of the agencies with which the researchers are working) it is judged that 
confidentiality will have to be breached for the safety of the participant or others.  
 
I agree to participate in this study. 
 
Your name 
 
Your signature 
   
Name of investigator         
Signature of investigator 
Date                                 
_____________________________________________      
                                                 
9  Completion of this informed consent form is not compulsory for participation in the  the 
questionnaire survey.. 
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Information sheet 
Title of the Research:  
Investigating the roles and responsibilities of the board of directors in the 
Libyan banking sector. 
Researcher: 
Abdalla Shalba (PhD student) 
Business School  
Nottingham Trent University (NTU) UK 
Supervisors:  
 Dr Donald Harradine 
Dr Petra Molthan-Hill 
Introduction 
The consequences of the financial crisis in the West have spread to other parts of the 
world. In developed countries, the focus has been on enhancing corporate governance 
practice and on forcing firms to give directors a greater role and to improve board 
effectiveness. Much less has been done in developing countries like Libya, however, 
not least because the relative lack of research on CG and board performance in these 
countries means our understanding of these issues in this context is limited. The main 
aims of this research are therefore to examine the practices, roles and responsibilities 
of boards of directors in the Libyan banking sector and to identify what directors see 
as the internal and external obstacles that prevent them from performing these roles 
and responsibilities effectively. The study is particularly relevant, given the 
increasingly important role Libya’s financial sector is playing in the country’s 
economic growth. 
Confidentiality and Anonymity 
This research will be carried out within the ethical framework set out by Nottingham 
Trent University. It will also abide by any non-disclosure agreement deemed necessary 
by any of the banks involved. Strict attention will be paid to the confidentiality of the 
collected data, which will be anonymised and kept in a safe and secure place. 
Participation in the project is voluntary and unpaid. The interview, which will be 
conducted at a place and time that is convenient to you, will be designed to be 
approximately 45 minutes in length, though you will be free to expand on the topic or 
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talk about related ideas if you wish. Your answers may be reported by position, but the 
data gathered in the study will be anonymous and no individual names will be included 
in the analysis. If there are any questions you would rather not answer, the interview 
will be stopped or moved on to the next question. Withdrawing from the project will 
not result in any negative consequences for you or your bank. You will have the right 
to review, comment on and/or delete information prior to the project submission. All 
interview notes will be kept in a secure environment and if required, all raw data such 
as transcripts, notes and electronic files will be destroyed within three months of the 
completion of the project.   
Please keep a copy of this consent form. If you have any questions concerning your 
participation in this project, please contact the student researcher, Abdalla Shalba. 
Yours faithfully 
Abdalla Shalba 
Mob. Libya: +218912130560 
Mob. The UK: +447577667079 
E-mail: Abdalla.Shalba@ntu.ac.uk   
 
Thank you very much in advance for your assistance and cooperation. 
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 استبيان  
 القسم الأول: معلومات عامة
من فضلك حدد القطاع الذي ينتمي إليه المصرف التي تعمل به من بين القطاعات التالية؟  الرجاء وضع  .1.1
 بالمكان المناسب.  )√علامة (
 
 المناسب بالمكان(√) ما هو موقعك الوظيفي؟  الرجاء وضع علامة  .2.1
 
 المناسب بالمكان(√) وضع علامة  أعلى شهادات تعليمية تحصلت عليها. الرجاء .3.1
 
 ……………………………………………………إذا كان اختيارك على شهادة أخرى فيرجى تحديدها 
 من فظلك حدد مجال تخصصك العلمي : .4.1
 
 )السابقة الوظائف ذلك في بما( تخصصال هذا في العمل في الخبرة مدة بين فضلك من 1.4.1
 
 □ذكر                        □ أنثى ..…………………يرجى تحديد الجنس  .5.1
 
 القسم الثاني: تصورات عامة لحوكمة الشركات ودور مجالس الإدارة:
التالي هو عبارة عن مجموعة من المفاهيم العامة لحوكمة الشركات. الرجاء  :. المفهوم العام لحوكمة الشركات 1.2
 لليبية:تحديد إلى أي مدى تتوافق أو لا تتوافق معها فيما يتعلق ببيئة الأعمال ا
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                                      □لا     □نعم        والمسؤوليات؟ بالمهام ا فيما يتعلقواضح ة مصرفكم بيانامجلس إدار يصدرهل  .2.2
 
المبدئية لمجلس الإدارة التي تم  التالي هو عبارة عن مجموعة من الأدوار ،مؤخرا أجري لبحث وفقا .3.2
  إلى الإشارة ن وجدت) يتبنى مجلس إدارة مصرفكم بشكل أساسي؟ يرجىتحديدها. أي هذه الأدوار (إ
 المناسب: الرقم حول دائرة وذلك بوضع التالية العبارات مع عدم الاتفاق/  الاتفاق درجة
 
الرجاء حدد درجة موافقتك أو عدم موافقتك مع المؤثرات التالية التي يمكن أن تؤثر و تعيق أدوار ومسؤوليات    4.2 
 اء مجلس الإدارة؟ أعض
 
وفاعلية مجالس بهدف تعزيز كفاءة  تصور عام للآليات الداخلية لحوكمة الشركات 5.2
 .الإدارة بالمصارف الليبية
في الأدب المحاسبي ُوجد في الكثير من الدراسات أن آليات حوكمة الشركات تسهم في تحسين فعالية مجالس الإدارة. حدد 
 كون الإجراءات الآتية يمكنها أن تحسن من فعالية مجالس الإدارة في المصارف الليبية.إلى أي مدى تتفق أو لا تتفق مع 
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 :فقط التنفيذي هذا الجزء يتعلق بالمدير الثالث: الجزء
  □لا                   □نعم                               الإدارة؟ عضو في مجلس التنفيذي هل الرئيس .1.3
 ذكر    أنثى.……………..……ارة في المصرف؟ كم عدد أعضاء مجلس الإد .2.3
 .………………………….………………… ……… كم هو عدد المدراء التنفيذيين؟  .3.3
 ...................................هو عدد المدراء غير التنفيذيين (المستقلين)؟ .....................كم   .4.3
 □لا     □ي المصرف؟                   نعم هل دور رئيس مجلس الإدارة منفصل عن دور المدير التنفيذي ف  .5.3
 □لا     □نعم                                          هل رئيس مجلس إدارة المصرف غير تنفيذي (مستقل)؟       . 6.3
 واضح ورسمي يبين فيه أدوار ومسؤوليات وسلطات كل من: بيانهل يصدر المصرف     . 7.3
  □لا     □نعم                                                                           رئيس مجلس الإدارة       )أ(
 □لا     □المدير العام / المدير التنفيذي                                                                       نعم  )ب(
 □لا     □نعم                                                   المدراء التنفيذيين                                   )ت(
 □لا     □نعم                                               المدراء غير التنفيذيين (المستقلين)                    )ث(
 : المناسب بالمكان√) (. كم عدد اجتماعات مجلس إدارة المصرف خلال السنة؟ الرجاء وضع علامة 8.3
   .…………………………………………………إذا كان عدد المرات أكثر من ثمانية، ُيرجى تحديد العدد
 :بالمكان المناسب(√) الرجاء وضع علامة . كم هو متوسط عدد المدراء الذين يحضرون اجتماعات المجلس؟ 9.3
 
 
 :من فضلك حدد تكوين اللجان بنعم،  . هل لدى مجلس الادارة أي من اللجان الفرعية الآتية؟  إن كان الجواب01.3
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إذا كان اختيارك على أخرى (مثلا: اللجنة الاستثمارية، اللجنة الشرعية (شريعة)، لجان الأزمات (المخاطر) أو 
 ....حدد: .................................................................................... الاستراتيجيات... الخ) من فضلك
 المدراء غير التنفيذيين (المستقلين)؟ من فضلك اختر واحدة فقط: اختيار تم . كيف11.3
 
 من فضلك اختر واحدة فقط:   الإدارة؟ مجلس أعضاء ترشيح كان . كيف21.3
 
 التنفيذي؟ الرئيس تعيين/اختيار كان .  كيف31.3
 
هذه الاستبانة مكررا التأكيد لكم أن المعلومات التي أدليتم بها في الختام، أود أن أشكركم جزيل الشكر علي تكرمكم بتعبئة 
 سوف تتم المحافظة على سريتها التامة.
 من فضلكم، إذا كان لديكم أية ملاحظات أو تعقيبات قد تساعد في إنجاز هذا البحث فيمكنكم تدوينها أدناه:
 ......................................................................................................................................
 ....................................................................................................................................
 .....................................................................................................................................
 .....................................................................................................................................
 ....................................................................................................................................
 .....................................................................................................................................
 ....................................................................................................................................
 .....................................................................................................................................
 .....................................................................................................................................
 ....................................................................................................................................
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 اسئلة المقابلة 
 ماذا تفهم من معنى مصطلح " حوكمة الشركات  .1
 .كيف تراقب أداء المصرف؟ .2
أعطي وجهة نظرك في كيفية عمل وتكوين مجلس الإدارة، وبأي طرق يمكن توسيع أو تقليص أدوار  .3
 المجالس؟ هل ينفع كتابة مخطط مفصل حول مسؤوليات المجالس؟
 س)؟ ماذا يفعل مجلس الإدارة ( وظيفة المجل .4
 :( كيف) في أي مجال قيد المناقشة يتعامل معه مجلس الإدارة بشكل فعال؟ ناقش التالي .5
 
هل توافق على أن أعضاء مجالس الإدارة في ليبيا يفهمون ويلتزمون بأدوارهم ومسؤولياتهم؟ إذا كان  .6
 .الجواب نعم فهل يمكنك تقديم مثال لشرح قرار شاركت فيه ويظهر فيه التزامهم؟
من المعلومات تستلم عادة كونك عضو في مجلس الإدارة وكيف يمكن لمعلومات معدة للمجلس  أي نوع .7
 أن يتم تحسينها من حيث طريقة العرض والتوقيت أو مستوى التفصيل أو المحتوى؟ 
 ن) وكيف يختلف بعضهم عن بعض داخلالمستقليما هي خدمات الأعضاء التنفيذيين والغير تنفيذيين ( .8
 .المجلس؟
 كيف تجد كونك عضو بمجلس الإدارة وكونك مديرا تنفيذي في نفس الوقت؟  .9
هل يعكس حجم مجلس إلا دارة ادوار و مسئوليات المجلس والي أي مدي يؤثر علي واقع عمل المصرف  .01
 .من ناحية الإفصاح والشفافية؟
نفيذية جنة التعيين، اللجنة التما أهمية اللجان التالية في المصارف الليبية, لجنة المراجعة، لجنة المكافآت، ل .11
 ..و لجنة المخاطر. من فضلك حدد هيكلية و تركيبة هذه اللجان الفرعية؟
 كيف يتم تشكيل وتأسيس هذه اللجان؟ هل لديهم توصيات وأوامر مكتوبة و واضحة؟ .21
كيف يمكن تحسين اجتماعات مجلس الإدارة من حيث العدد والتكرار الاجتماعات والمواضيع   .31
 امات؟ والاهتم
 من يضع جدول أعمال مجلس الإدارة؟ وكيف؟ .41
 ؟ في منع التجاوزات والأخطاءكيف يمكنك تقييم أداء المجلس و لجان مجلس الإدارة  .51
 هل تتوفر الشفافية و الواضحة للمسؤوليات بين عمل المجلس وبين عمل المدراء التنفيذيين؟ كيف ؟    .61
فيذي منفصلين في مصرفك؟ كيف يتعامل رئيس هل دور كل من رئيس مجلس الإدارة والمدير التن .71
 المجلس مع المدير التنفيذي؟ 
 كيف يتم تعيين واختيار أعضاء مجلس الإدارة؟ من المسئول عن الاختيار؟  .81
إلى أي مدى قد تؤثر استراتيجيات المصرف في عملية الاختيار؟ على أي عوامل تبنى عملية اختيار  .91
 رئيس المجلس؟ 
تركيبات الملكية المختلفة بمجلس الإدارة وفي تفادي سوء التصرف كيف يمكنك تقييم دور  .02
 ..................والأخطاء؟
 كيف يري أعضاء مجلس الإدارة علاقتهم بالمساهمين؟ .12
 ما هو دور المساهمين الرئيسيين في وضع  إستراتيجية المصرف؟ .أ
 .ما هو دور الأطراف الأجنبية في إعداد إستراتيجية المصرف؟ .ب
 
عتقادك ورأيك حول تأثير الثقافة والشريعة الإسلامية و النظام القانوني و السياسي (الليبية) في ما هو ا .22
 أداء مجلس الإدارة وتطبيق و تطوير نظام حوكمة الشركات في ليبيا؟
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 ما هو دور الشريعة الإسلامية في إعداد وتسيير إستراتيجية المصرف؟  .32
ارف الإسلامية في النظام المصرفي الليبي على أداء  مجالس ما هو اعتقادك حول تأثير تطبيق نظام المص .42
 الإدارة؟
 كيف يقوم أعضاء مجلس الإدارة بتفهم و تصور الشفافية والمصداقية؟  .52
ما هي العوائق الداخلية والخارجية ونقاط الضعف والقصور التي تجدها عند قيامك بدورك ومسؤولياتك  .62
 مةكحو تطبيق وتطوير تفعيل من يمكننا يفك ظركن وجهة حسب بشكل فّعال في مجلس الإدارة؟
 ؟  ذلك عن المسئول ومن ,لبيبا في اتكالشر
 ماذا تعتقد كونه مهم و ضروريا لكي نحصل على مجلس إدارة فّعال؟  .72
 ما هي العوامل الداخلية والخارجية التي تعتقد بأنها تؤثر في أدوار ومسؤوليات أعضاء مجلس الإدارة؟   .82
 الأدوار؟ الإدارة مجلس أداء على تؤثر تجربة,  والخبرة أنثى /ذكر مثل مجلس التنوع ترى كيف.  .92
هل لديك بيان واضحة بالأدوار والمسؤوليات المنوط إلي كلا من  مجلس الإدارة وللجان المجلس ؟ هل  .03
  من  فضلك؟ منها إذا سمحتيمكنني الحصول على نسخة 
 
 
